I am using swanctl, and having "no matching peer config found" issue.
Please find logs and swanctl.conf in this email.
Thanks,
Rajeev
9[NET] received packet: from fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[500] to
2017::5002[500] (264 bytes)
09[ENC] parsed IKE_SA_INIT request 0 [ SA KE No N(NATD_S_IP) N(NATD_D_IP)
N(HASH_ALG) N(REDIR_SUP) ]
09[CFG] looking for an ike config for 2017::5002...fc00:cada:c402:607::1001
09[CFG] ike config match: 3100 (2017::5002 fc00:cada:c402:607::1001 IKEv2)
09[CFG] candidate: 2017::5002...fc00:cada:C402:607::1001, prio 3100
09[CFG] found matching ike config: 2017::5002...fc00:cada:C402:607::1001
with prio 3100
09[IKE] fc00:cada:c402:607::1001 is initiating an IKE_SA
09[IKE] IKE_SA (unnamed)[2] state change: CREATED => CONNECTING
09[CFG] selecting proposal:
09[CFG] proposal matches
09[CFG] received proposals:
IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/ECP_256
09[CFG] configured proposals:
IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/ECP_256
09[CFG] selected proposal:
IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/ECP_256
09[IKE] natd_chunk => 34 bytes @ 0x7f6d080009c0
09[IKE] 0: 4D 98 3C 1D 83 58 E9 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
M.<..X.w........
09[IKE] 16: 20 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 02
.............P.
09[IKE] 32: 01 F4 ..
09[IKE] natd_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005630
09[IKE] 0: F8 0F 32 75 38 53 84 20 35 D3 D5 81 06 50 5B B1 ..2u8S.
5....P[.
09[IKE] 16: 90 95 12 4B ...K
09[IKE] natd_chunk => 34 bytes @ 0x7f6d080009c0
09[IKE] 0: 4D 98 3C 1D 83 58 E9 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
M.<..X.w........
09[IKE] 16: FC 00 CA DA C4 02 06 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 01
................
09[IKE] 32: 01 F4 ..
09[IKE] natd_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d080056a0
09[IKE] 0: 89 87 B4 7C 73 09 A9 F3 2A 92 E3 A9 C6 C6 64 35
...|s...*.....d5
09[IKE] 16: 95 BC 38 0F ..8.
09[IKE] precalculated src_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d080056a0
09[IKE] 0: 89 87 B4 7C 73 09 A9 F3 2A 92 E3 A9 C6 C6 64 35
...|s...*.....d5
09[IKE] 16: 95 BC 38 0F ..8.
09[IKE] precalculated dst_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005630
09[IKE] 0: F8 0F 32 75 38 53 84 20 35 D3 D5 81 06 50 5B B1 ..2u8S.
5....P[.
09[IKE] 16: 90 95 12 4B ...K
09[IKE] received src_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08000eb0
09[IKE] 0: 89 87 B4 7C 73 09 A9 F3 2A 92 E3 A9 C6 C6 64 35
...|s...*.....d5
09[IKE] 16: 95 BC 38 0F ..8.
09[IKE] received dst_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08000fd0
09[IKE] 0: F8 0F 32 75 38 53 84 20 35 D3 D5 81 06 50 5B B1 ..2u8S.
5....P[.
09[IKE] 16: 90 95 12 4B ...K
09[IKE] shared Diffie Hellman secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005600
09[IKE] 0: 07 A8 18 F1 5B 97 39 47 DB AE 62 F1 56 DA 12 56
....[.9G..b.V..V
09[IKE] 16: 5F 5F F9 55 F4 68 94 50 AB 11 2D 5D E4 8C A8 9A
__.U.h.P..-]....
09[IKE] SKEYSEED => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003240
09[IKE] 0: C0 1A C8 49 7B ED 7C AD 07 02 B7 44 48 18 B3 B3
...I{.|....DH...
09[IKE] 16: 7D 43 E0 E7 5D 58 40 B2 5D 7B 90 D5 90 BD D3 99 }C..]X@
.]{......
09[IKE] Sk_d secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005600
09[IKE] 0: BE 08 2D 04 64 4D BB CE FC 83 DD 05 C9 D9 F0 05
..-.dM..........
09[IKE] 16: 60 EF C4 53 88 C9 82 41 54 36 00 3A AC DD 40 A9
`..S...AT6.:..@.
09[IKE] Sk_ai secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003240
09[IKE] 0: 03 03 2C 1E 63 60 16 08 B6 E3 3E BA 8C 80 AA 34
..,.c`....>....4
09[IKE] 16: A9 FA 0C 9A FF 0B A5 3C E8 2C 66 FE C6 A3 6D 85
.......<.,f...m.
09[IKE] Sk_ar secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003240
09[IKE] 0: 58 50 F7 80 69 2E F1 BF C6 3E 27 B2 7F 51 11 D2
XP..i....>'..Q..
09[IKE] 16: 79 FE 18 9B 6E C7 71 20 2B E6 EB 7F D5 A2 E3 3D y...n.q
+......=
09[IKE] Sk_ei secret => 16 bytes @ 0x7f6d080017e0
09[IKE] 0: FC CB 72 54 A1 2B C4 31 BF 80 E6 E3 62 50 3F 34
..rT.+.1....bP?4
09[IKE] Sk_er secret => 16 bytes @ 0x7f6d080017e0
09[IKE] 0: F4 18 F2 91 64 3D 72 97 5C 71 06 7F A8 82 C6 41
....d=r.\q.....A
09[IKE] Sk_pi secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003ea0
09[IKE] 0: 9A 72 FC 50 C5 8E 55 FF EC 59 F3 AB A9 1B 71 58
.r.P..U..Y....qX
09[IKE] 16: 27 76 46 AB EE 5B 64 36 9F 9A 09 52 81 82 D3 A9
'vF..[d6...R....
09[IKE] Sk_pr secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003f70
09[IKE] 0: 3F A5 34 D7 4A B5 2E DB D4 F3 18 57 52 97 A8 EC
?.4.J......WR...
09[IKE] 16: 9D 87 5A 66 AE AF 18 F0 17 75 C7 67 4C 0F 39 4D
..Zf.....u.gL.9M
09[IKE] natd_chunk => 34 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005730
09[IKE] 0: 4D 98 3C 1D 83 58 E9 77 54 E5 64 60 22 20 BF A2
M.<..X.wT.d`" ..
09[IKE] 16: 20 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 02
.............P.
09[IKE] 32: 01 F4 ..
09[IKE] natd_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005510
09[IKE] 0: 05 CB 8A 0D 44 85 26 3F 29 89 80 B8 35 8E ED DE
....D.&?)...5...
09[IKE] 16: D4 48 4E F0 .HN.
09[IKE] natd_chunk => 34 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005730
09[IKE] 0: 4D 98 3C 1D 83 58 E9 77 54 E5 64 60 22 20 BF A2
M.<..X.wT.d`" ..
09[IKE] 16: FC 00 CA DA C4 02 06 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 01
................
09[IKE] 32: 01 F4 ..
09[IKE] natd_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08001960
09[IKE] 0: 42 0F 2B 31 CF D7 4F 9E 5C 13 63 B3 BA 38 37 6B
B.+1..O.\.c..87k
09[IKE] 16: AD 69 13 A6 .i..
09[IKE] sending cert request for "C=US, O=CableLabs, OU=TEST Device CA01,
CN=TEST CableLabs Device Certification Authority"
09[ENC] generating IKE_SA_INIT response 0 [ SA KE No N(NATD_S_IP)
N(NATD_D_IP) CERTREQ N(HASH_ALG) N(MULT_AUTH) ]
09[NET] sending packet: from 2017::5002[500] to
fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[500] (289 bytes)
08[NET] received packet: from fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[4500] to
2017::5002[4500] (1680 bytes)
08[ENC] parsed IKE_AUTH request 1 [ IDi CERT CERTREQ AUTH N(USE_TRANSP) SA
TSi TSr N(MOBIKE_SUP) N(NO_ADD_ADDR) N(MULT_AUTH) N(EAP_ONLY) ]
08[IKE] received cert request for "C=US, O=CableLabs, OU=TEST Device CA01,
CN=TEST CableLabs Device Certification Authority"
08[IKE] received cert request for unknown ca with keyid
bd:0e:4c:0f:21:cf:f0:49:af:19:34:3b:c2:64:c5:31:a1:2e:11:07
08[IKE] received 1 cert requests for an unknown ca
08[ASN] L0 - x509:
08[ASN] => 1016 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003df0
08[ASN] 0: 30 82 03 F4 30 82 02 5C A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00
0...0..\........
08[ASN] 16: DD DC 09 21 36 F2 E8 71 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86
...!6..q0...*.H.
08[ASN] 32: F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00 30 74 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55
.......0t1.0...U
08[ASN] 48: 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0A 13
....US1.0...U...
08[ASN] 64: 09 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 31 19 30 17 06 03
.CableLabs1.0...
08[ASN] 80: 55 04 0B 13 10 54 45 53 54 20 44 65 76 69 63 65 U....TEST
Device
08[ASN] 96: 20 43 41 30 31 31 36 30 34 06 03 55 04 03 13 2D
CA011604..U...-
08[ASN] 112: 54 45 53 54 20 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 20 44 TEST
CableLabs D
08[ASN] 128: 65 76 69 63 65 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 evice
Certificat
08[ASN] 144: 69 6F 6E 20 41 75 74 68 6F 72 69 74 79 30 1E 17 ion
Authority0..
08[ASN] 160: 0D 31 37 30 39 32 38 31 38 31 38 35 33 5A 17 0D
.170928181853Z..
08[ASN] 176: 33 37 30 39 32 38 31 38 31 38 35 33 5A 30 4A 31
370928181853Z0J1
08[ASN] 192: 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 0E 30 0C
.0...U....US1.0.
08[ASN] 208: 06 03 55 04 0A 13 05 41 52 52 49 53 31 0F 30 0D
..U....ARRIS1.0.
08[ASN] 224: 06 03 55 04 0B 13 06 4C 4F 57 45 4C 4C 31 1A 30
..U....LOWELL1.0
08[ASN] 240: 18 06 03 55 04 03 13 11 30 30 3A 33 33 3A 35 66
...U....00:33:5f
08[ASN] 256: 3A 61 62 3A 38 63 3A 39 65 30 82 01 22 30 0D 06
:ab:8c:9e0.."0..
08[ASN] 272: 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 0F
.*.H............
08[ASN] 288: 00 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1
.0.........?`.d.
08[ASN] 304: 4F 8F 83 F5 D5 FB 66 99 2E 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7
O.....f..m]c....
08[ASN] 320: 64 BD 8F F5 BD 5B 0F 29 A0 FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14
d....[.)..V.....
08[ASN] 336: C0 71 42 B8 67 EA B1 49 A4 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17
.qB.g..I.4...eD.
08[ASN] 352: E4 B3 E1 53 C5 C4 FD 5F 0D 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21
...S..._...tZ..!
08[ASN] 368: 90 2F C7 98 17 CD 84 B4 B7 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02
./.......W.r.L..
08[ASN] 384: 59 4C E0 4B 4C 6B 92 D0 90 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F
YL.KLk........j?
08[ASN] 400: A5 D3 A7 47 DC 08 52 E6 C1 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6
...G..R..lf...|.
08[ASN] 416: 08 D8 89 2A 7E 68 E1 10 F5 CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08
...*~h.....}K.8.
08[ASN] 432: 11 9C B6 AC 63 1F 5C B0 59 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04
....c.\.Y=....=.
08[ASN] 448: 65 07 56 C8 A0 1B 87 CF 02 ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0
e.V.......$.....
08[ASN] 464: 7A 5E CB DA E4 89 30 31 BB A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06
z^....01........
08[ASN] 480: CE 0C C4 62 41 77 73 96 EA 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45
...bAws..:..l..E
08[ASN] 496: EB EF C0 51 F6 D4 14 60 10 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4
...Q...`......Z.
08[ASN] 512: 0C FB 81 70 DA 15 F2 5D D7 FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C
...p...]...T.f.,
08[ASN] 528: 18 A4 0E 05 39 F0 C4 FF 31 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B
....9...1.3...z.
08[ASN] 544: DB F2 2C CD F2 33 22 BF 20 83 02 03 01 00 01 A3 ..,..3".
.......
08[ASN] 560: 33 30 31 30 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03
3010...U........
08[ASN] 576: 02 05 A0 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14
...0...U.#..0...
08[ASN] 592: F6 DC 40 8A 89 B6 7B 7A 08 F6 78 B5 4A 28 7A 7F
..@...{z..x.J(z.
08[ASN] 608: 57 9B F9 9B 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01
W...0...*.H.....
08[ASN] 624: 0B 05 00 03 82 01 81 00 54 17 44 39 3D 12 4C E8
........T.D9=.L.
08[ASN] 640: AB 84 9F D3 0E 6C CA 73 18 6B CD D0 B7 E7 6C E5
.....l.s.k....l.
08[ASN] 656: B2 C0 40 77 62 1A 42 45 60 81 9E 9F D4 0C 6F FE
..@wb.BE`.....o.
08[ASN] 672: 20 75 31 CF AF 55 29 13 3B E3 62 F4 70 B2 25 55
u1..U).;.b.p.%U
08[ASN] 688: 11 41 F2 1C D9 8D 50 ED 13 DF 76 62 B7 DE A3 15
.A....P...vb....
08[ASN] 704: 55 BD 6C EC 0F 7A 96 33 CA 29 CC A1 C7 30 AE 19
U.l..z.3.)...0..
08[ASN] 720: 34 42 C8 28 24 50 51 E0 A3 4A 6A 52 C9 F1 27 C3
4B.($PQ..JjR..'.
08[ASN] 736: A5 C0 7C 0D 61 8B E7 A0 94 25 D6 53 BB 01 DB EB
..|.a....%.S....
08[ASN] 752: 42 BF 24 96 54 BD D8 A8 44 43 47 DE E6 0C 7C C6
B.$.T...DCG...|.
08[ASN] 768: DE 62 F5 3D 52 20 A6 F9 EB 93 65 4E 4C AD 29 37 .b.=R
....eNL.)7
08[ASN] 784: 96 B7 FD 6B 0F D6 49 5D 4D C3 E4 D5 7C DC C9 DB
...k..I]M...|...
08[ASN] 800: 7E 86 2A 72 76 06 AA BF 13 5D 3E B1 73 D5 AE CB
~.*rv....]>.s...
08[ASN] 816: 46 3F E4 F1 B7 25 BF DA 87 E9 AE E7 10 45 9B 7E
F?...%.......E.~
08[ASN] 832: F3 3C 2A 5F 81 D4 0B A7 22 D6 A6 4C 49 1F 2B 78
.<*_...."..LI.+x
08[ASN] 848: EA BF DF 2E 74 B8 70 BD 89 74 C2 65 03 7F 60 E3
....t.p..t.e..`.
08[ASN] 864: 1D 0F 3E 23 AB 2F 7B 32 09 68 DD DE 9D D6 FC 9F
..>#./{2.h......
08[ASN] 880: 58 7A 5C 36 FF 01 25 9E 66 A6 F4 F5 F6 A0 04 5A
Xz\6..%.f......Z
08[ASN] 896: DA F4 A1 CB 88 BE A4 67 41 95 17 F2 9E 10 50 60
.......gA.....P`
08[ASN] 912: 32 B3 A1 7E A3 DB E2 C3 0D 5E 65 03 E7 06 1A B7
2..~.....^e.....
08[ASN] 928: 55 82 73 D8 98 5C A5 32 A3 36 2C C8 2E 61 CA 61
U.s..\.2.6,..a.a
08[ASN] 944: 79 48 87 C4 10 43 2F 43 AE 99 AF E1 81 80 AE 23
yH...C/C.......#
08[ASN] 960: 60 3F A8 E4 1E BD 22 51 86 99 34 4E 97 99 7D 40
`?...."Q..4N..}@
08[ASN] 976: 8B 4B 91 48 F2 8B 8A A1 BF 34 56 DA 0A 32 67 8D
.K.H.....4V..2g.
08[ASN] 992: B3 28 AB D7 24 7C 78 AA 0A 56 91 E0 67 E3 11 9B
.(..$|x..V..g...
08[ASN] 1008: 30 71 0C 78 59 D2 26 30 0q.xY.&0
08[ASN] L1 - tbsCertificate:
08[ASN] => 608 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003df4
08[ASN] 0: 30 82 02 5C A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 DD DC 09 21
0..\...........!
08[ASN] 16: 36 F2 E8 71 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01
6..q0...*.H.....
08[ASN] 32: 0B 05 00 30 74 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02
...0t1.0...U....
08[ASN] 48: 55 53 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0A 13 09 43 61 62
US1.0...U....Cab
08[ASN] 64: 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 0B 13
leLabs1.0...U...
08[ASN] 80: 10 54 45 53 54 20 44 65 76 69 63 65 20 43 41 30 .TEST Device
CA0
08[ASN] 96: 31 31 36 30 34 06 03 55 04 03 13 2D 54 45 53 54
11604..U...-TEST
08[ASN] 112: 20 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 20 44 65 76 69 63 CableLabs
Devic
08[ASN] 128: 65 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 20 e
Certification
08[ASN] 144: 41 75 74 68 6F 72 69 74 79 30 1E 17 0D 31 37 30
Authority0...170
08[ASN] 160: 39 32 38 31 38 31 38 35 33 5A 17 0D 33 37 30 39
928181853Z..3709
08[ASN] 176: 32 38 31 38 31 38 35 33 5A 30 4A 31 0B 30 09 06
28181853Z0J1.0..
08[ASN] 192: 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 0E 30 0C 06 03 55 04
.U....US1.0...U.
08[ASN] 208: 0A 13 05 41 52 52 49 53 31 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04
...ARRIS1.0...U.
08[ASN] 224: 0B 13 06 4C 4F 57 45 4C 4C 31 1A 30 18 06 03 55
...LOWELL1.0...U
08[ASN] 240: 04 03 13 11 30 30 3A 33 33 3A 35 66 3A 61 62 3A
....00:33:5f:ab:
08[ASN] 256: 38 63 3A 39 65 30 82 01 22 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48
8c:9e0.."0...*.H
08[ASN] 272: 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 0F 00 30 82 01
.............0..
08[ASN] 288: 0A 02 82 01 01 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1 4F 8F 83 F5
.......?`.d.O...
08[ASN] 304: D5 FB 66 99 2E 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7 64 BD 8F F5
..f..m]c....d...
08[ASN] 320: BD 5B 0F 29 A0 FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14 C0 71 42 B8
.[.)..V......qB.
08[ASN] 336: 67 EA B1 49 A4 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17 E4 B3 E1 53
g..I.4...eD....S
08[ASN] 352: C5 C4 FD 5F 0D 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21 90 2F C7 98
..._...tZ..!./..
08[ASN] 368: 17 CD 84 B4 B7 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02 59 4C E0 4B
.....W.r.L..YL.K
08[ASN] 384: 4C 6B 92 D0 90 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F A5 D3 A7 47
Lk........j?...G
08[ASN] 400: DC 08 52 E6 C1 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6 08 D8 89 2A
..R..lf...|....*
08[ASN] 416: 7E 68 E1 10 F5 CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08 11 9C B6 AC
~h.....}K.8.....
08[ASN] 432: 63 1F 5C B0 59 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04 65 07 56 C8
c.\.Y=....=.e.V.
08[ASN] 448: A0 1B 87 CF 02 ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0 7A 5E CB DA
......$.....z^..
08[ASN] 464: E4 89 30 31 BB A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06 CE 0C C4 62
..01...........b
08[ASN] 480: 41 77 73 96 EA 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45 EB EF C0 51
Aws..:..l..E...Q
08[ASN] 496: F6 D4 14 60 10 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4 0C FB 81 70
...`......Z....p
08[ASN] 512: DA 15 F2 5D D7 FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C 18 A4 0E 05
...]...T.f.,....
08[ASN] 528: 39 F0 C4 FF 31 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B DB F2 2C CD
9...1.3...z...,.
08[ASN] 544: F2 33 22 BF 20 83 02 03 01 00 01 A3 33 30 31 30 .3".
.......3010
08[ASN] 560: 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 05 A0 30
...U...........0
08[ASN] 576: 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 F6 DC 40 8A
...U.#..0.....@.
08[ASN] 592: 89 B6 7B 7A 08 F6 78 B5 4A 28 7A 7F 57 9B F9 9B
..{z..x.J(z.W...
08[ASN] L2 - DEFAULT v1:
08[ASN] L3 - version:
08[ASN] => 1 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003dfc
08[ASN] 0: 02 .
08[ASN] X.509v3
08[ASN] L2 - serialNumber:
08[ASN] => 9 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003dff
08[ASN] 0: 00 DD DC 09 21 36 F2 E8 71 ....!6..q
08[ASN] L2 - signature:
08[ASN] L3 - algorithmIdentifier:
08[ASN] L4 - algorithm:
08[ASN] 'sha256WithRSAEncryption'
08[ASN] L2 - issuer:
08[ASN] => 118 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003e17
08[ASN] 0: 30 74 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31
0t1.0...U....US1
08[ASN] 16: 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0A 13 09 43 61 62 6C 65 4C
.0...U....CableL
08[ASN] 32: 61 62 73 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 0B 13 10 54 45
abs1.0...U....TE
08[ASN] 48: 53 54 20 44 65 76 69 63 65 20 43 41 30 31 31 36 ST Device
CA0116
08[ASN] 64: 30 34 06 03 55 04 03 13 2D 54 45 53 54 20 43 61
04..U...-TEST Ca
08[ASN] 80: 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 20 44 65 76 69 63 65 20 43 bleLabs
Device C
08[ASN] 96: 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 20 41 75 74 ertification
Aut
08[ASN] 112: 68 6F 72 69 74 79 hority
08[ASN] 'C=US, O=CableLabs, OU=TEST Device CA01, CN=TEST CableLabs Device
Certification Authority'
08[ASN] L2 - validity:
08[ASN] L3 - notBefore:
08[ASN] L4 - utcTime:
08[ASN] 'Sep 28 18:18:53 UTC 2017'
08[ASN] L3 - notAfter:
08[ASN] L4 - utcTime:
08[ASN] 'Sep 28 18:18:53 UTC 2037'
08[ASN] L2 - subject:
08[ASN] => 76 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003ead
08[ASN] 0: 30 4A 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31
0J1.0...U....US1
08[ASN] 16: 0E 30 0C 06 03 55 04 0A 13 05 41 52 52 49 53 31
.0...U....ARRIS1
08[ASN] 32: 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04 0B 13 06 4C 4F 57 45 4C 4C
.0...U....LOWELL
08[ASN] 48: 31 1A 30 18 06 03 55 04 03 13 11 30 30 3A 33 33
1.0...U....00:33
08[ASN] 64: 3A 35 66 3A 61 62 3A 38 63 3A 39 65 :5f:ab:8c:9e
08[ASN] 'C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=LOWELL, CN=00:33:5f:ab:8c:9e'
08[ASN] L2 - subjectPublicKeyInfo:
08[ASN] -- > --
08[ASN] L0 - subjectPublicKeyInfo:
08[ASN] L1 - algorithm:
08[ASN] L2 - algorithmIdentifier:
08[ASN] L3 - algorithm:
08[ASN] 'rsaEncryption'
08[ASN] L1 - subjectPublicKey:
08[ASN] => 271 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003f10
08[ASN] 0: 00 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1
.0.........?`.d.
08[ASN] 16: 4F 8F 83 F5 D5 FB 66 99 2E 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7
O.....f..m]c....
08[ASN] 32: 64 BD 8F F5 BD 5B 0F 29 A0 FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14
d....[.)..V.....
08[ASN] 48: C0 71 42 B8 67 EA B1 49 A4 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17
.qB.g..I.4...eD.
08[ASN] 64: E4 B3 E1 53 C5 C4 FD 5F 0D 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21
...S..._...tZ..!
08[ASN] 80: 90 2F C7 98 17 CD 84 B4 B7 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02
./.......W.r.L..
08[ASN] 96: 59 4C E0 4B 4C 6B 92 D0 90 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F
YL.KLk........j?
08[ASN] 112: A5 D3 A7 47 DC 08 52 E6 C1 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6
...G..R..lf...|.
08[ASN] 128: 08 D8 89 2A 7E 68 E1 10 F5 CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08
...*~h.....}K.8.
08[ASN] 144: 11 9C B6 AC 63 1F 5C B0 59 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04
....c.\.Y=....=.
08[ASN] 160: 65 07 56 C8 A0 1B 87 CF 02 ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0
e.V.......$.....
08[ASN] 176: 7A 5E CB DA E4 89 30 31 BB A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06
z^....01........
08[ASN] 192: CE 0C C4 62 41 77 73 96 EA 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45
...bAws..:..l..E
08[ASN] 208: EB EF C0 51 F6 D4 14 60 10 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4
...Q...`......Z.
08[ASN] 224: 0C FB 81 70 DA 15 F2 5D D7 FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C
...p...]...T.f.,
08[ASN] 240: 18 A4 0E 05 39 F0 C4 FF 31 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B
....9...1.3...z.
08[ASN] 256: DB F2 2C CD F2 33 22 BF 20 83 02 03 01 00 01 ..,..3".
......
08[ASN] -- > --
08[ASN] L0 - RSAPublicKey:
08[ASN] => 270 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003f11
08[ASN] 0: 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1 4F
0.........?`.d.O
08[ASN] 16: 8F 83 F5 D5 FB 66 99 2E 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7 64
.....f..m]c....d
08[ASN] 32: BD 8F F5 BD 5B 0F 29 A0 FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14 C0
....[.)..V......
08[ASN] 48: 71 42 B8 67 EA B1 49 A4 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17 E4
qB.g..I.4...eD..
08[ASN] 64: B3 E1 53 C5 C4 FD 5F 0D 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21 90
..S..._...tZ..!.
08[ASN] 80: 2F C7 98 17 CD 84 B4 B7 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02 59
/.......W.r.L..Y
08[ASN] 96: 4C E0 4B 4C 6B 92 D0 90 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F A5
L.KLk........j?.
08[ASN] 112: D3 A7 47 DC 08 52 E6 C1 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6 08
..G..R..lf...|..
08[ASN] 128: D8 89 2A 7E 68 E1 10 F5 CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08 11
..*~h.....}K.8..
08[ASN] 144: 9C B6 AC 63 1F 5C B0 59 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04 65
...c.\.Y=....=.e
08[ASN] 160: 07 56 C8 A0 1B 87 CF 02 ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0 7A
.V.......$.....z
08[ASN] 176: 5E CB DA E4 89 30 31 BB A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06 CE
^....01.........
08[ASN] 192: 0C C4 62 41 77 73 96 EA 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45 EB
..bAws..:..l..E.
08[ASN] 208: EF C0 51 F6 D4 14 60 10 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4 0C
..Q...`......Z..
08[ASN] 224: FB 81 70 DA 15 F2 5D D7 FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C 18
..p...]...T.f.,.
08[ASN] 240: A4 0E 05 39 F0 C4 FF 31 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B DB
...9...1.3...z..
08[ASN] 256: F2 2C CD F2 33 22 BF 20 83 02 03 01 00 01 .,..3".
......
08[ASN] L1 - modulus:
08[ASN] => 257 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003f19
08[ASN] 0: 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1 4F 8F 83 F5 D5 FB 66 99 2E
..?`.d.O.....f..
08[ASN] 16: 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7 64 BD 8F F5 BD 5B 0F 29 A0
m]c....d....[.).
08[ASN] 32: FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14 C0 71 42 B8 67 EA B1 49 A4
.V......qB.g..I.
08[ASN] 48: 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17 E4 B3 E1 53 C5 C4 FD 5F 0D
4...eD....S..._.
08[ASN] 64: 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21 90 2F C7 98 17 CD 84 B4 B7
..tZ..!./.......
08[ASN] 80: 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02 59 4C E0 4B 4C 6B 92 D0 90
W.r.L..YL.KLk...
08[ASN] 96: 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F A5 D3 A7 47 DC 08 52 E6 C1
.....j?...G..R..
08[ASN] 112: 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6 08 D8 89 2A 7E 68 E1 10 F5
lf...|....*~h...
08[ASN] 128: CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08 11 9C B6 AC 63 1F 5C B0 59
..}K.8.....c.\.Y
08[ASN] 144: 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04 65 07 56 C8 A0 1B 87 CF 02
=....=.e.V......
08[ASN] 160: ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0 7A 5E CB DA E4 89 30 31 BB
.$.....z^....01.
08[ASN] 176: A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06 CE 0C C4 62 41 77 73 96 EA
..........bAws..
08[ASN] 192: 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45 EB EF C0 51 F6 D4 14 60 10
:..l..E...Q...`.
08[ASN] 208: 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4 0C FB 81 70 DA 15 F2 5D D7
.....Z....p...].
08[ASN] 224: FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C 18 A4 0E 05 39 F0 C4 FF 31
..T.f.,....9...1
08[ASN] 240: 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B DB F2 2C CD F2 33 22 BF 20
.3...z...,..3".
08[ASN] 256: 83 .
08[ASN] L1 - publicExponent:
08[ASN] => 3 bytes @ 0x7f6d1400401c
08[ASN] 0: 01 00 01 ...
08[ASN] -- < --
08[ASN] -- < --
08[ASN] L2 - optional extensions:
08[ASN] L3 - extensions:
08[ASN] L4 - extension:
08[ASN] L5 - extnID:
08[ASN] 'keyUsage'
08[ASN] L5 - critical:
08[ASN] => 1 bytes @ 0x7f6d1400402c
08[ASN] 0: FF .
08[ASN] TRUE
08[ASN] L5 - extnValue:
08[ASN] => 4 bytes @ 0x7f6d1400402f
08[ASN] 0: 03 02 05 A0 ....
08[ASN] L4 - extension:
08[ASN] L5 - extnID:
08[ASN] 'authorityKeyIdentifier'
08[ASN] L5 - critical:
08[ASN] FALSE
08[ASN] L5 - extnValue:
08[ASN] => 24 bytes @ 0x7f6d1400403c
08[ASN] 0: 30 16 80 14 F6 DC 40 8A 89 B6 7B 7A 08 F6 78 B5 0.....@
...{z..x.
08[ASN] 16: 4A 28 7A 7F 57 9B F9 9B J(z.W...
08[ASN] L6 - authorityKeyIdentifier:
08[ASN] L7 - keyIdentifier:
08[ASN] => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d14004040
08[ASN] 0: F6 DC 40 8A 89 B6 7B 7A 08 F6 78 B5 4A 28 7A 7F
..@...{z..x.J(z.
08[ASN] 16: 57 9B F9 9B W...
08[ASN] L1 - signatureAlgorithm:
08[ASN] L2 - algorithmIdentifier:
08[ASN] L3 - algorithm:
08[ASN] 'sha256WithRSAEncryption'
08[ASN] L1 - signatureValue:
08[ASN] => 385 bytes @ 0x7f6d14004067
08[ASN] 0: 00 54 17 44 39 3D 12 4C E8 AB 84 9F D3 0E 6C CA
.T.D9=.L......l.
08[ASN] 16: 73 18 6B CD D0 B7 E7 6C E5 B2 C0 40 77 62 1A 42
s.k....l...@wb.B
08[ASN] 32: 45 60 81 9E 9F D4 0C 6F FE 20 75 31 CF AF 55 29 E`.....o.
u1..U)
08[ASN] 48: 13 3B E3 62 F4 70 B2 25 55 11 41 F2 1C D9 8D 50
.;.b.p.%U.A....P
08[ASN] 64: ED 13 DF 76 62 B7 DE A3 15 55 BD 6C EC 0F 7A 96
...vb....U.l..z.
08[ASN] 80: 33 CA 29 CC A1 C7 30 AE 19 34 42 C8 28 24 50 51
3.)...0..4B.($PQ
08[ASN] 96: E0 A3 4A 6A 52 C9 F1 27 C3 A5 C0 7C 0D 61 8B E7
..JjR..'...|.a..
08[ASN] 112: A0 94 25 D6 53 BB 01 DB EB 42 BF 24 96 54 BD D8
..%.S....B.$.T..
08[ASN] 128: A8 44 43 47 DE E6 0C 7C C6 DE 62 F5 3D 52 20 A6
.DCG...|..b.=R .
08[ASN] 144: F9 EB 93 65 4E 4C AD 29 37 96 B7 FD 6B 0F D6 49
...eNL.)7...k..I
08[ASN] 160: 5D 4D C3 E4 D5 7C DC C9 DB 7E 86 2A 72 76 06 AA
]M...|...~.*rv..
08[ASN] 176: BF 13 5D 3E B1 73 D5 AE CB 46 3F E4 F1 B7 25 BF
..]>.s...F?...%.
08[ASN] 192: DA 87 E9 AE E7 10 45 9B 7E F3 3C 2A 5F 81 D4 0B
......E.~.<*_...
08[ASN] 208: A7 22 D6 A6 4C 49 1F 2B 78 EA BF DF 2E 74 B8 70
."..LI.+x....t.p
08[ASN] 224: BD 89 74 C2 65 03 7F 60 E3 1D 0F 3E 23 AB 2F 7B
..t.e..`...>#./{
08[ASN] 240: 32 09 68 DD DE 9D D6 FC 9F 58 7A 5C 36 FF 01 25
2.h......Xz\6..%
08[ASN] 256: 9E 66 A6 F4 F5 F6 A0 04 5A DA F4 A1 CB 88 BE A4
.f......Z.......
08[ASN] 272: 67 41 95 17 F2 9E 10 50 60 32 B3 A1 7E A3 DB E2
gA.....P`2..~...
08[ASN] 288: C3 0D 5E 65 03 E7 06 1A B7 55 82 73 D8 98 5C A5
..^e.....U.s..\.
08[ASN] 304: 32 A3 36 2C C8 2E 61 CA 61 79 48 87 C4 10 43 2F
2.6,..a.ayH...C/
08[ASN] 320: 43 AE 99 AF E1 81 80 AE 23 60 3F A8 E4 1E BD 22
C.......#`?...."
08[ASN] 336: 51 86 99 34 4E 97 99 7D 40 8B 4B 91 48 F2 8B 8A Q..4N..}@
.K.H...
08[ASN] 352: A1 BF 34 56 DA 0A 32 67 8D B3 28 AB D7 24 7C 78
..4V..2g..(..$|x
08[ASN] 368: AA 0A 56 91 E0 67 E3 11 9B 30 71 0C 78 59 D2 26
..V..g...0q.xY.&
08[ASN] 384: 30 0
08[IKE] received end entity cert "C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=LOWELL,
CN=00:33:5f:ab:8c:9e"
08[CFG] looking for peer configs matching
2017::5002[%any]...fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=LOWELL,
CN=00:33:5f:ab:8c:9e]
08[CFG] peer config match local: 1 (ID_ANY -> )
08[CFG] peer config match remote: 0 (ID_DER_ASN1_DN ->
30:4a:31:0b:30:09:06:03:55:04:06:13:02:55:53:31:0e:30:0c:06:03:55:04:0a:13:05:41:52:52:49:53:31:0f:30:0d:06:03:55:04:0b:13:06:4c:4f:57:45:4c:4c:31:1a:30:18:06:03:55:04:03:13:11:30:30:3a:33:33:3a:35:66:3a:61:62:3a:38:63:3a:39:65)
08[CFG] ike config match: 3100 (2017::5002 fc00:cada:c402:607::1001 IKEv2)
08[CFG] no matching peer config found
08[IKE] peer supports MOBIKE
08[ENC] generating IKE_AUTH response 1 [ N(AUTH_FAILED) ]
08[NET] sending packet: from 2017::5002[4500] to
fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[4500] (80 bytes)
08[IKE] IKE_SA (unnamed)[2] state change: CONNECTING => DESTROYING
swanctl.conf
# Section defining IKE connection configurations.
connections {
# Section for an IKE connection named <conn>.
rw{
# IKE major version to use for connection.
version = 2
# Local address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
local_addrs = 2017::5002
#local_addrs = 10.13.199.130
#local_addrs = 10.185.44.187
# Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
remote_addrs = fc00:cada:C402:607::1001
#remote_addrs = 10.13.199.174
#remote_addrs = 10.14.37.97
# Local UDP port for IKE communication.
# local_port = 500
# Remote UDP port for IKE communication.
# remote_port = 500
# Comma separated proposals to accept for IKE.
proposals = aes128-sha256-ecp256
# Virtual IPs to request in configuration payload / Mode Config.
# vips =
# Use Aggressive Mode in IKEv1.
# aggressive = no
# Set the Mode Config mode to use.
# pull = yes
# Enforce UDP encapsulation by faking NAT-D payloads.
# encap = no
# Enables MOBIKE on IKEv2 connections.
# mobike = yes
# Interval of liveness checks (DPD).
# dpd_delay = 0s
# Timeout for DPD checks (IKEV1 only).
# dpd_timeout = 0s
# Use IKE UDP datagram fragmentation. (yes, no or force).
# fragmentation = no
# Send certificate requests payloads (yes or no).
# send_certreq = yes
# Send certificate payloads (always, never or ifasked).
# send_cert = ifasked
# Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial
connect.
# keyingtries = 1
# Connection uniqueness policy (never, no, keep or replace).
# unique = no
# Time to schedule IKE reauthentication.
# reauth_time = 0s
# Time to schedule IKE rekeying.
# rekey_time = 4h
# Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete, as time.
# over_time = 10% of rekey_time/reauth_time
# Range of random time to subtract from rekey/reauth times.
# rand_time = over_time
# Comma separated list of named IP pools.
# pools =
# Section for a local authentication round.
local {
# Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds are
# sorted. If not specified rounds are ordered by their
position in
# the config file/VICI message.
# round = 0
# Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for
# authentication.
certs = device.crt
# Comma separated list of raw public key candidates to use for
# authentication.
#pubkeys =
# Authentication to perform locally (pubkey, psk,
xauth[-backend] or
# eap[-method]).
auth = pubkey
# IKE identity to use for authentication round.
id = "C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=Lowell, CN=00:0c:29:9d:7d:92"
#id = "C=US, ST=MA, O=Arris, CN=StrongSwan Root CA"
#id = 10.13.199.130
#id = 10.185.44.187
# Client EAP-Identity to use in EAP-Identity exchange and the
EAP
# method.
# eap_id = id
# Server side EAP-Identity to expect in the EAP method.
# aaa_id = remote-id
# Client XAuth username used in the XAuth exchange.
# xauth_id = id
}
# Section for a remote authentication round.
remote {
# Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds are
# sorted. If not specified rounds are ordered by their
position in
# the config file/VICI message.
# round = 0
# IKE identity to expect for authentication round.
id = fc00:cada:c402:607::1001
#id = "C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=Lowell, CN=00:33:5f:ab:8c:9e"
#id = 10.13.199.174
#id = 10.14.37.97
# Authorization group memberships to require.
# groups =
# Comma separated list of certificate to accept for
authentication.
# certs =
# Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for
# authentication.
# cacerts = deviceCa.crt
# Comma separated list of raw public keys to accept for
# authentication.
# pubkeys =
# Certificate revocation policy, (strict, ifuri or relaxed).
# revocation = relaxed
# Authentication to expect from remote (pubkey, psk,
xauth[-backend]
# or eap[-method]).
auth = pubkey
}
children {
# CHILD_SA configuration sub-section.
gcp {
# AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
# ah_proposals =
# ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
esp_proposals = aes128-sha256-ecp256
# Local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
local_ts = 2017::5002[tcp]
# Remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
remote_ts = fc00:cada:C402:607::1001[tcp]
# Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying.
# rekey_time = 1h
# Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed, as time.
# life_time = rekey_time + 10%
# Range of random time to subtract from rekey_time.
# rand_time = life_time - rekey_time
# Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA
rekeying.
# rekey_bytes = 0
# Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.
# life_bytes = rekey_bytes + 10%
# Range of random bytes to subtract from rekey_bytes.
# rand_bytes = life_bytes - rekey_bytes
# Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA
# rekeying.
# rekey_packets = 0
# Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets
# closed.
# life_packets = rekey_packets + 10%
# Range of random packets to subtract from packets_bytes.
# rand_packets = life_packets - rekey_packets
# Updown script to invoke on CHILD_SA up and down events.
#updown = abcd
# Hostaccess variable to pass to updown script.
# hostaccess = yes
# IPsec Mode to establish (tunnel, transport, beet, pass or
# drop).
mode = transport
# Whether to install IPsec policies or not.
# policies = yes
# Action to perform on DPD timeout (clear, trap or restart).
# dpd_action = clear
# Enable IPComp compression before encryption.
# ipcomp = no
# Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity.
# inactivity = 0s
# Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA.
# reqid = 0
# Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic.
# mark_in = 0/0x00000000
# Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic.
# mark_out = 0/0x00000000
# Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding.
# tfc_padding = 0
# IPsec replay window to configure for this CHILD_SA.
# replay_window = 32
# Action to perform after loading the configuration (none,
trap,
# start).
# start_action = none
# Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed (none,
trap,
# start).
# close_action = none
}
l2tp {
# AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
# ah_proposals =
# ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
esp_proposals = aes128-sha256-ecp256
# Local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
local_ts = 2017::5002[115]
# Remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
remote_ts = fc00:cada:C402:607::1001[115]
# Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying.
# rekey_time = 1h
# Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed, as time.
# life_time = rekey_time + 10%
# Range of random time to subtract from rekey_time.
# rand_time = life_time - rekey_time
# Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA
rekeying.
# rekey_bytes = 0
# Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.
# life_bytes = rekey_bytes + 10%
# Range of random bytes to subtract from rekey_bytes.
# rand_bytes = life_bytes - rekey_bytes
# Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA
# rekeying.
# rekey_packets = 0
# Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets
# closed.
# life_packets = rekey_packets + 10%
# Range of random packets to subtract from packets_bytes.
# rand_packets = life_packets - rekey_packets
# Updown script to invoke on CHILD_SA up and down events.
#updown = abcd
# Hostaccess variable to pass to updown script.
# hostaccess = yes
# IPsec Mode to establish (tunnel, transport, beet, pass or
# drop).
mode = transport
# Whether to install IPsec policies or not.
policies = yes
# Action to perform on DPD timeout (clear, trap or restart).
# dpd_action = clear
# Enable IPComp compression before encryption.
# ipcomp = no
# Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity.
# inactivity = 0s
# Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA.
# reqid = 0
# Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic.
# mark_in = 0/0x00000000
# Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic.
# mark_out = 0/0x00000000
# Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding.
# tfc_padding = 0
# IPsec replay window to configure for this CHILD_SA.
# replay_window = 32
# Action to perform after loading the configuration (none,
trap,
# start).
# start_action = none
# Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed (none,
trap,
# start).
# close_action = none
}
}
}
}
