commit 44996dccd89ce86c7c38e37e0635d30c66279772
Author: Serge Hallyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date:   Fri Feb 29 15:14:57 2008 +0000

    file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()
    
    upstream commit: aedb60a67c10a0861af179725d060765262ba0fb
    
    The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
    
        check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
        However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
        unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
        resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
    
    However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
    granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
    and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
    where it might still be called but return -EPERM.  Those cases
    are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
    as per the check in check_kill_permission().
    
    One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
    
    This patch removes cap_task_kill().
    
    Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
    Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
    Earlier-version-tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
    Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
    [EMAIL PROTECTED]: backport to 2.6.24.4]
    Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ac05083..d842ee3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t 
old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, 
u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct 
sched_param *lp);
 extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -2112,7 +2111,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct 
*p,
                                      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
                                      u32 secid)
 {
-       return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+       return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
        .inode_need_killpriv =          cap_inode_need_killpriv,
        .inode_killpriv =               cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-       .task_kill =                    cap_task_kill,
        .task_setscheduler =            cap_task_setscheduler,
        .task_setioprio =               cap_task_setioprio,
        .task_setnice =                 cap_task_setnice,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e87422e..6e9065c 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -527,40 +527,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
        return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-                               int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-       if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || 
SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-               return 0;
-
-       /*
-        * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-        * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-        * allowed.
-        * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-        */
-       if (p->uid == current->uid)
-               return 0;
-
-       /* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-       if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-               return 0;
-
-       if (secid)
-               /*
-                * Signal sent as a particular user.
-                * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-                * only thing we can do at the moment.
-                * Used only by usb drivers?
-                */
-               return 0;
-       if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-               return 0;
-       if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-               return 0;
-
-       return -EPERM;
-}
 #else
 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
                           struct sched_param *lp)
@@ -575,11 +541,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
        return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-                               int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-       return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
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