I know that this is opening a can of worms, but I'm genuinely interested
in what people think about this:

Isn't security really an economic problem? It seems like the real goal
(since perfect security isn't possible) is to make defeating your
security measures too expensive to be worth defeating. That is, if it
costs me more time / money / resources to defeat you than I will gain by
doing so, then I just won't.

And on the flip side if it will cost me more to protect my assets than
I'd lose if someone took them then I also shouldn't bother.

Of course, really you don't just give up, or leave a system completely
open just because you don't have anything of value on it. But you might
spend less keeping your home computer secure than you would keeping your
department server secure. (When I say spend, I mean effort, time, etc.,
not just money).

Also, you aren't just protecting your assets from theft, but damage. 
And don't forget availability, or liability (if your machine is used to
attack another system). But my point is that all of these should be
figured into your potential losses when deciding how much (effort, time,
money) to spend protecting yourself.

Why is it okay to use a credit card online? (or anywhere for that
matter)? SSL has very little to do with it. The real reason it's okay to
use credit cards is that you can dispute the charges if it gets stolen.
The reason you make sure you're submitting your info over SSL is to see
that it's not trivial to steal. If it's as easy as running ettercap for
a few minutes to 'earn' a few thousand dollars why not?

I think this is true outside of technology as well. If I had $10 and got
mugged I'd hand over the money. Why? Because the mugger may do more than
$10 damage to me if I don't (even if I win or escape).

So to relate this back to the issue of implementing your own CHAP, it
seems like if you can make it very difficult to break (though clearly
not impossible) and you don't have anything vital to protect then your
own efforts are probably good enough.

Am I wrong?

Now you may say that breaking strong crypto isn't just expensive it's
impossible for the foreseeable future, but that's only if you ignore the
possibility that there's some other way of breaking it that you haven't
thought of (quantum computing, that algebraic attack on AES that hasn't
been proven yet). Still my point is that it would cost too much to break
for it to be worth the effort. 


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