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Today's Topics:
1. looking for advice on international fraud that took place via
an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed (Matt Yaklin)
2. Re: looking for advice on international fraud that took place
via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed (Matt Yaklin)
3. Re: looking for advice on international fraud that took place
via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed (Brad Anouar)
4. Re: looking for advice on international fraud that took place
via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed (Matt Yaklin)
5. Re: looking for advice on international fraud that took place
via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed (Monterrosa Santiago)
6. Re: looking for advice on international fraud that took place
via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed (David Thompson)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 12:30:36 -0400 (EDT)
From: Matt Yaklin <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that
took place via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; format=flowed; charset=US-ASCII
Hi all,
I had some toll fraud to Grenada last night which we stopped as soon
as we became aware of it. Example numbers being dialed were:
1-473-405-0085
1-473-405-0084
1-473-405-0088
Normally I can track down how it happened to figure out who was at fault.
But this time I am having a hard time.
The customer has two types of service from us. Yealink phones connected
to our Broadsoft system with an Edgemarc 200EW installed at the customer
premise. They also have some POTS line with us for faxing. One of those
POTS lines is connected to the Edgemarc 200EW via the built in FXO port
for "Survivability". Meaning if the WAN ethernet port on the Edgemarc has
a failure they can at least have one line to dial out on in case of an
emergency. That is about the only time it would ever be used except for
faxing.
The toll fraud CPN just happens to be that POTS line connected to the
Edgemarc. That POTS line is also connected to a very basic fax machine.
In the Edgemarc for that FXO port two stage dialing is disabled in
both directions. We had incoming calls on the FXO line being forward to a
Yealink phone but that would never function properly due to the customer
having a fax line picking up first. Just leftover config during the
install where we made an assumption the customer might want it.
The Yealink phones are behind the Edgemarc (NAT) and not reachable via the
internet. The Edgemarc is using radius for user auth and has strong
passwords set. I cannot find any config in Broadsoft where a user
had call forwarding setup or whatever that would cause this. I cannot find
any settings in the Edgemarc that would allow this to take place. As in
a config mistake.
The Edgemarc is running code Version 11.6.19.
The Yealink phones are also up2date with the newest code from the vendor's
website.
I do not think this fraud was done on site via physical means. It is
a school and I just cannot picture a student or faculty having a need
to call Grenada.
The Edgemarc does have port 5060 open to the world but it is just a ?proxy?
I was under the impression that one cannot brute force an account on a
proxy device that has no config as such like an asterisk box would. You
would be basically brute forcing against Broadsoft in that case?
Either way I am still digging into things but I thought by sending this
email someone might have some advice to clue me into something I am
missing when it comes to Edgemarc and FXO security.
Thanks,
[email protected]
------------------------------
Message: 2
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 13:01:46 -0400 (EDT)
From: Matt Yaklin <[email protected]>
To: Keith Croxford <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that
took place via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
Keith,
Since radius server authentication is enabled any attempt
to login as rouser would go via that method. My radius server
does not have a rouser.
Only when the Edgemarc cannot reach the radius server or when
the radius secret password is incorrect would it fall back to
local auth.
But yes we changed it during the initial config. It is not
a very strong password though since we are limited to 6-8
characters by the software. I just think the attacker never
had a chance to use it since the device has been online
and reachable via our network.
[email protected]
On Fri, 1 Nov 2013, Keith Croxford wrote:
> Do you have the 'read only' user password changed on the Edgemarc? I've seen
> interesting problems occur when the 'read
> only' account is vulnerable.
>
> Keith
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Matt Yaklin <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> I had some toll fraud to Grenada last night which we stopped as soon
> as we became aware of it. Example numbers being dialed were:
>
> 1-473-405-0085
> 1-473-405-0084
> 1-473-405-0088
>
> Normally I can track down how it happened to figure out who was at
> fault.
> But this time I am having a hard time.
>
> The customer has two types of service from us. Yealink phones connected
> to our Broadsoft system with an Edgemarc 200EW installed at the customer
> premise. They also have some POTS line with us for faxing. One of those
> POTS lines is connected to the Edgemarc 200EW via the built in FXO port
> for "Survivability". Meaning if the WAN ethernet port on the Edgemarc
> has
> a failure they can at least have one line to dial out on in case of an
> emergency. That is about the only time it would ever be used except for
> faxing.
>
> The toll fraud CPN just happens to be that POTS line connected to the
> Edgemarc. That POTS line is also connected to a very basic fax machine.
>
> In the Edgemarc for that FXO port two stage dialing is disabled in
> both directions. We had incoming calls on the FXO line being forward to
> a
> Yealink phone but that would never function properly due to the customer
> having a fax line picking up first. Just leftover config during the
> install where we made an assumption the customer might want it.
>
> The Yealink phones are behind the Edgemarc (NAT) and not reachable via
> the
> internet. The Edgemarc is using radius for user auth and has strong
> passwords set. I cannot find any config in Broadsoft where a user
> had call forwarding setup or whatever that would cause this. I cannot
> find
> any settings in the Edgemarc that would allow this to take place. As in
> a config mistake.
>
> The Edgemarc is running code Version 11.6.19.
> The Yealink phones are also up2date with the newest code from the
> vendor's
> website.
>
> I do not think this fraud was done on site via physical means. It is
> a school and I just cannot picture a student or faculty having a need
> to call Grenada.
>
> The Edgemarc does have port 5060 open to the world but it is just a
> ?proxy?
> I was under the impression that one cannot brute force an account on a
> proxy device that has no config as such like an asterisk box would. You
> would be basically brute forcing against Broadsoft in that case?
>
> Either way I am still digging into things but I thought by sending this
> email someone might have some advice to clue me into something I am
> missing when it comes to Edgemarc and FXO security.
>
> Thanks,
>
> [email protected]
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
>
>
>
------------------------------
Message: 3
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 16:54:20 +0000
From: Brad Anouar <[email protected]>
To: Matt Yaklin <[email protected]>, "[email protected]"
<[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that
took place via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Message-ID:
<[email protected]>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Matt,
Assuming that the accounts associated with the POTS lines are registering
users, have you already considered the fact that the attack could've originated
somewhere other than the edgemark?
Have you checked the auth/pass for the users associated with the POTS lines? Is
international calling enabled for these users? Do they have a voice portal?
Brad Anouar
Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone
----- Reply message -----
From: "Matt Yaklin" <[email protected]>
To: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Subject: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that took place
via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Date: Fri, Nov 1, 2013 9:31 AM
Hi all,
I had some toll fraud to Grenada last night which we stopped as soon
as we became aware of it. Example numbers being dialed were:
1-473-405-0085
1-473-405-0084
1-473-405-0088
Normally I can track down how it happened to figure out who was at fault.
But this time I am having a hard time.
The customer has two types of service from us. Yealink phones connected
to our Broadsoft system with an Edgemarc 200EW installed at the customer
premise. They also have some POTS line with us for faxing. One of those
POTS lines is connected to the Edgemarc 200EW via the built in FXO port
for "Survivability". Meaning if the WAN ethernet port on the Edgemarc has
a failure they can at least have one line to dial out on in case of an
emergency. That is about the only time it would ever be used except for
faxing.
The toll fraud CPN just happens to be that POTS line connected to the
Edgemarc. That POTS line is also connected to a very basic fax machine.
In the Edgemarc for that FXO port two stage dialing is disabled in
both directions. We had incoming calls on the FXO line being forward to a
Yealink phone but that would never function properly due to the customer
having a fax line picking up first. Just leftover config during the
install where we made an assumption the customer might want it.
The Yealink phones are behind the Edgemarc (NAT) and not reachable via the
internet. The Edgemarc is using radius for user auth and has strong
passwords set. I cannot find any config in Broadsoft where a user
had call forwarding setup or whatever that would cause this. I cannot find
any settings in the Edgemarc that would allow this to take place. As in
a config mistake.
The Edgemarc is running code Version 11.6.19.
The Yealink phones are also up2date with the newest code from the vendor's
website.
I do not think this fraud was done on site via physical means. It is
a school and I just cannot picture a student or faculty having a need
to call Grenada.
The Edgemarc does have port 5060 open to the world but it is just a ?proxy?
I was under the impression that one cannot brute force an account on a
proxy device that has no config as such like an asterisk box would. You
would be basically brute forcing against Broadsoft in that case?
Either way I am still digging into things but I thought by sending this
email someone might have some advice to clue me into something I am
missing when it comes to Edgemarc and FXO security.
Thanks,
[email protected]
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
[email protected]
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
------------------------------
Message: 4
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 13:20:04 -0400 (EDT)
From: Matt Yaklin <[email protected]>
To: Brad Anouar <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that
took place via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
Hi Brad,
On Fri, 1 Nov 2013, Brad Anouar wrote:
> Hi Matt,
>
> Assuming that the accounts associated with the POTS lines are registering
> users,
> have you already considered the fact that the attack could've originated
> somewhere other than the edgemark?
> Have you checked the auth/pass for the users associated with the POTS lines?
If I understood you correctly I think this will answer your
question. The POTS line is not SIP at all. It is a POTS line provided
out of our legacy Coppercom voice switch. It travels via GR303 to
a central office and from there to the customer premise via Pairgain
SHDSL gear. That gear muxes up to 6 POTS lines down a single copper
pair to the customer premise. A little CPE unmuxes them.
My CDR records on my border T7000 switch clearly show the call
coming from the Coppercom switch via SS7 trunks and then going out
to Level3.
All of this is TDM based POTS lines. No SIP at all when discussing
the POTS line.
So based on that the call had to be generated at the customer premise
in some fashion. The Edgemarc is the most likely culprit unless physical
access was used to make the calls.
> Is international calling enabled for these users?
It was on the Broadsoft system. It is not anymore. Any call
the Broadsoft group generates goes out as their main number
unless they call 911. The main number is not the POTS line
number. Plus I would have seen any Broadsoft generated call
come in a different path to our border switch.
It was allowed via the dialing rules on the Edgemarc. I have
not modified that yet to only allow certain calls. Grenada,
sadly, is part of the North American Dialing Plan. No 011
needed in front of the number. Just a 1+xxx-xxx-xxxx. Modifying
the dialing plan on the Edgemarc may be painful unless I just
allow New Hampshire's area code to start, 911, and 7 digit dialing.
> Do they have a voice portal?
Yes they do. It is on Broadsoft. But once again any Broadsoft
call would come into my border switch via a different path. I would
know if it came from that system.
[email protected]
>
> Brad Anouar
>
> Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone
>
>
> ----- Reply message -----
> From: "Matt Yaklin" <[email protected]>
> To: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
> Subject: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that took place
> via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
> Date: Fri, Nov 1, 2013 9:31 AM
>
>
>
>
> Hi all,
>
> I had some toll fraud to Grenada last night which we stopped as soon
> as we became aware of it. Example numbers being dialed were:
>
> 1-473-405-0085
> 1-473-405-0084
> 1-473-405-0088
>
> Normally I can track down how it happened to figure out who was at fault.
> But this time I am having a hard time.
>
> The customer has two types of service from us. Yealink phones connected
> to our Broadsoft system with an Edgemarc 200EW installed at the customer
> premise. They also have some POTS line with us for faxing. One of those
> POTS lines is connected to the Edgemarc 200EW via the built in FXO port
> for "Survivability". Meaning if the WAN ethernet port on the Edgemarc has
> a failure they can at least have one line to dial out on in case of an
> emergency. That is about the only time it would ever be used except for
> faxing.
>
> The toll fraud CPN just happens to be that POTS line connected to the
> Edgemarc. That POTS line is also connected to a very basic fax machine.
>
> In the Edgemarc for that FXO port two stage dialing is disabled in
> both directions. We had incoming calls on the FXO line being forward to a
> Yealink phone but that would never function properly due to the customer
> having a fax line picking up first. Just leftover config during the
> install where we made an assumption the customer might want it.
>
> The Yealink phones are behind the Edgemarc (NAT) and not reachable via the
> internet. The Edgemarc is using radius for user auth and has strong
> passwords set. I cannot find any config in Broadsoft where a user
> had call forwarding setup or whatever that would cause this. I cannot find
> any settings in the Edgemarc that would allow this to take place. As in
> a config mistake.
>
> The Edgemarc is running code Version 11.6.19.
> The Yealink phones are also up2date with the newest code from the vendor's
> website.
>
> I do not think this fraud was done on site via physical means. It is
> a school and I just cannot picture a student or faculty having a need
> to call Grenada.
>
> The Edgemarc does have port 5060 open to the world but it is just a ?proxy?
> I was under the impression that one cannot brute force an account on a
> proxy device that has no config as such like an asterisk box would. You
> would be basically brute forcing against Broadsoft in that case?
>
> Either way I am still digging into things but I thought by sending this
> email someone might have some advice to clue me into something I am
> missing when it comes to Edgemarc and FXO security.
>
> Thanks,
>
> [email protected]
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
------------------------------
Message: 5
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 11:00:04 -0600
From: Monterrosa Santiago <[email protected]>
To: Matt Yaklin <[email protected]>,
"[email protected]"<[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that
took place via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Message-ID:
<0f223dea3160f5499565fd4615e12b70ef0f8...@svc-ex1df4-011.mcm.mexico>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hi, interesting puzzle!
Just trying to figure out your scenario
Have you checked in the CDRs if the originating IP address matches the private
IP of the Yealink?
If not, the hacker could be guessing wisely the Broadsoft authentication
password of the Yealink devices to register its own device from Internet, then
making calls to Grenada or wherever destination is allowed.
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Matt Yaklin
Sent: viernes, 01 de noviembre de 2013 10:31 a.m.
To: [email protected]
Subject: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that took place
via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Hi all,
I had some toll fraud to Grenada last night which we stopped as soon as we
became aware of it. Example numbers being dialed were:
1-473-405-0085
1-473-405-0084
1-473-405-0088
Normally I can track down how it happened to figure out who was at fault.
But this time I am having a hard time.
The customer has two types of service from us. Yealink phones connected to our
Broadsoft system with an Edgemarc 200EW installed at the customer premise. They
also have some POTS line with us for faxing. One of those POTS lines is
connected to the Edgemarc 200EW via the built in FXO port for "Survivability".
Meaning if the WAN ethernet port on the Edgemarc has a failure they can at
least have one line to dial out on in case of an emergency. That is about the
only time it would ever be used except for faxing.
The toll fraud CPN just happens to be that POTS line connected to the Edgemarc.
That POTS line is also connected to a very basic fax machine.
In the Edgemarc for that FXO port two stage dialing is disabled in both
directions. We had incoming calls on the FXO line being forward to a Yealink
phone but that would never function properly due to the customer having a fax
line picking up first. Just leftover config during the install where we made an
assumption the customer might want it.
The Yealink phones are behind the Edgemarc (NAT) and not reachable via the
internet. The Edgemarc is using radius for user auth and has strong passwords
set. I cannot find any config in Broadsoft where a user had call forwarding
setup or whatever that would cause this. I cannot find any settings in the
Edgemarc that would allow this to take place. As in a config mistake.
The Edgemarc is running code Version 11.6.19.
The Yealink phones are also up2date with the newest code from the vendor's
website.
I do not think this fraud was done on site via physical means. It is a school
and I just cannot picture a student or faculty having a need to call Grenada.
The Edgemarc does have port 5060 open to the world but it is just a ?proxy?
I was under the impression that one cannot brute force an account on a proxy
device that has no config as such like an asterisk box would. You would be
basically brute forcing against Broadsoft in that case?
Either way I am still digging into things but I thought by sending this email
someone might have some advice to clue me into something I am missing when it
comes to Edgemarc and FXO security.
Thanks,
[email protected]
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
[email protected]
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
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------------------------------
Message: 6
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 10:47:58 -0700
From: David Thompson <[email protected]>
To: Matt Yaklin <[email protected]>, Brad Anouar <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that
took place via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
How many calls are we talking about here?
David Thompson
Network Services Support Technician
(O) 858.357.8794
(F) 858-225-1882
(E) [email protected]
(W)?www.esi-estech.com
-----Original Message-----
From: VoiceOps [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Matt
Yaklin
Sent: Friday, November 01, 2013 10:20 AM
To: Brad Anouar
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that
took place via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
Hi Brad,
On Fri, 1 Nov 2013, Brad Anouar wrote:
> Hi Matt,
>
> Assuming that the accounts associated with the POTS lines are
> registering users, have you already considered the fact that the
> attack could've originated somewhere other than the edgemark?
> Have you checked the auth/pass for the users associated with the POTS
lines?
If I understood you correctly I think this will answer your question. The
POTS line is not SIP at all. It is a POTS line provided out of our legacy
Coppercom voice switch. It travels via GR303 to a central office and from
there to the customer premise via Pairgain SHDSL gear. That gear muxes up
to 6 POTS lines down a single copper pair to the customer premise. A
little CPE unmuxes them.
My CDR records on my border T7000 switch clearly show the call coming from
the Coppercom switch via SS7 trunks and then going out to Level3.
All of this is TDM based POTS lines. No SIP at all when discussing the
POTS line.
So based on that the call had to be generated at the customer premise in
some fashion. The Edgemarc is the most likely culprit unless physical
access was used to make the calls.
> Is international calling enabled for these users?
It was on the Broadsoft system. It is not anymore. Any call the Broadsoft
group generates goes out as their main number unless they call 911. The
main number is not the POTS line number. Plus I would have seen any
Broadsoft generated call come in a different path to our border switch.
It was allowed via the dialing rules on the Edgemarc. I have not modified
that yet to only allow certain calls. Grenada, sadly, is part of the North
American Dialing Plan. No 011 needed in front of the number. Just a
1+xxx-xxx-xxxx. Modifying the dialing plan on the Edgemarc may be painful
unless I just allow New Hampshire's area code to start, 911, and 7 digit
dialing.
> Do they have a voice portal?
Yes they do. It is on Broadsoft. But once again any Broadsoft call would
come into my border switch via a different path. I would know if it came
from that system.
[email protected]
>
> Brad Anouar
>
> Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone
>
>
> ----- Reply message -----
> From: "Matt Yaklin" <[email protected]>
> To: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
> Subject: [VoiceOps] looking for advice on international fraud that
> took place via an Edgemarc 200EW with FXO line installed
> Date: Fri, Nov 1, 2013 9:31 AM
>
>
>
>
> Hi all,
>
> I had some toll fraud to Grenada last night which we stopped as soon
> as we became aware of it. Example numbers being dialed were:
>
> 1-473-405-0085
> 1-473-405-0084
> 1-473-405-0088
>
> Normally I can track down how it happened to figure out who was at
fault.
> But this time I am having a hard time.
>
> The customer has two types of service from us. Yealink phones
> connected to our Broadsoft system with an Edgemarc 200EW installed at
> the customer premise. They also have some POTS line with us for
> faxing. One of those POTS lines is connected to the Edgemarc 200EW via
> the built in FXO port for "Survivability". Meaning if the WAN ethernet
> port on the Edgemarc has a failure they can at least have one line to
> dial out on in case of an emergency. That is about the only time it
> would ever be used except for faxing.
>
> The toll fraud CPN just happens to be that POTS line connected to the
> Edgemarc. That POTS line is also connected to a very basic fax machine.
>
> In the Edgemarc for that FXO port two stage dialing is disabled in
> both directions. We had incoming calls on the FXO line being forward
> to a Yealink phone but that would never function properly due to the
> customer having a fax line picking up first. Just leftover config
> during the install where we made an assumption the customer might want
it.
>
> The Yealink phones are behind the Edgemarc (NAT) and not reachable via
> the internet. The Edgemarc is using radius for user auth and has
> strong passwords set. I cannot find any config in Broadsoft where a
> user had call forwarding setup or whatever that would cause this. I
> cannot find any settings in the Edgemarc that would allow this to take
> place. As in a config mistake.
>
> The Edgemarc is running code Version 11.6.19.
> The Yealink phones are also up2date with the newest code from the
> vendor's website.
>
> I do not think this fraud was done on site via physical means. It is a
> school and I just cannot picture a student or faculty having a need to
> call Grenada.
>
> The Edgemarc does have port 5060 open to the world but it is just a
?proxy?
> I was under the impression that one cannot brute force an account on a
> proxy device that has no config as such like an asterisk box would.
> You would be basically brute forcing against Broadsoft in that case?
>
> Either way I am still digging into things but I thought by sending
> this email someone might have some advice to clue me into something I
> am missing when it comes to Edgemarc and FXO security.
>
> Thanks,
>
> [email protected]
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> VoiceOps mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
>
_______________________________________________
VoiceOps mailing list
[email protected]
https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
------------------------------
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[email protected]
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------------------------------
End of VoiceOps Digest, Vol 53, Issue 1
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