STIR/SHAKEN does not delegate any authority to anyone.
It merely allows me to sign a call that I originate, so that someone else
can say "Oh this came from $COMPANY."
Besides, STIR/SHAKEN is done at the time of an origination call, it cannot
be "looked up" to see where to route a call.
The suggestion that STIR/SHAKEN could be used to authoritatively assign a
DID endpoint to someone demonstrates a lack of understanding in how it
works and what it does and does not do.
Beckman
On Wed, 25 Oct 2023, Matthew Crocker via VoiceOps wrote:
With STIR/SHAKEN (in theory) all calls will be signed, authenticated so you can
trace the originating carrier. In an open peering environment you can use it
to accept/reject calls
Open SIP proxy handles all of the SIP traffic, RTP goes directly between
carriers.
All calls originated must be signed (STIRred)
* Call isn’t signed, gets rejected by the SIP peering proxy
Terminating carrier can validate the signed calls (SHAKEN)
* Don’t like the signing CA? reject the call
* Don’t like the signing carrier? Reject the call
* Carrier sending too many spam calls, adjust treatment based on customer
spam settings
Routing is handled between terminating carrier and SIP peering proxy.
Originating carrier sends all calls to peering proxy first, if proxy doesn’t
have the route it sends a 4XX error back and originating carrier can continue
routing on other paths.
So terminating carriers would need to export/upload (hacked BGP?) numbers they
are willing to receive calls on to the peering proxy.
Proxies can be spun up in various AWS/Azure/GoogleCloud VPS
From: Pinchas Neiman <neimanpinc...@gmail.com>
Date: Wednesday, October 25, 2023 at 11:18 AM
To: Jawaid Bazyar <jaw...@bazyar.net>
Cc: Matthew Crocker <matt...@corp.crocker.com>, voiceops <voiceops@voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Voice Peering
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of Crocker. Do not click links or
open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
By reading the RFCs I was able to grasp 75% of it, it's well written and covers
your clear constraint, at least on how to verify the SIP header comes from a
trustworthy authority (If you agree on the root authority)
Practically implementing STIR/SHAKEN has bureaucracy involved.
On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 9:38 PM Jawaid Bazyar via VoiceOps
<voiceops@voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops@voiceops.org>> wrote:
Is there a good clear document somewhere describing how STIR/SHAKEN is supposed
to work?
On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 9:33 PM Matthew Crocker via VoiceOps
<voiceops@voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops@voiceops.org>> wrote:
On Oct 24, 2023, at 9:13 PM, Peter Beckman via VoiceOps
<voiceops@voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops@voiceops.org>> wrote:
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of Crocker. Do not click links or
open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
The challenge is how do you authenticate the end "carrier" or service
provider?
STIR/SHAKEN
Sure, anyone who leases numbers directly from NANPA can look up the carrier
of record and exchange traffic directly, but any business who also leases
numbers INDIRECTLY gets cut out and still needs to pay their upstream
carrier(s) to place/receive calls, either by channels or per minute, even
if their upstream is directly peered and not transiting the PSTN at all.
If this would be for the end user, then NANPA would have to delegate to the
leasee, the leasee delegate to the reseller, the reseller to the end user,
then the end user could publish their VoIP contact info, and anyone could
call directly via VoIP, cutting out all of the middle peers.
But, as another person said, this is ripe for abuse, and with no motivation
by NANPA or the larger carriers to make calls less expensive for the
reseller or end user, I see this going nowhere. Until there is some value
in NANPA (plus all the other country telephony organizations) and the
direct carriers leasing numbers to do so.
Beckman
On Tue, 24 Oct 2023, Ross Tajvar via VoiceOps wrote:
I can think of a few ways that could be adapted into a platform more like
an Internet exchange, but as others have said, it just doesn't seem worth
it.
On Tue, Oct 24, 2023, 5:31 PM Jawaid Bazyar via VoiceOps <
voiceops@voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops@voiceops.org>> wrote:
I think schemes like DUNDI (and some of the others mentioned here) suffer
from a trust issue – what’s to prevent operator X from poisoning the
protocol with bogus “stolen” numbers?
On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 5:25 PM Jared Smith via VoiceOps <
voiceops@voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops@voiceops.org>> wrote:
On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 8:49 AM Mike Hammett via VoiceOps <
voiceops@voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops@voiceops.org>> wrote:
This was in another thread, but I broke it out into it's own
conversation. Someone had asked:
---
I am joining this thread late, but, would anyone out there be interested
in exchanging traffic with other carriers directly over SIP?
Just another point of VoIP history trivia at this point... but in
addition to things like ENUM and ITAD, Mark Spencer of Asterisk fame also
invented Dundi, which was an encrypted peer-to-peer protocol for route
advertisement and discovery. As far as I know, very few people besides me
ever put it in production, but it worked really well at the time. (Of
course, it's been about 17 or 18 years now since I used it in production.)
-Jared
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Pinchas S. Neiman
Software Engineer At ESEQ Technology Corp.
845.213.1229 #2
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