Posted by Orin Kerr:
Lori Drew, Take 2?: The Government's Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Prosecution 
in *United States v. Nosal*:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_02_22-2009_02_28.shtml#1235510297


   Readers will recall that in the Lori Drew case, the government is
   arguing that mere breach of Terms of service violates the Computer
   Fraud and Abuse Act, [1]18 U.S.C. 1030, which prohibits accessing a
   computer "without authorization." It turns out that there's another
   case in which the government is trying a similarly broad theory of the
   CFAA, if not an even broader one. The case is United States v. Nosal,
   No. CR 08-0237 MHP, a case in the Northern District of California
   presently before Judge Marilyn Hall Patel.
     Nosal involves the most common fact pattern found in the civil
   caselaw of Section 1030, raised for the first time in a criminal case.
   The basic fact pattern is this: Employee at Company A decides that he
   is going to leave company A and join competitor company B, and he
   accesses the computers of Company A before he leaves. During that
   access, he looks around the files stored on Company A's servers
   looking for information he might be able to use at Company B. After
   the employee leaves, Company A then sues the employee and Company B on
   the theory that by using Company A's computers with a subjective
   intent to help Company B, the employee was accessing Company A's
   computer "without authorization." That is, by acting contrary to the
   interests of Company A, the employee was implicitly no longer
   authorized to access the Computers of A.
     Courts are sharply divided on this theory in the civil context.
   Almost all the caselaw is district court caselaw, so there isn't a
   circuit split yet. But there have been about 20 district court
   decisions on this, about 10 of which were handed down in the last year
   alone, and the cases are divided almost 50/50 (or should I say 10/10?)
   between decisions accepting the theory and decisions rejecting it.
   Also, there is a clear trend in the caselaw: The earlier decisions
   generally accepted this theory, and the more recent cases tend to
   reject it. The one federal appeals court opinion to address the issue
   agreed with this theory, [2]International Airport Centers v. Citrin,
   in a rather breezy opinion by Judge Posner in 2006 (I blogged about it
   at my solo blog [3]here). As far as I know, however, this theory has
   not been tried in such a case in the criminal context.
     At least until the Nosal case, that is. I have posted some of the
   filings in the Nosal case here:

     1) [4]Initial indictment (later superceded, but it gives you the
     basic idea of the government's theory of the case),
     2) [5]Motion to dismiss indictment for failure to state an offense
     3) [6]Government opposition to motion to dismiss, and
     4) [7]Reply.

     There's a lot going on in the Nosal case beyond the broad theory of
   the CFAA, I should emphasize. The matter has also been charged as a
   theft of trade secrets, for example, and the government claims that
   there may be facts to prove unauthorized access beyond the Citrin
   theory that an employee who uses an employer's computer with a bad
   motive is a criminal. Still, my understanding is that the government
   is indeed relying on that theory in several counts of the Nosal case,
   I believe for the first time in any criminal setting outside the Lori
   Drew case.
     In my view, the government's broad theory of the CFAA in the Nosal
   case should be rejected for the same reasons that the government's
   similar theory of the CFAA should be rejected in the Lori Drew case.
   The early civil cases adopting a very broad construction of the
   statute were simply incorrect. The early courts didn't understand that
   they were interpreting a criminal statute; they didn't understand that
   the interpretation of the CFAA should follow the fraud in the
   factum/fraud in the inducement dictinction; and they didn't apply the
   rule of lenity or consider how such interpretations would raise
   obvious overbreadth problems in the criminal setting. To the extent
   the government is relying on the Citrin agency theory of the CFAA, I
   hope the court will reject that effort and force the government to
   stick to the narrower reading of the CFAA that Congress intended.
      I raised a lot of the arguments against the government's theory in
   [8]an article on the CFAA back in 2003, and I hope the court will
   address the theory and reject it squarely in the Nosal case. In the
   meantime, the Nosal case is very much worth watching: I wouldn't be
   surprised if Judge Patel hands down a ruling on this issue before
   Judge Wu decides the very similar issues in the Lori Drew case,
   meaning that Judge Patel may be the first judge to address these
   important issues.

References

   1. http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/1030.html
   2. http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/LB1FFAOC.pdf
   3. http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/03/24/wifi-crime-in-illinois/
   4. http://volokh.com/files/Indictment.pdf
   5. http://volokh.com/files/Motion.pdf
   6. http://volokh.com/files/NosalOpp.pdf
   7. http://volokh.com/files/Reply.pdf
   8. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=399740

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