On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 03:14:46PM -0700, Siwei Liu wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 7:28 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 03:57:57PM -0700, Siwei Liu wrote:
> >> On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 3:22 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com>
> >> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 02:38:57PM -0700, Siwei Liu wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 1:06 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com>
> >> >> wrote:
> >> >> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 12:44:39PM -0700, Siwei Liu wrote:
> >> >> >> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:56 AM, Michael S. Tsirkin
> >> >> >> <m...@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> >> >> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:44:40AM -0700, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> >> >> >> >> On Mon, 23 Apr 2018 20:24:56 +0300
> >> >> >> >> "Michael S. Tsirkin" <m...@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:04:06AM -0700, Stephen Hemminger
> >> >> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >> >> >> > > > >
> >> >> >> >> > > > >I will NAK patches to change to common code for netvsc
> >> >> >> >> > > > >especially the
> >> >> >> >> > > > >three device model. MS worked hard with distro vendors to
> >> >> >> >> > > > >support transparent
> >> >> >> >> > > > >mode, ans we really can't have a new model; or do backport.
> >> >> >> >> > > > >
> >> >> >> >> > > > >Plus, DPDK is now dependent on existing model.
> >> >> >> >> > > >
> >> >> >> >> > > > Sorry, but nobody here cares about dpdk or other similar
> >> >> >> >> > > > oddities.
> >> >> >> >> > >
> >> >> >> >> > > The network device model is a userspace API, and DPDK is a
> >> >> >> >> > > userspace application.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > It is userspace but are you sure dpdk is actually poking at
> >> >> >> >> > netdevs?
> >> >> >> >> > AFAIK it's normally banging device registers directly.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > > You can't go breaking userspace even if you don't like the
> >> >> >> >> > > application.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > Could you please explain how is the proposed patchset breaking
> >> >> >> >> > userspace? Ignoring DPDK for now, I don't think it changes the
> >> >> >> >> > userspace
> >> >> >> >> > API at all.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> The DPDK has a device driver vdev_netvsc which scans the Linux
> >> >> >> >> network devices
> >> >> >> >> to look for Linux netvsc device and the paired VF device and
> >> >> >> >> setup the
> >> >> >> >> DPDK environment. This setup creates a DPDK failsafe
> >> >> >> >> (bondingish) instance
> >> >> >> >> and sets up TAP support over the Linux netvsc device as well as
> >> >> >> >> the Mellanox
> >> >> >> >> VF device.
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> So it depends on existing 2 device model. You can't go to a 3
> >> >> >> >> device model
> >> >> >> >> or start hiding devices from userspace.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Okay so how does the existing patch break that? IIUC does not go to
> >> >> >> > a 3 device model since netvsc calls failover_register directly.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> Also, I am working on associating netvsc and VF device based on
> >> >> >> >> serial number
> >> >> >> >> rather than MAC address. The serial number is how Windows works
> >> >> >> >> now, and it makes
> >> >> >> >> sense for Linux and Windows to use the same mechanism if possible.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Maybe we should support same for virtio ...
> >> >> >> > Which serial do you mean? From vpd?
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > I guess you will want to keep supporting MAC for old hypervisors?
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > It all seems like a reasonable thing to support in the generic
> >> >> >> > core.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> That's the reason why I chose explicit identifier rather than rely on
> >> >> >> MAC address to bind/pair a device. MAC address can change. Even if it
> >> >> >> can't, malicious guest user can fake MAC address to skip binding.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> -Siwei
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Address should be sampled at device creation to prevent this
> >> >> > kind of hack. Not that it buys the malicious user much:
> >> >> > if you can poke at MAC addresses you probably already can
> >> >> > break networking.
> >> >>
> >> >> I don't understand why poking at MAC address may potentially break
> >> >> networking.
> >> >
> >> > Set a MAC address to match another device on the same LAN,
> >> > packets will stop reaching that MAC.
> >>
> >> What I meant was guest users may create a virtual link, say veth that
> >> has exactly the same MAC address as that for the VF, which can easily
> >> get around of the binding procedure.
> >
> > This patchset limits binding to PCI devices so it won't be affected
> > by any hacks around virtual devices.
>
> Wait, I vaguely recall you seemed to like to generalize this feature
> to non-PCI device.
It's purely a layering thing. It is cleaner not to have PCI specific
data in the device-specific transport-independent section of the virtio
spec.
> But now you're saying it should stick to PCI. It's
> not that I'm reluctant with sticking to PCI. The fact is that I don't
> think we can go with implementation until the semantics of the
> so-called _F_STANDBY feature can be clearly defined into the spec.
> Previously the boundary of using MAC address as the identifier for
> bonding was quite confusing to me. And now PCI adds to the matrix.
PCI is simply one way to exclude software NICs. It's not the most
elegant one, but it will cover many setups. We can add more types, but
we do want to exclude software devices since these have
not been supplied by the hypervisor.
> However it still does not gurantee uniqueness I think. It's almost
> incorrect of choosing MAC address as the ID in the beginning since
> that has the implication of breaking existing configs.
IMO there's no chance it will break any existing config since
no existing config sets _F_STANDBY.
> I don't think
> libvirt or QEMU today retricts the MAC address to be unique per VM
> instance. Neither the virtio spec mentions that.
You really don't have to.
> In addition, it's difficult to fake PCI device on Linux does not mean
> the same applies to other OSes that is going to implement this VirtIO
> feature. It's a fragile assumption IMHO.
What an OS does internally is its own business.
What we are telling the guest here is simply that the virtio NIC is
actually the same device as some other NIC. At this point we do not
specify this other NIC in any way. So how do you find it? Well it has
to have the same MAC clearly.
You point out that there could be multiple NICs with the same
MAC in theory. It's a broken config generally but since it
kind of works in some setups maybe it's worth supporting.
If so we can look for ways to make the matching more specific by e.g.
adding more flags but I see that as a separate issue,
and pretty narrow in scope.
> >
> >> There's no explicit flag to
> >> identify a VF or pass-through device AFAIK. And sometimes this happens
> >> maybe due to user misconfiguring the link. This process should be
> >> hardened to avoid from any potential configuration errors.
> >
> > They are still PCI devices though.
> >
> >> >
> >> >> Unlike VF, passthrough PCI endpoint device has its freedom
> >> >> to change the MAC address. Even on a VF setup it's not neccessarily
> >> >> always safe to assume the VF's MAC address cannot or shouldn't be
> >> >> changed. That depends on the specific need whether the host admin
> >> >> wants to restrict guest from changing the MAC address, although in
> >> >> most cases it's true.
> >> >>
> >> >> I understand we can use the perm_addr to distinguish. But as said,
> >> >> this will pose limitation of flexible configuration where one can
> >> >> assign VFs with identical MAC address at all while each VF belongs to
> >> >> different PF and/or different subnet for e.g. load balancing.
> >> >> And
> >> >> furthermore, the QEMU device model never uses MAC address to be
> >> >> interpreted as an identifier, which requires to be unique per VM
> >> >> instance. Why we're introducing this inconsistency?
> >> >>
> >> >> -Siwei
> >> >
> >> > Because it addresses most of the issues and is simple. That's already
> >> > much better than what we have now which is nothing unless guest
> >> > configures things manually.
> >>
> >> Did you see my QEMU patch for using BDF as the grouping identifier?
> >
> > Yes. And I don't think it can work because bus numbers are
> > guest specified.
>
> I know it's not ideal but perhaps its the best one can do in the KVM
> world without adding complex config e.g. PCI bridge.
KVM is just a VMX/SVM driver. I think you mean QEMU. And well -
"best one can do" is a high bar to clear.
> Even if bus
> number is guest specified, it's readily available in the guest and
> recognizable by any OS, while on the QEMU configuration users specify
> an id instead of the bus number. Unlike Hyper-V PCI bus, I don't think
> there exists a para-virtual PCI bus in QEMU backend to expose VPD
> capability to a passthrough device.
We can always add more interfaces if we need them. But let's be clear
that we are adding an interface and what are we trying to fix by doing
it. Let's not mix it as part of the failover discussion.
> >
> >> And there can be others like what you suggested, but the point is that
> >> it's requried to support explicit grouping mechanism from day one,
> >> before the backup property cast into stones.
> >
> > Let's start with addressing simple configs with just two NICs.
> >
> > Down the road I can see possible extensions that can work: for example,
> > require that devices are on the same pci bridge. Or we could even make
> > the virtio device actually include a pci bridge (as part of same
> > or a child function), the PT would have to be
> > behind it.
> >
> > As long as we are not breaking anything, adding more flags to fix
> > non-working configurations is always fair game.
>
> While it may work, the PCI bridge has NUMA and IOMMU implications that
> would restrict the current flexibility to group devices.
It's interesting you should mention that.
If you want to be flexible in placing the primary device WRT NUMA and
IOMMU, and given that both IOMMU and NUMA are keyed by the bus address,
then doesn't this completely break the idea of passing
the bus address to the guest?
> I'm not sure
> if vIOMMU would have to be introduced inadvertently for
> isolation/protection of devices under the PCI bridge which may cause
> negative performance impact on the VF.
No idea how do you introduce an IOMMU inadvertently.
> >
> >> This is orthogonal to
> >> device model being proposed, be it 1-netdev or not. Delaying it would
> >> just mean support and compatibility burden, appearing more like a
> >> design flaw rather than a feature to add later on.
> >
> > Well it's mostly myself who gets to support it, and I see the device
> > model as much more fundamental as userspace will come to depend
> > on it. So I'm not too worried, let's take this one step at a time.
> >
> >> >
> >> > I think ideally the infrastructure should suppport flexible matching of
> >> > NICs - netvsc is already reported to be moving to some kind of serial
> >> > address.
> >> >
> >> As Stephen said, Hyper-V supports the serial UUID thing from day-one.
> >> It's just the Linux netvsc guest driver itself does not leverage that
> >> ID from the very beginging.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >> -Siwei
> >
> > We could add something like this, too. For example,
> > we could add a virtual VPD capability with a UUID.
>
> I'm not an expert on that and wonder how you could do this (add a
> virtual VPD capability with a UUID to passthrough device) with
> existing QEMU emulation model and native PCI bus.
I think I see an elegant way to do that.
You could put it in the port where you want to stick you PT device.
Here's how it could work then:
- standby virtio device is tied to a pci bridge.
Tied how? Well it could be
- behind this bridge
- include a bridge internally
- have the bridge as a PCI function
- include a bridge and the bridge as a PCI function
- have a VPD or serial capability with same UUID as the bridge
- primary passthrough device is placed behind a bridge
*with the same ID*
- either simply behind the same bridge
- or behind another bridge with the same UUID.
The treatment could also be limited just to bridges which have a
specific vendor/device id (maybe a good idea), or in any other arbitrary
way.
> >
> > Do you know how exactly does hyperv pass the UUID for NICs?
>
> Stephen might know it more and can correct me. But my personal
> interpretation is that the SN is a host generated 32 bit sequence
> number which is unique per VM instance and gets propogated to guest
> via the para-virtual Hyper-V PCI bus.
>
> Regards,
> -Siwei
Ah, so it's a Hyper-V thing.
> >
> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > --
> >> >> >> > MST
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