There's an interesting discussion of the role of the statistical p-value in science in a recent article published online at Nature:
For all the P value's apparent precision, Fisher intended it to be just one > part of a fluid, non-numerical process that blended data and background > knowledge to lead to scientific conclusions. But it soon got swept into a > movement to make evidence-based decision-making as rigorous and objective > as possible. This movement was spearheaded in the late 1920s by Fisher's > bitter rivals, Polish mathematician Jerzy Neyman and UK statistician Egon > Pearson, who introduced an alternative framework for data analysis that > included statistical power, false positives, false negatives and many other > concepts now familiar from introductory statistics classes. They pointedly > left out the P value. It seems to me that normal human judgment is inseparable from the day-to-day work of science, and that statistics is best thought of as another tool in the hands of someone who is skilled at their work. This makes scientific endeavor sound a little more like art than science. (I think Feyerabend might agree.) Eric
