Thank you Glen and Paul, much appreciated! On Wed, Dec 2, 2020 at 5:19 PM Glen Gerhard <g...@cognexus.net> wrote:
> Sounds like a good plan to me. It might help to figure out a few test call > paths to verify the verstats directly. > > IMHO much of the S/S technology will be overshadowed by the analytics > providers in terms of call presentation/blocking. > > That said, S/S will be helpful to law agencies in tracking malicious > intent groups. This alone makes it worth the effort. A lot of the work > /benefit takes place at the vetting of corporate ownership. S/S also > provides Rich Call Data which replaces the pathetic CNAM. > > The Delegated Certs extension will help with the call center attestations > but is still a ways off. Then you need your SBCs and PBXs to support it. > > SIPNOC is next week and it's usually helpful. > https://www.sipforum.org/news-events/sipnoc-2020-overview/#topics > > > ~Glen > > On 12/2/2020 1:49 PM, Patrick Labbett wrote: > > Hello, I'm looking for guidance/feedback on the impact of STIR/SHAKEN on > the call center and answering service industries. Very few are > interconnected VoIP service providers themselves. > > Specifically, customers of these industries often desire the call center > utilize their company phone number when contacting their employees or > customers for an improved end-user experience. > > The worry is that STIR/SHAKEN will be implemented in a way that causes > these "spoofed" calls (that have legitimate business relationships in > place) to be marked as such or eventually blocked as STIR/SHAKEN tightens > it's grip on malicious intent. > > Here is my understanding of the situation: As a customer of an Originating > carrier, the Call Center's outbound calls will be signed by their > Originating carrier's STIR/SHAKEN certificate - so as long as the SIP > Identity header isn't modified in transit and the certificate is validated > on the Terminating side, everything should continue to work normally for us > as end users. So this is largely the carrier's problem, and not the call > centers. > > However, it's not clear (to me) how the Attestation aspect of things will > work (and if it even effects the typical customer): > > - Does just being a customer of the Originating Carrier give the Call > Center's calls Full Attestation? > - As a call center, if spoofing a number not owned/in inventory, would > that be Partial Attestation? > - Does the owner/location of the spoofed number matter, i.e. : > - Partial Attestation: Number owned by Originating carrier, but not > by customer making call > - Gateway Attestation: Number not owned by Originating carrier (and > by extension not owned by customer making the call) > - Will different Terminating carriers treat Attestation designations > differently? > - Is this largely a framework that carriers will implement some day in > the future? > > Am I way overthinking this? (Yes.) > > Thank you in advance for any perspective you can offer, or resources you > can direct me to. > > My personal plan of attack for call centers: > > - Document permission and business use case for numbers spoofed on > behalf of customers > - That's it - that's the whole plan. > - ???? > > Aside from making sure my carriers know I exist and that I have permission > to use those numbers, what else is there? > > -Patrick Labbett > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing > listVoiceOps@voiceops.orghttps://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > > -- > Glen gerhardg...@cognexus.net > 858.324.4536 > > Cognexus, LLC > 7891 Avenida Kirjah > San Diego, CA 92037 > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > VoiceOps@voiceops.org > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops >
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