In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within gbr. Inferred improvements during Jun 2018: ASN Name Fixed-By 44684 MYTHIC 2018-06-03 205899 NeginRayanehAlmasKhorasan 2018-06-21 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2018: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 60339 H3GUK 2016-09-01 2018-06-13 42004 ULGRP 2016-11-07 2018-06-29 5089 NTL 2016-11-16 2018-06-14 9009 M247 2017-01-10 2018-06-21 41495 FAELIX 2017-06-17 2018-06-22 21320 GEANT_IAS_VRF 2018-03-15 2018-06-29 30740 EXA-NETWORKS 2018-04-25 2018-06-08 33920 AQL 2018-06-01 2018-06-01 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=gbr&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org
