The Struggle in Yemen and the Houthis and the Power Shift
[image: Houthi rebels operate in the northern region of Yemen. [3]]
[image: <b>Houthis</b> hold their weapons as they gather in Haz, west of
the Yemeni ...]
[image: The Houthis have made a giant leap on the military level since
Saleh ...]The Houthis
*The Growth and Expansion of the Houthis*
*What happens in Yemen in the nearing period and long term period really
does and of importance - both locally and regionally**.*
By
*Malik Sekou Osei*
Looking at Yemen can give a view of a complex Gordian knot of a
geostrategic contradiction. As the present predicament in a place call
Yemen has been all but ignored in the Western media and Yemen is noted for
more than a series of ghetto candy stores of loose cigarettes and cheap ice
cream of over loaded sugary artificial cupcakes and pies.
At this time Yemen is ablaze within its internal contradictions of a
struggle of hegemony and actual development. Nonetheless, with the bigger
conflagrations getting more out of control in other parts of the world, the
struggle of Yemen it seems to have been reduced in importance to the back
page of mainstream media or the vulgar background discussions of the
dysfunctional characters of Reality TV, for most of the last few months one
of the most important political centers of the so-called Middle East, in
terms of imperial geo-strategic interests. But what happens in Yemen in the
short term and long term really has an effect that could lead to broader
chaos and further instability, both locally and regionally. Yemen is the
poorest country in the Middle East, Yemen has been beleaguered for decades
by corrupt and feeble and frail governments, tribal internal strife,
resource depletion, a depreciating security situation and sheer poverty.
Yemeni the unnecessary poverty [image: Yemen poverty] [image:
Yemen poverty]
One of the things that has to be addressed in understanding the
crisis that is brewing in Yemen is the growth of the Houthis and their
political influence in Yemen. To see the larger political consequences of
the grown of the Houthis in Yemen and the potential of the political
character in Yemen, thus for the larger Middle East. For it would be
impossible to understand Yemen without understanding the growth of the
Houthis.
In September two months ago, Houthi insurgents charging a wave of
public restlessness, ran and overflowed into the capital city of Sanaa from
the north, and succeeded in bringing the government to its knees in a
matter of just under a week. In the eyes of many Yemenis, the Houthis are,
at least for now, the leading political force and best hope for change in a
country that truly needs it from top to bottom. They are also a substantial
military force, having taken control of much of Yemen's security apparatus
in the north and central parts of the country. What makes both these points
remarkable is that the Houthis are members of the Zaidi branch of Shia
Islam, a small minority in an otherwise Sunni majority country.
A group called the Zaidis reigned over much of northern Yemen under a
system of religious and secular rule known as an imamate for over a
thousand years until revolution swept through the country back in 1962.
Yemen's nationalist movement eventually led to the establishment of two
separate countries: the Yemen Arab Republic or North Yemen and the People’s
Democratic Republic of Yemen or South Yemen. In 1990, North and South Yemen
united to become the present day Republic of Yemen.
*The Marginalized*
However, the Zaidis were to never recover the power and authority they
once had previous to 1962, and have been both politically and economically
marginalized by each successive government ever since—at least up until
currently. And this is a very important point to remember in any
examination about the Houthis.
[image: Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi] Hussein Badral al
al-Houthi
Back in 2004, Hussein Badr al Din al-Houthi, a mutineer cleric
from northern Yemen and head of the Zaidi clique there, started a revolt
and insurrection against the government in Sanaa, insisting a greater
autonomy in the north, as well as to protect Zaidi religious and cultural
traditions thought to be an impingement by Sunnis. Houthi was killed by
government troops just a few months later, but his followers adopted his
name and carried on the struggle.
Following a series of on again off again periods of bloody fighting,
the Houthis agreed to a ceasefire with the government in 2010. However, not
much changed for the Houthis in terms of perceived grievances perpetuated
by the government, which brings us to the more recent events that resulted
in the Houthis' rapid and astonishing rise to power.
Ali
Abdullah Saleh [image: Ali Abdullah Saleh, presidente do Iêmen, está a
quase 33 anos no ...]
President Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled Yemen with an iron fist for more
than 30 years, and although a Zaidi himself, was no ally of the Houthis. In
fact, he was their nemesis during and after the six years of rebellion. As
the Arab Spring swept through much of the Middle East in 2011, the Houthis
took advantage of growing discontent and disappointment throughout Yemen
with the Saleh government, and began to establish their control in the
north.
As part of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative signed later
that year, Saleh agreed to step down and pass the reins of power to his
deputy, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. But once again, promises of government
reform went nowhere and the lives of everyday Yemenis, to include the
Houthis, were no better.
The Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative
[image: Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi 2013.jpg] Abd Rabbo Mansour
Hadi
For the Houthis, the last straw in their fight with the government
was the lifting of fuel subsidies in July 2014, which lead to wide scale
demonstrations by both Sunni and Shia in Sanaa. By that time, the Houthis
had become much more politically wise and militarily skillful. At this
point, the Houthis they knew what they wanted and how they were going to
accomplish it. After taking control of Sanaa in September, the Houthis
forced Yemen’s Prime Minister, Mohammed Basindwa, to resign, and then
outright rejected Hadi’s first nomination to replace him. From that point
on, the Houthis have more or less been calling the shots in Sanaa, although
it’s important to note that what happens there doesn’t necessarily carry
weight in much of the rest of the country.
[image: Ali al-Sarari, an
adviser to Prime Minister Mohammed Salem Basindwa ...] Mohammed Basindwa
*Governmental Concessions*
So now the question becomes; what do the Houthis want? The short
answer is political concessions that give them important impact in the
central government and greater regional autonomy throughout the country,
mainly for them in the north. And so far, they’ve been very successful in
that regard. Since taking control of security functions in and around
Sana’a two months ago, the Houthis have proven to be a formidable military
force, and have not shied away from flexing their muscle.
[image: Fighting resumes between Houthis, pro-Salafi
militants] The Houthis
“*So what do the Houthis want? The short answer is political concessions
that give them significant influence in the central government and greater
regional autonomy throughout the country, particularly for them in the
north.”*
Frustrated and unsatisfied with Hadi's slow pace toward real change
reform, the Houthis gave Hadi a 10-day challenge and task at the end of
October to form a new government, which he then proclaimed on November 9.
The new technocratic reconciliation government incorporates representatives
from the time-honored power bases as well as the Houthis, southern
secessionists and most every other political party in the country. For now,
the Houthis have established themselves as a valid and authentic political
party with long-term goals, and an essential part of the security operation.
So what stands in the way of the Houthis' plans for greater influence
in Yemeni politics? Plenty. In the south, the al-Hirak secessionist
movement looks at the Houthis as a direct threat to their long sought after
aim of independence, especially if the Houthis begin to move in that
direction.
What has to be considered is the Islah Party, which is Yemen's branch
of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Houthis' biggest political enemy. They
both have a history of doing whatever it takes each to destabilize and
weaken the one another. And then there is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), based primarily in central Yemen, where the Houthis have already
begun to extend their influence. Daily clashes between the Houthis and AQAP
are taking a deadly toll on both sides, with no sign of letting up.
AQAP will forge whatever relations they can with the Sunni tribes in
central Yemen to exploit in their favor the Sunni-Shia struggles seen
throughout much of the Middle East. And speaking of Sunni-Shia struggles,
don't discount Saudi Arabia either, which looks at the Houthis as nothing
more than an Iranian tool to undermine them.
The Houthis' rise to power and influence was as sudden as it was
unexpected, and for now at least, they have brought about political change
that may not have occurred otherwise for many years. Change that for the
first time in Yemen's history is set to be truly representative of all the
disparate political factions. Only time will tell whether the new
government can effectively control a country as complex and diverse as
Yemen. But the Houthis' best chance at helping it to succeed is to maintain
their role as a legitimate long-term political party with limited goals and
a short-term guarantor of security.
What they don't want to do is become another divisive political or
military element with a grand scheme for power and influence, something
Yemen has proven to have no shortage of in the past and it seems it has a
vast fuel for this type endeavor in its future.
For the people of Yemen, they have a crisis of lacking real and
radical leadership with everyday people could united around a real program
of development that is truly and vastly anti-imperialist that hark back to
ethnic religious superstitions that needs imperialist proxies to
rationalize their political subterfuge of social distraction of religious
utopias.
For the real contradiction in the crisis of Yemen is not ethnic
strife, but its imperialism and its proxies.
For the people of Yemen, History is on their side, but not time
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