By MICHAEL O'HANLON and TONY GAMBINO | 12/11/12 9:38 PM EST
The troubled country of the Democratic Republic of the Congo again has come
into the headlines as a new rebellion in eastern Congo shakes the center of
Africa. The present situation has already displaced hundreds of thousands,
with unknown numbers dead and, as before, it could easily widen,
threatening the safety of millions and stability across the middle of
Africa.
Earlier this month, M23 rebels fighting the Congolese army withdrew from the
eastern regional capital city of Goma, which they had seized 10 days
earlier. Their withdrawal occurred after intense international activity,
negotiations between M23 officials and Congo President Joseph Kabila in
Kampala, Uganda, and an agreement signed there on Nov. 24 by the leaders of
a regional African organization, the International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the chairwoman of the
African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, endorsed this agreement. However, the
Kampala Accords and ICGLR role are grossly insufficient to respond to the
underlying, interlinked crises in Congo and the wider region.
Congo is plagued by three interlocking crises. First, a local crisis in
eastern Congo involving multiple groups has turned violent many times since
1991. Second, a national crisis of poor governance and state failure has
stymied Congo for decades. Failed national elections in 2011 added an even
deeper crisis of political legitimacy. Finally, an international crisis has
existed between Congo and Rwanda since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. It
remains unresolved, with Rwandas clear military support to the M23 rebels
its most recent manifestation. All three intertwined crises must be tackled
and resolved.
Ground zero of Congos three crises is found in its incompetent, brutal,
corrupt army. Neither Congos leaders nor the international community have
been willing to effectively confront this issue. The inability of the
Congolese state to secure its own territory is embodied by rapacious,
abusive commanders in senior positions, many of whom cycle in and out
between the Congolese army and various militias, sometimes allied with the
army, sometimes fighting it. For example, all the senior commanders now
leading the M23 rebellion, including Bosco Ntaganda, an indicted
international war criminal, were officers in good standing in the Congolese
army just a few months ago.
Many senior international diplomats, including Clinton, have been willing to
visit Congo and speak out strongly about the suffering of Congos civilians,
particularly girls and women. However, in early 2009, after an outbreak of a
remarkably similar round of fighting, Clinton and other leaders acquiesced
in Congos decision to name Ntaganda as the key commander in the relevant
theater of conflict in eastern Congo. The infamous formula articulated
publicly by Congolese leaders at the time was that it was necessary to
choose stability over justice. The flawed, weak March 23 agreement, from
which the M23 rebels take their name, dates from this sad time. Diplomats,
anxious for an easy fix to the deep problems of Congo, ignored the obvious
and accepted Ntaganda, consigning hundreds of thousands of Congolese
civilians to continued brutalization, suffering and, in too many cases,
injury and death. The world grows too easily weary of Congo. Diplomats flail
during Congos crises for quick fixes. Since Congo remains a poorly
governed, failed state, the international community must engage much more
deeply with Congo and its neighbors to support essential institutions and
defeat political and military spoilers. To do this, the United States should
lead the international community in a new strategy to move Congo away from
consistent crises and toward democratic stability.
The addition of high-profile international envoys may prove useful, but it
is insufficient to solve Congos three crises. Success in Congo requires
day-to-day, on-the-ground, longer-term engagement by international actors.
During the 2003-06 period of transition, the international community was
organized in a formal International Committee to Support the Transition
(known by its French acronym, CIAT). CIAT, chaired by the head of the U.N.
Mission in the Congo, included ambassadors from the United States, Africa,
Europe and China. It met regularly and, most importantly, used its influence
frequently and effectively to maintain the integrity of the fragile
transition. The world tired of Congo after the 2006 elections. Multiple
crises since have not yet led to any fundamental change in this
self-defeating posture.
A new CIAT is now needed. The U.S. should work immediately for it to be
reconstituted and formally blessed by both the U.N. Security Council and the
African Union. As before, it should include representatives from the U.N.
Permanent Five and key African and European states. CIAT II should be given
a mandate to:
Work with Congolese civilian leaders at both the national and local levels
to establish a constitutional process for legal and political reform in
eastern Congo. Central to this must be the early organization of provincial
elections, for eastern Congo and the rest of Congo. Without heavy pressure
and involvement of CIAT II, the European Union and others, reform in eastern
Congo and provincial elections alike will fail.
Work with Congolese civilian and military leaders to establish a credible
process for reform of Congos military. This must include, among initial
actions, the exclusion and arrest of indicted war criminals like Bosco
Ntaganda and the removal of other well-known top Congolese military leaders
already deeply implicated in abuses and/or proven incompetent. This will not
be easy, but successful reform has occurred in difficult places elsewhere
when international actors provided the necessary incentives and support to
key domestic reformers while disempowering the many spoilers. Once the new
CIAT is established and initial discussions started on political and
military reform, the U.S. should lay out conditions under which its military
not contractors in support, but the U.S. armed forces themselves would
consider joining the U.N. mission. U.S. expertise gained in training and
mentoring the Iraqi and Afghan security forces would be welcome in Congo.
While a major step for America, no huge U.S. troop totals are required. As
Afghanistan winds down, sending several thousand troops (primarily a
training brigade and support) could make a dramatic difference, giving
Congolese reformers a major boost of confidence and increasing American
leverage on key issues with the Kinshasa government.
The U.S. should also push for a stronger U.N. force. Although that force is
today the U.N.s largest, it is a miserly 18,000 strong for a country twice
the population of either Iraq or Afghanistan. (Under radically different
circumstances, more than 100,000 international troops were needed for a
stretch in each of those countries. No such huge expansion is necessary
here.) The purpose of this modest expansion a few thousand additional
troops and various enhanced capabilities is for the U.N. to better help
stabilize Congo while Congolese forces are trained and mentored ultimately
to do this on their own.
Finally, the U.S. and others must bring heavy diplomatic pressure, including
sanctions if necessary, on Rwanda to cease its destructive interventions.
Although Rwanda has legitimate security interests along its borders with
Congo, it is not defending those interests using legitimate means. However,
unless Congos army is reformed so that it can protect its own citizens and
secure its territory, no combination of threats and aid cutoffs will
dissuade Rwanda from taking actions across its own border areas for economic
and security reasons.
By the standards of what the U.S. has done to date in Congo, this agenda
will appear radical. By the standards of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and
Iraq, it is minimal. By the standard of what works, it is painfully apparent
that the episodic, on-off engagement by the U.S. and others has failed. What
we propose done with energy, skill and perseverance could help Congo
finally turn the same corner toward democracy and stability that other
countries in Africa have succesfully navigated in recent years. The cost to
us would be small. The benefits for the people of Congo and the entire
region would be incalculable.
The authors were Peace Corps volunteers in Congo in the 1970s and 80s; Tony
Gambino was USAID mission director there from 2001-04. He now teaches at the
Georgetown School of Foreign Service; Michael OHanlon is senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution.
Thé Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni and Dr. Kiiza Besigye Uganda is in anarchy"
Kuungana Mulindwa Mawasiliano Kikundi
"Pamoja na Yoweri Museveni na Dk. Kiiza Besigye Uganda ni katika machafuko"
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