2016-08-22 23:11 GMT+02:00 Paul Steyn <paulste...@afrihost.co.za>: > As all the information is being downloaded, and not uploaded, and is > publicly available, there is no security from the encryption; anybody > can get the same data you are accessing. The verification of the domain > is useful, but does still rely on trusting the DNS servers. The download > itself can be verified through other, better means to ensure it is good, > although this does again rely on the website not having been hacked, > which https does nothing to ensure. >
HTTPS does some stuff to make the download safer: assuming the server's private key itself was not accessed by an attacker, AND assuming the third party certificate authority didn't issue a bogus certificate. In that case, we can reasonably think that what is shown accessing https://libreoffice.org really originate from libreoffice.org. This includes the files and the hash fingerprints provided as a way to check the downloaded files. One could argue that the download themselves could be served over HTTP for efficiency, and only the hashes needs to go through HTTPS, but pushing everything through TLS is not that troublesome. Of course, we assume that some bases are correct. And that's ignoring other ways of attack: corporate "nosey" decrypt-all routers, user accepting invalid certificates, browser hijacking, etc. All in all, providing HTTPS access with a verified certificate does add something, even for a public project that only provide files to the users, but it's not completely secure just because of the https green thingy. > PS. I find the tone of the message to be a little strong, > Agreed. -- To unsubscribe e-mail to: users+unsubscr...@global.libreoffice.org Problems? http://www.libreoffice.org/get-help/mailing-lists/how-to-unsubscribe/ Posting guidelines + more: http://wiki.documentfoundation.org/Netiquette List archive: http://listarchives.libreoffice.org/global/users/ All messages sent to this list will be publicly archived and cannot be deleted
