Hi, Dino Should we consider the security of sovereignty for the mapping system? This question is probably too early.
As you know, DNS tree architecture introduced a lot debate historically for the ownership and operation of root DNS. Due to pressure from industry and other countries, USA government plans to hand over the operation of root DNS to IANA next month even there is a lot opposing voice from congress. It could change back again. One side is that the national security of US prefer the government operates the root DNS, another side is that other countries don’t like US to completely control the DNS. This is related to both technology and politics. Without the support of other countries, mapping server deployment globally will be in question. Regards Lin -----Original Message----- From: Ideas [mailto:ideas-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dino Farinacci Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 2:13 PM To: id...@ietf.org Cc: b...@lispers.net; LISP mailing list list; NVO3; lisp-al...@external.cisco.com; LISPmob; 5gan...@ietf.org; lisp-...@external.cisco.com Subject: [Ideas] Mapping System Requirements and draft-padma-ideas-problem-statement-00.txt Hello folks. In draft-padma-ideas-problem-statement-00.txt, we have a section on mapping system requirements for map-n-encap and translation based loc/id split protocols. Rather than having you go into the document in detail (we wish you would and comment though), I will provide the short list below to attempt a discussion on requirements. I have copied the possible WGs that may want to use the mapping system technology. And I have also copied the LISP working group who can shed expertise on the subject as well as some beta lists that have some operational experiences with mapping database deployment and management. The requirements below have a security and robustness twist to it but I think that is the best place to start and to consider security “up front”. Thanks in advance, Dino ---- 6.4. Mapping System Security The secure mapping system must have the following requirements: 1. The components of the mapping system need to be robust against direct and indirect attacks. If any component is attacked, the rest of the system should act with integrity and scale and only the information associated with the compromised component is made unavailable. 2. The addition and removal of components of the mapping system must be performed in a secure matter so as to not violate the integrity and operation of the system and service it provides. 3. The information returned by components of the mapping system needs to be authenticated as to detect spoofing from masqueraders. 4. Information registered (by publishers) to the mapping system must be authenticated so the registering entity or the information is not spoofed. 5. The mapping system must allow request access (for subscribers) to be open and public. However, it is optional to provide confidentiality and authentication of the requesters and the information they are requesting. 6. Any information provided by components of the mapping system must be cryptographically signed by the provider and verified by the consumer. 7. Message rate-limiting and other heuristics must be part of the foundational support of the mapping system to protect the system from invalid overloaded conditions. 8. The mapping system should support some form of provisioned policy. Either internal to the system or via mechanisms for users of the system to describe policy rules. Access control should not use traditional granular-based access lists since they do not scale and are hard to manage. By the use of token- or key- based authentication methods as well as deploying multiple instances of the mapping system will allow acceptable policy profiles. Machine learning techniques could automate these mechanisms. _______________________________________________ Ideas mailing list id...@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ideas
