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1. Ethnic Nationalism and Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
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Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2005 22:21:15 -0000
From: "RVS" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Ethnic Nationalism and Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Ethnic Nationalism and Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Neil DeVotta
Occasional ethnic tensions between Sri Lanka's majority Sinhalese and
minority Tamil communities notwithstanding, both groups had lived
together peacefully for centuries. Indeed, Sinhalese and Tamil elites
collaborated to attain universal franchise from the British colonial
authorities in 1931, merely three years before the British themselves
enjoyed such egalitarian status, and their camaraderie also enabled
the island to gain independence in 1948. But around 1955, just seven
years after independence, the island's Sinhalese elites began
outbidding each other on who could provide the best deal for their
community at the expense of the Tamils. The ethnocentrism that was
consequentially embedded led to the Tamils' marginalisation, and
their reactive nationalism eventually unleashed a gruesome civil war
that has killed nearly 70,000 persons and threatened to dismember Sri
Lanka. In what follows, this paper will argue that (i) Sinhalese
ethnocentrism contributed to the reactive Tamil nationalism that has
now culminated in civil war, (ii) an arrangement that jettisons the
unitary system and provides wide devolution to the mostly Tamil-
speaking northeast region is the optimum way to end the ethnic
conflict and (iii) Sri Lanka's very close relations with India should
also help ensure that the country stays united.
Ethnic Outbidding and the Politics of Opportunism
English continued to operate as the official language when Sri Lanka
(then called Ceylon) gained independence, despite only about 10 per
cent of the population speaking it fluently. It was thus
understandable why many Sinhalese and Tamil elites felt it was high
time the vernacular languages were given their rightful place, and
this led to a movement that called for replacing English with Sinhala
and Tamil as official languages. Sri Lanka's politicians in the
opposition, headed by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, however, realised
that linguistic nationalism could be manipulated to attain power, and
in 1955 his party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), began
demanding that only Sinhala be made the official language. The irony
is that Bandaranaike had been one of the strongest proponents of
linguistic parity, arguing that 'it would be ungenerous on our part
as Sinhalese not to give due recognition to the Tamil language1.' But
eager to become prime minister, Bandaranaike changed stripes and
began thundering that linguistic parity would spell 'disaster to the
Sinhalese race2.' The island's Tamil leaders had collaborated with
their Sinhalese counterparts to ensure that the transfer of power
from the British to the Ceylonese was a tidy affair, and this was
partly because Sinhalese elites had promised that they would not
abuse their majority status and instead treat the minority
communities fairly. The Sinhala-only movement was the first sign that
the concord reached among the elites was about to be sundered.
Making Sinhala the only official language, especially at a time when
the state was the largest employer, meant that those not speaking the
majority community's language stood marginalised and their socio-
economic upward mobility undermined. Part of the argument made by
those clamouring for Sinhala-only was that British colonial policies
had disproportionately benefited the minority communities. This was
certainly the case, given the British proclivity to divide and rule.
That noted, marginalising the Tamils and their legitimate aspirations
signalled that the majority Sinhalese state was unwilling to treat
its minorities fairly.
When it became clear that Bandaranaike was going to win the 1956
elections on the Sinhala-only platform, the governing United National
Party (UNP), which had hitherto strongly supported linguistic parity,
also changed positions, with Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala
claiming that he wanted Sinhala 'to be the official language as long
as the sun and moon shall last3.' Thereafter, the UNP and SLFP began
outbidding each other on who could provide the best deal to the
majority Sinhalese community at the expense of the minority
community. It was the beginning of Sri Lanka's outbidding culture
that has, in various other guises, continued to this day.
The political agitprop that Bandaranaike and his supporters resorted
to, made many Sinhalese believe that their socio-economic conditions
would be transformed overnight. This was pie-in-the-sky, and in
trying to appease their disgruntled Sinhalese constituencies,
subsequent Sinhalese politicians began promoting policies that
further undermined the Tamils. Some of these policies saw Tamils
forced to operate in Sinhala when dealing with the country's courts,
traditionally Tamils areas colonised by transplanted Sinhalese
settlers, resources earmarked for Tamil areas diverted to Sinhalese
areas, Buddhism (which is practiced by the vast majority of
Sinhalese) provided special status in the 1972 Constitution, and
quota systems instituted for tertiary education so that fewer Tamils
were admitted to the university system. The anti-Tamil riots that
ensued in 1956 and 1958 further consolidated Tamil opinion that the
Sinhalese were bent upon dominating and marginalising the minority
communities. The Tamils initially resorted to non-violent protests
when demanding that the language policies be reversed. But the
numerous pro-Sinhalese and anti-Tamil policies that were instituted
over the next two decades caused Tamil youths to mobilise seeking
separation. The more Sinhalese politicians disregarded legitimate
Tamil grievances -- so that even agreements reached between the two
groups' elites were abrogated once Sinhalese nationalists put
pressure on their leaders -- the more the moderate Tamil politicians
were made to look impotent and ineffective. The military was
stationed in Tamil areas in 1961, and the mostly Sinhalese soldiers
soon began operating in a ham-fisted fashion. The more these
miscreants in the military misbehaved with impunity, the more
marginalised the Tamils started to feel and the more it undermined
their confidence in the Sri Lankan state. A state may have a monopoly
on the use of force, but that force is legitimate only if used in a
fair and just fashion. Whenever state authorities resort to force to
dominate and marginalise a minority community, and utilise such
emotive issues as language and religion to stoke such subordination,
a territorialised minority is likely to rebel. This is indeed what
ensued in Sri Lanka4; especially after the 1983 anti-Tamil riots
killed 400-2000 Tamils5
It is clear that the opportunistic practices adopted by Sri Lanka's
Sinhalese elites, who cavalierly placed their personal political
ambitions ahead of the island's national interests, were what
legitimised Tamil extremism, though none could have envisioned it
would lead to the emergence of a militant group, such as the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), dominating the northeast. As
Nigel Harris has aptly observed, 'Successive [Sinhalese] governments
were more preoccupied with securing their own base among the
Sinhalese. . . at virtually any cost -- or rather, in the political
auction, preventing themselves being pushed out by their rivals. If
the Tamils had not existed, Colombo would have had to invent them.
And, in an important sense, it did. It was Colombo that forced the
inhabitants of the north to become different, to cease to be Sri
Lankan and become exclusively Tamil7.' Sri Lanka's present leaders
also agree: for example, President Kumaratunga has repeatedly
observed that the island has not succeeded in the crucial task of
nation building because its governments 'failed to address the issue
of building a truly pluralist nation state.' The former Prime
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has also noted that 'The Tamils tried
peaceful protests which soon degenerated into violence. With the
underlying grievances being unattended, the stage was set for
terrorist groups to emerge. Whatever the cause, the reality became
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam8.'
The LTTE is branded a terrorist outfit by a number of countries, and
Sri Lanka's future as a united island now also depends on what its
(LTTE's) leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, decides to ultimately
settle for. Since Sri Lanka's Sinhalese leaders continue to try to
outbid each other on all issues concerning the ethnic conflict, their
numerous enlightened pronouncements notwithstanding, they are more
interested in attaining and maintaining power than formulating a
lasting settlement that may see Sinhalese and Tamils coalesce9. That
the lessons learnt from 50 years of ethnic malpractice have not
managed to coax them away from such expeditious behaviour is one of
the attendant tragedies of the island's civil war
The Debate on Devolution
One would think that after all Sri Lanka has gone through there would
not be much debate on how a more devolved structure -- federal or
otherwise -- would be a welcome option, since that would maintain the
country's unity even as it satisfies the vast majority of Tamils.
Indeed, devolving power is the best option for both parties because
it requires the predominantly Sinhalese state and the LTTE to
compromise. Not only is devolution opposed by nationalist politicians
whose monomania over maintaining the extant unitary state structure
contributes to ethnocentric rhetoric, but the debate on devolution is
also used by mainstream leaders who adeptly manipulate the issue
(especially when in the opposition) to outbid their respective
opponents.
The Sinhala-only language policy had legitimised the Tamil demand for
increased autonomy in the northeast, which the Tamils have long
considered their traditional homeland, and the Federal Party (FP),
headed by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, made this its fundamental plank
when negotiating with Sinhalese leaders. Indeed, the FP and
Chelvanayakam were initially opposed to the country being divided and
instead only demanded devolution, since they believed that would
allow the Tamils to oversee their own affairs with some self respect
and prevent further colonisation of the northeast by Sinhalese
settlers10. Sinhalese nationalists, assisted by radical Buddhist
monks, campaigned against any form of devolution, claiming that such
a change would be the first step towards the island's dismemberment.
Indeed, the nationalist forces are assisted by the country's
omnipresent Buddhist monks who command veneration and influence among
the Sinhalese Buddhists11. Claiming that the island was destined to
be a repository for the Buddhist faith, the most radical among these
monks have promoted a military solution and long argued that all
minorities in the island live under the sufferance of the Sinhalese
Buddhists. These purportedly peace-loving monks have volunteered to
go house-to-house to promote such an outcome, abused and attacked pro-
peace activists, and even claimed that some of them are ready to
disrobe to join the army. The radical monks' ferocity even led the
state owned Sunday Observer to note that 'it is frightening to
observe the insouciance with which the most revered prelates of the
Maha Sangha talk of a recourse to arms12.' The monks were at the
forefront in forcing S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and others to abrogate
agreements that were reached with the Tamils, agreements that, if
implemented, could have ended the Sinhalese-Tamil antipathy that
followed the Sinhala only movement. But Sinhalese politicians have
long pandered to the monks' every whim and fancy to unleash an
invidious charade whereby the monks and the politicians shamelessly
manipulate each other to perpetuate their corrupt and divisive
designs13. These extremist monks in no way represent all monks in Sri
Lanka and they certainly do not represent the views of most
Buddhists14, have consequently had a baneful influence on the attempt
to seek a solution to the ethnic conflict between the LTTE and the
government.
The LTTE now oversees vast areas in the northeast, and the written
proposals the organisation made to the previous United National Front
(UNF) government in October 2003, if implemented, would enable a de
facto statelet. The vast majority of Sri Lankans now agree that the
ethnic issue may have been settled if Sinhalese leaders had agreed to
the modest demands the FP made in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet many
Sinhalese, no doubt influenced by the ethnocentric agitprop of the
nationalists, oppose any form of devolution and argue that the LTTE
should be militarily defeated. One president even had the chutzpah to
argue that what the country faced was not an ethnic problem but a
terrorist problem. That the terrorist problem was due to the majority
community's chauvinism was conveniently disregarded. The LTTE has
publicly stated that it could settle for a federal arrangement,
though its demands are more in line with a confederal set up15.
Indeed, it is highly questionable if the LTTE is sincere in its
claim, though one cannot be fully certain of this until the Sinhalese
parties craft a package that allows the northeast autonomy. The
LTTE's practices -- i.e., forcibly recruiting child soldiers,
unleashing suicide bombers, assassinating its Tamil rivals, and not
tolerating a modicum of dissent -- have provided ample fodder for
these nationalists to hold strongly to their extremist beliefs. The
irony is that while it was the extremist and ethnocentric actions of
the radical Sinhalese that legitimated the rise of the LTTE, now it
is the LTTE's actions that have provided the extremist Sinhalese with
the legitimacy to operate in the most intransigent fashion.
Those against devolution have also opposed the activities of civil
society groups, and they pillory the Norwegians who have been
facilitating the peace talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan
state. The nationalists and many Sinhalese consider the Norwegians to
be biased in favour of the LTTE, and a member of the SLFP -- before
the party, as part of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA)
coalition, returned to power in April 2004 -- even derogatorily
referred to the Norwegian representatives as 'salmon eating
busybodies.' Civil society groups are especially lambasted as
parasitic organisations that have used the ethnic conflict to pursue
agendas inimical to the island's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. As the newspaper Island, which toes the nationalist line,
argued: 'Now, who constitutes Sri Lanka's civil society? Gullible
foreign organisations have fallen into the trap of recognising groups
of wishy-washy individuals who have no standing in Sri Lankan
society. These groups hobnobbing at embassy functions, milking
foreign monetary and travel grants are mostly those who have failed
to gain entry to Sri Lankan universities and gone abroad on various
scholarships . . . and come back with doctorates in law and other
esoteric subjects. Others are those who have been sponsored by anti-
national Sri Lankan interests, determined to change the religious and
cultural outlook of this country and distort its history16.' Such
caustic rhetoric stems from the nationalists; belief that the LTTE is
not to be trusted and that the group does not qualify to be regarded
as the Tamils' sole representative (a principle LTTE demand). They
are most likely right, but two decades of war have proven that there
is unlikely to be a military solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic
conflict. The only reason successive governments have decided to talk
peace with the LTTE is because of the rebels' military prowess. There
can consequently be no peace to the island's ethnic imbroglio unless
the government talks to the LTTE -- irrespective of whether the
rebels at this stage are willing to settle for an arrangement short
of eelam (Tamil state) or not. What will mostly help the government's
position is a united southern front, whereby parties would come
together across the ideological spectrum to form a national
government determined to devolve power to the northeast in a fair
fashion while maintaining the island's territorial integrity. But
rampant ethnic outbidding among Sinhalese politicians has prevented
such an association, and that by itself is reason enough for the LTTE
to believe it has to keep the military option open.
The India Factor
There is no gainsaying that India's preferences will play a big role
in how conflict resolution transpires in Sri Lanka. With only 22
miles of the shallow Palk Strait separating Sri Lanka from India, all
parties well understand that an outcome undermining Indian interests
in the region cannot be implemented17 As president Chandrika
Kumaratunga has noted: 'India is our immediate neighbour, with whom
we have been inextricably bound by ties, the origins of which have
long been lost in the mist of time. We have with India the broadest
and deepest interaction that we as a nation could have with another
state. India therefore possesses the capacity, given her vastly
disparate strength and influence, to help or hinder (us) to a great
extent. In a word the India factor is crucial to the existence of our
nation. Forging and sustaining a mutually trusting and supportive
friendship with India must therefore be for us, not just a conscious
and soundly judged policy . . . [but] a natural and vital ingredient
for our national well being18.' Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar
has likewise stated that 'there can be no viable solution to our
problem without the support of India19.'
In a real sense, the policies pursued during the early years of the
J. R. Jayewardene administration (1977-88) and India's angry reaction
to these policies is what has convinced Sri Lankan leaders to
scrupulously take Indian interests into account. The pro-west, pro-
free trade Jayewardene administration disregarded India's strategic
concerns and began promoting policies that India felt was inimical to
its interests. The more the government's structural adjustment
policies became tied to its legitimacy, the more it embraced the west
and distanced itself from India. Its anti-Tamils actions further
angered the Tamil Nadu electorate and Indian leaders20. Indira Gandhi
and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) responded by arming and
training Tamil rebels. The LTTE ultimately became the most dominant
rebel group, and when an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) deployed in
1987 in the northeast failed to keep the peace, the IPKF ended up
fighting the LTTE. What ensued has been branded 'India's Vietnam'
and 'India's Afghanistan21.' Fearing that the IPKF may be redeployed
if Rajiv Gandhi was to be re-elected, the LTTE used a suicide bomber
to assassinate Gandhi in 1991. The IPKF experience and Gandhi's
killing have made the Indians cautious -- and some would argue
overcautious -- when dealing especially with Sri Lanka's ethnic
conflict, so much so that in May 2000 the Indians refused to directly
intervene to save nearly 40,000 Sri Lankan soldiers when it seemed
like they were on the verge of being captured by the LTTE22.
The LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and many Sri Lankan leaders
using suicide bombers and the forcible recruitment of child soldiers
are two reasons a number of states, including the United States, have
branded the group a terrorist organisation. Though they initially
opposed internationalising the conflict, successive Sri Lankan
governments have welcomed the international involvement, as that has
further marginalised the LTTE among the international community. Thus
the Norwegians, much to the chagrin of Sinhalese nationalists, have
operated as facilitators between the Sri Lankan government and the
LTTE while Japanese and European Union diplomats have also stepped in
and conducted discussions between the two antagonists. Throughout,
Sri Lankan leaders and their foreign counterparts have kept the
Indians fully informed of their dealings with the LTTE. Indeed, Sri
Lankan leaders in the past few years have travelled to New Delhi so
frequently to genuflect before Indian leaders and, more
ignominiously, to bicker about their respective political opponents
that they are generally regarded an embarrassment to most independent
minded Sri Lankans.
Soon after the UPFA came to power in April 2004, the new Sri Lankan
foreign minister flew to New Delhi and asked the Indians to get more
involved in the peace process. With the Indians unwilling to see a
separate Tamil state created in Sri Lanka and also vehemently opposed
to the LTTE's activities in the region -- especially the group's
naval capability that is used to smuggle in arms and its harassment
of Indian fishermenSri Lanka's leaders are right to want increased
Indian involvement in the peace process. The problem, however, is
that the LTTE is unlikely to consider India a dispassionate third
party to the conflict given the IPKF-LTTE war and the undiminished
Indian antipathy towards the group, the Indian warrant still in place
for Vellupillai Prabhakaran's arrest (given his alleged involvement
in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination), and the LTTE's continued
proscription as a terrorist group in India. The Congress Party, for
obvious reasons, has been more anti-LTTE, and it even made clear
before the April-May 2004 Indian elections that Prabhakaran's
extradition 'remains on the table and there is no question of it
being withdrawn23.' The Congress, as a part of coalition, has now
regained power in India, and this makes it even more unlikely India
would act as a facilitator, although its preferences would continue
to be taken into account and its military support for the government
against the LTTE could most likely grow.
The Sri Lankan government under Sirimavo Bandaranaike (President
Kumaratunga's mother) enjoyed exceedingly friendly relations with
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and there is every reason to believe
that President Kumaratunga and Sonia Gandhi (representing Congress)
would enjoy equally close relations. Indeed, both women have had
similar experiences: belonging to political dynasties, raising two
children as single mothers after their spouses were assassinated by
extremists24, and replacing their husbands to head political parties.
Both also aspire to see their children succeed them at the helm of
their respective parties. Moreover, Kumaratunga escaped an
assassination attempt by the LTTE, while Sonia (Gandhi)'s husband was
killed by the LTTE, and this should intensify the empathy they are
bound to have for each other. It is hard to predict how Dr Manmohan
Singh, Sonia Gandhi and the Congress Party will deal with the LTTE.
On the one hand, the parties Congress allied with in Tamil Nadu for
the 2004 elections either sympathise with the LTTE (i.e., Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam, DMK) or openly support it (i.e, Pattali Makkal
Katchi and Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam), which suggests
that Congress may not pursue too drastic a policy against the LTTE.
On the other hand, it is also clear that as long as Sonia Gandhi and
her children play a leading role in the Congress Party a separate
Tamil state in Sri Lanka, even if attained militarily, would never be
condoned by the Indians, which is to say that it will also not be
recognised internationally.
Some claim that the main reason India opposes an independent Tamil
state in Sri Lanka is because that would radicalise separatist
elements in Tamil Nadu. This is a dubious argument, given the extent
to which India has succeeded in making South Indians think of
themselves as Indian -- something the Sri Lankan state has failed to
do with its northern Tamils -- and given the impotence of these
supposedly separatist elements in South India. This line of reasoning
is also questionable given that the LTTE craves closer relations with
India and would rather support Indian interests than be subjected to
the ethnocentric dictates of predominantly Sinhalese governments. An
independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka will no doubt embolden
separatists in Kashmir and insurgents in India's northeast. Indeed,
separatist elements throughout the world would likely wonder why they
should not succeed in their quests for independence if the LTTE was
able to carve out a separate state in a small island like Sri Lanka.
However, separatist groups rarely achieve success25, which does not
bode well for the LTTE's quest to create eelam (an independent Tamil
state). Consequently, the LTTE may ultimately have to jettison the
struggle for eelam and instead settle for a more devolved structure,
albeit one with more autonomy for Tamils than India and Sri Lanka
prefer. This, too, would depend on intra-Sinhalese politics and
India's involvement in the island.
Conclusion
In the mid-1950s opportunistic and unprincipled Sinhalese leaders
began sowing the seeds of ethnocentrism to capture power, and in
doing so the island reaped an ethnic conflict. The subsequent civil
war has caused untold misery to tens of thousands of innocent
civilians and exacerbated the regional security dynamic in South
Asia, even as it has allowed the country's elites to continue to
practice ethnic outbidding. Like a repetitive nightmare, Sri Lanka's
politicians in the opposition keep coming up with reasons to disagree
with the respective government's policies to bridge the ethnic
divide, even when the policies advocated are the same as those the
opposition may have propounded when in power. Thus, the United
National Front, which was relegated to the opposition after the April
2, 2004 parliamentary elections, has threatened to oppose the UPFA's
attempts to continue the peace process with the LTTE, claiming that
the UPFA criticised the UNF's approach to peace when it was in the
opposition but has now embraced the same positions merely because it
wants to ensure a parliamentary majority26 and receive the billions
of dollars pledged by international donors to the peace process27.
Such political opportunism is the LTTE's best ally, and the resulting
outbidding is also the LTTE's best argument as to why the Tamils
cannot trust Sinhalese elites and therefore qualify to create eelam.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
(Neil DeVotta is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Hartwick
College, New York)
End Notes
Ceylon State Council, Debates, 25 May 1944, pp. 810-11.
'Parity Means Disaster to SinhaleseSWRD', Ceylon Daily News, 24
November, 1955, p. 7.
'Sinhalese Only -- 'If the UNP Gets 68 Seats or Less', Ceylon Daily
News, 15 March, 1956, p. 5.
See Neil DeVotta, 'Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the
Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,' Pacific
Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 55-76. Also see A.
Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and
Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2000).
Patricia Hyndman, Sri Lanka: Serendipity Under Siege (Nottingham, UK:
Spokesman, 1988).
Nigel Harris, National Liberation (London, I. B. Tauris, 1990), p.
221.
Quoted in 'Massacre a Conspiracy by LTTE: Chandrika', The Hindu, Nov.
1, 2000 at wysiwyg://36/http://www.the-hindu.com/holnus/03011801/htm.
(accessed Nov. 2, 2000).
Quoted in 'Our Approach for a Better Tomorrow Free from Terrorism',
Daily News, July 25, 2002 at
http://www.dailynews.lk/2002/07/25/fea01.html. (accessed July 25,
2002).
This was (made) especially clear by how Chandrika Kumaratunga and her
allies vilified the UNP led United National Front coalition for
negotiating with the LTTE in a way that supposedly compromised Sri
Lanka's sovereignty, even though the president and her United
People's Freedom Alliance government that came to power in April 2004
have sought to continue the peace process in the exact same manner.
A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri
Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 1947-1977 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2000).
While about ten per cent of the Sinhalese population is Christian,
Sinhalese Buddhists and Christians coalesced in the mid 1950s to
clamour for a Sinhala-only policy to be instituted. However, the
nationalists' recent violent actions against Christian evangelicals,
who are said to be 'unethically converting' Buddhists, has caused
tension between Buddhist and Christian Sinhalese.
See 'The Maha Sangha and the Nation', The Sunday Observer, March 19,
2000, at http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2000/03/19. (accessed on March
20, 2000).
See H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: the New Buddhism in Sri
Lanka (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Stanley J.
Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri
Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
See Seneviratne, The Work of Kings; Chandra R. de Silva, 'The
Plurality of Buddhist Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into Views among
Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka', in Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra
R. de Silva (eds.), Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities
in Sri Lanka, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press,
1998), pp. 53-73.
See Neil DeVotta, 'Sri Lanka in 2003: Seeking to Consolidate Peace',
Asian Survey, vol. XLIV, no. 1 (January/February 2004), pp. 49-55.
'The Peace Brokers are Back', Island, May 9, 2004, at Island
http://www.island.lk/2004/05/10/editoria.html. (accessed May 9,
2004).
P. V. J. Jayasekera (ed.), Security Dilemma of a Small State: Sri
Lanka in the South Asian Context, vol. 1 (New Delhi: South Asian
Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1992).
Quoted in K. Godage, 'India and Our Peace Process,' Island, May 9,
2004, at http://www.island.lk/2004/05/09/politi03.html. (accessed May
9, 2004).
Quoted in 'Both Major Parties Corrupt,' Island, May 15, 2005, at
http://www.island.lk/2004/05/15/news04.html. (accessed May 15, 2004).
See Neil DeVotta, 'Sri Lanka's Structural Adjustment Program and its
Impact on Indo-Lanka Relations,' Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 5, May
1998, pp. 457-73.
Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2001), p. 149.
For details see Neil DeVotta, 'Is India Over-extended? When Domestic
Disorder Precludes Regional Intervention,' Contemporary South Asia,
vol. 12, no. 3, September 2003, pp. 365-380.
As reported in Daily Mirror, 'Kadir Sees no Policy Shift by India,'
May 15, 2004, at http://www.dailymirror.lk/2004/05/15/front/2.asp.
(accessed May 15, 2004). Indeed, the Indians have even advertised in
Sri Lanka's press seeking information on Prabhakaran's whereabouts.
However, many close to the LTTE make clear that Prabhakaran has no
intention of spending a single day in an Indian or Sri Lankan jail,
and a LTTE representative is reported to have sarcastically said that
those who want to extradite Prabhakaran should go to the Wanni (the
jungle area the LTTE controls) and try to apprehend him.
As already noted, an LTTE suicide bomber assassinated Rajiv Gandhi,
while Kumaratunga's husband was said to have been killed by the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation FrontJVP) in February
1988. Since allying with the JVP to create the UPFA, Kumaratunga has
conveniently sought to implicate the UNP in the assassination.
Donald L. Horowitz, 'The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede,'
Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, April 2003, pp. 5-17.
Neither coalition was able to garner sufficient seats to ensure a
majority in parliament. The main parties are thus heavily dependent
on minority parties, including the Tamil National Alliance, which now
operates as the LTTE's proxy.
'UNF Rejects UPFA Peace Talks as Sham,' Daily Mirror, May 14, 2004,
at http://www.dailmirror.lk/2004/05/14/front/2.asp. (accessed May 15,
2004).
http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/6_ethnic_nationalism.h
tm
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