So, based on these entries on the log4j apache pages, I can't see that any 1x
product is vulnerable. Mark, is there some message from Apache that we can
share with those that need to know that for certain 1x log4j is NOT vulnerable?
News
CVE-2021-44228
The Log4j team has been made aware of a security vulnerability, CVE-2021-44228,
that has been addressed in Log4j 2.15.0.
Log4j's JNDI support has not restricted what names could be resolved. Some
protocols are unsafe or can allow remote code execution. Log4j now limits the
protocols by default to only java, ldap, and ldaps and limits the ldap
protocols to only accessing Java primitive objects by default served on the
local host.
One vector that allowed exposure to this vulnerability was Log4j's allowance of
Lookups to appear in log messages. As of Log4j 2.15.0 this feature is now
disabled by default. While an option has been provided to enable Lookups in
this fashion, users are strongly discouraged from enabling it.
For those who cannot upgrade to 2.15.0, in releases >=2.10, this behavior can
be mitigated by setting either the system property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or
the environment variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS to true. For releases
>=2.7 and <=2.14.1, all PatternLayout patterns can be modified to specify the
message converter as %m{nolookups} instead of just %m. For releases >=2.0-beta9
and <=2.10.0, the mitigation is to remove the JndiLookup class from the
classpath: zip -q -d log4j-core-*.jar
org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class.
Fixed in Log4j 2.15.0
CVE-2021-44228<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228>:
Apache Log4j2 JNDI features do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and
other JNDI related endpoints.
Severity: Critical
Base CVSS Score: 10.0 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Versions Affected: all log4j-core versions >=2.0-beta9 and <=2.14.1
Descripton: Apache Log4j <=2.14.1 JNDI features used in configuration, log
messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and
other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log
message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when
message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has
been disabled by default.
Mitigation: In releases >=2.10, this behavior can be mitigated by setting
either the system property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or the environment
variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS to true. For releases >=2.7 and <=2.14.1,
all PatternLayout patterns can be modified to specify the message converter as
%m{nolookups} instead of just %m. For releases >=2.0-beta9 and <=2.10.0, the
mitigation is to remove the JndiLookup class from the classpath: zip -q -d
log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class.
Credit: This issue was discovered by Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba Cloud Security
Team.
References: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3201 and
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3198
Thanks,
Dream * Excel * Explore * Inspire
Jon McAlexander
Infrastructure Engineer
Asst Vice President
Middleware Product Engineering
Enterprise CIO | EAS | Middleware | Infrastructure Solutions
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Tel 515-988-2508 | Cell 515-988-2508
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