Thanks for your proposal ...in ldap no prefix means clear text pw  -maybe we
should stick to this. we are working on it already (concept/planning) and
will hopefully introduce it in (few?) days.  

Martin 

> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: Jonathon -- Improov [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Gesendet: Dienstag, 29. April 2008 14:23
> An: user@ofbiz.apache.org
> Betreff: Re: AW: WG: SHA / SHA1 seed data and password encryption
> 
> That would immediately solve Martin's problem, and allow him to port in
> passwords from other
> softwares (that use standard hashing, period). Also, it wouldn't
> disrupt existing OFBiz passwords.
> 
> I'm guessing (not sure) it might be dangerous to hash it multiple ways
> until we get a match,
> though. Best to hash it a single way only, which way it is will depend
> on the prefix. That is, the
> hash itself declares the hashing algo it needs, and only that algo will
> be hashed for that hash.
> 
> No prefix (no declaration of hashing algo) will mean the default OFBiz
> style.
> 
> What do you think?
> 
> Jonathon
> 
> David E Jones wrote:
> >
> > I played with this a little bit while working on some other stuff...
> >
> > The best solution seems to use something "standard" like the Apache
> > Commons Codex Hex class, which is an easier/better way to do the hex
> > encoding there.
> >
> > The problem is if we change wholesale anyone who updates OFBiz will
> > suddenly have a bunch of useless password data... so I've modified
> the
> > HashCrypt class to support doing it both ways, and changes the
> userLogin
> > service to try hashing it both ways to see if either matches.
> >
> > It seems to be working fine so if there are no complaints it'll be in
> > soon... well as soon as the SVN server is up for commits again!
> >
> > -David
> >
> >
> > On Apr 28, 2008, at 11:18 PM, David E Jones wrote:
> >>
> >> Martin,
> >>
> >> I agree that is odd, and not a good thing, and I'm really not sure
> why
> >> it is there or how it got there in the first place.
> >>
> >> It sounds like the proposal is to remove HashCrypt.java lines 52-53,
> >> 82-84.
> >>
> >> Does that sound correct, and does it give more consistent results to
> >> what you are seeing elsewhere?
> >>
> >> If so, let's get rid of 'em!
> >>
> >> -David
> >>
> >>
> >> On Apr 28, 2008, at 10:51 PM, Martin Wepper wrote:
> >>> Jonathon,
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for your comments.
> >>> it I understand it right we can not introduce other hashes to ofbiz
> >>> without
> >>> introducing the algorithm used to encrypt these.
> >>> Hashes are one way - so mangling them after being once created is
> >>> -hopefully
> >>> for sec reasons- impossible. Here we need the clear text pass
> again.
> >>>
> >>> So other systems we introduce these ofbiz haches to may not use
> these
> >>> without the ofbiz encryption - that’s bad - as it should comply to
> the
> >>> standard or clearly state that’s its different/wrong as it seems
> not
> >>> to be
> >>> sha1.
> >>>
> >>> Kind Regards
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> >>>> Von: Jonathon -- Improov [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >>>> Gesendet: Dienstag, 29. April 2008 04:12
> >>>> An: user@ofbiz.apache.org
> >>>> Betreff: Re: WG: SHA / SHA1 seed data and password encryption
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin,
> >>>>
> >>>>> A brief analysis shows that the implementation might start here
> >>>> being
> >>>>> problematic:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> getDigestHash in
> >>>> trunk/base/src/base/org/ofbiz/base/crypto/HashCrypt.java
> >>>>
> >>>> Yup. That's where the OFBiz-specific implementation (or rehashing)
> is.
> >>>>
> >>>>> Conclusion: the hashes in customer dbs are not really compatible
> >>>> with other
> >>>>> sha1 implementations today, bad for SSO.
> >>>>> Is there any impact on vulnerability of stored hashes created by
> >>>> ofbiz?
> >>>>
> >>>> Impact on vulnerability? No. In fact, it's slightly more secure.
> >>>>
> >>>> However, the increase in security is only slight. Check out the
> phrase
> >>>> "security by obscurity". I
> >>>> think I mentioned this some months back on the ML or JIRA. I can't
> >>>> guess what other reason OFBiz
> >>>> would have for making the hash different from the rest of the
> world.
> >>>> Seeding the password would be
> >>>> a more appropriate strategy for increased security (see
> >>>> https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OFBIZ-1151 ).
> >>>>
> >>>> The incompatibility may not pose a problem (I hope). You can still
> >>>> migrate passwords from other
> >>>> systems (not OFBiz, eg osCommerce) into OFBiz. The reason is that
> OFBiz
> >>>> does not mangle the
> >>>> original SHA hash beyond recovery (I hope, but don't think so).
> You
> >>>> just have to take the SHA
> >>>> hashes from other systems, pass it through OFBiz's mangling, and
> you
> >>>> have successfully ported
> >>>> those passwords into OFBiz. Someone please correct me if I'm wrong
> >>>> here; codes in
> >>>> HashCrypt.getDigestHash() (package org.ofbiz.base.crypto).
> >>>>
> >>>> If OFBiz does mangle the original SHA hash beyond recovery, then
> you
> >>>> cannot migrate passwords to
> >>>> and from OFBiz systems. Then this would be wrong, and needs to be
> >>>> fixed. This does seem to be the
> >>>> case in StringUtil.encodeInt().
> >>>>
> >>>> We also talked about a "pluggable security system" to easily
> replace
> >>>> that OFBiz-specific chunk.
> >>>> Not sure if this is done yet.
> >>>>
> >>>> Jonathon
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin Wepper wrote:
> >>>>> Dear ,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> hopefully I do miss a point, but ...
> >>>>> today we are experiencing a quite annoying  issue with sha
> hashes:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Please have  a look at this:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'm simply listing hashes,  let's start with the hash in
> seed/demo
> >>>> for
> >>>>> "ofbiz":
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 47b56994cbc2b6d10aa1be30f70165adb305a41a = ofbiz hashed by
> >>>> debian4/sha1sum
> >>>>> 47b56994cbc2b6d10aa1be30f70165adb305a41a = ofbiz hashed by php
> >>>>> 47b56994cbc2b6d10aa1be30f70165adb305a41a = ofbiz by  java -
> Jacksum
> >>>> 1.7.0,
> >>>>> algorithm=sha1
> >>>>> but:
> >>>>> 47ca69ebb4bdc9ae0adec130880165d2cc05db1a = ofbiz password for
> admin
> >>>> in
> >>>>> demo-seed-data
> >>>>> __xx__xxxxxxxxxx  xxxx  xx____xxxx__xx__    here the ofbiz hash
> >>>> differs to
> >>>>> other sha1 implementations
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Other examples:
> >>>>> xxxx________xxxxxx____xxxx__xx__________
> >>>>> 8cb2237d0679ca88db6464eac60da96345513964 = 12345 by "others"
> >>>>> f3cd237d0679b5f7a4646495b90dd66345513964 = 12345 by ofbiz
> >>>>>
> >>>>> ______xxxx__xxxxxxx_______xxxx__xx______
> >>>>> 7c222fb2927d828af22f592134e8932480637c0d = 12345678 by others
> >>>>> 7c222fcded7dfdf58d2f59213497ec24ff637c0d = 12345678 by ofbiz
> >>>>>
> >>>>> __xxxx____xxxx______xxxx__xx__xx____xx__
> >>>>> 2fb5e13419fc89246865e7a324f476ec624e8740 = abcdefg by others
> >>>>> 2fca9e341983f624686598dc248b7693624ef840 = abcdefg by ofbiz
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> A brief analysis shows that the implementation might start here
> being
> >>>>> problematic:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> getDigestHash in
> >>>> trunk/base/src/base/org/ofbiz/base/crypto/HashCrypt.java
> >>>>>
> >>>>> ...
> >>>>> int i1 = digestBytes[l];
> >>>>> if (i1 < 0)
> >>>>>   i1 = 127 + i1 * -1;
> >>>>> StringUtil.encodeInt(i1, k, digestChars);
> >>>>> ...
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The bit operations introduced in StringUtil.encodeInt do not
> comply
> >>>> to the
> >>>>> way the int is calculated before.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Example:
> >>>>> Digest of -116 should result in 0x8c but in our ofbiz code it is
> >>>> resulting
> >>>>> in 0xf3
> >>>>> But:
> >>>>> -116 = 0b10001100 = 0x8c -  ok for sha1
> >>>>> 127 + -116*-1 =  243 = 0b11110011 = 0xf3 for obfiz-sha
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The digest is calculated properly, but when converting to hex
> string
> >>>> the
> >>>>> function seems to fail on negative byte/int values, only.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This has been introduced in 2004-09-09 21:06:36 UTC (rev 3317)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Conclusion: the hashes in customer dbs are not really compatible
> with
> >>>> other
> >>>>> sha1 implementations today, bad for SSO.
> >>>>> Is there any impact on vulnerability of stored hashes created by
> >>>> ofbiz?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Martin
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> --
> >>>>> Martin Wepper
> >>>>> ZYRES digital media systems GmbH
> >>>>> Eschersheimer Landstr. 5-7 60322 Frankfurt am Main
> >>>>> Phone +49 (0)69 98 55 99 - 0
> >>>>> Fax +49 (0)69 98 55 99 - 11
> >>>>> Firmensitz: Eschersheimer Landstr. 5-7 60322 Frankfurt am Main
> >>>>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Frankfurt am Main, HRB 76374
> >>>>> Geschäftsführer: Sebastian Schirmer, Martin Wepper
> >>>>> http://www.zyres.com/
> >>>>> --
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
> >
> >


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