Parabéns Amilcar,
Sabemos que é mais um degrau de uma longa escada. Mas, continue.
Talvez outros Almeidas Limas venham para a frente de batalha !
Os Azeredos da vida cairão porque eles defendem uma coisa que não
conhecem!
Veja quanta besteira o Azeredo falou quando do discurso do Sen. Almeida
Lima!
Vá em frente !
Paulo Castelani Umuarama Pr.
>From: Amilcar Brunazo Filho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: [VotoEletronico] Noticia do NY Times - Voto-e inseguro
>Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 16:57:51 -0300
>
>Caros jornalistas, aos quais envio cópias desta,
>
>Vejam a noticia do NY Times de 24 de julho em:
>http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/24/technology/24VOTE.html
>
>Eu, que conheço o sistema brasileiro por dentro, afirmo que as
>falhas de segurança encontradas no software das urnas-E
americanas,
>desenvolvido pela Diebold, são de mesmo teor de gravidade que
as
>falhas de segurança do software das urnas-E brasileiras,
>desenvolvido pela mesma Diebold e utilizadas nas eleições de
2000.
>
>Posso indicar onde se encontram as provas disto que afirmo
apenas me
>referindo a perícias das urnas feitas em alguns processos sobre
as
>eleições de 2000.
>
>A diferença é que lá o NY Times publica e aqui o jornais se
calam...
>como se calam diante da clara interferência do judiciário (STF
e
>TSE) no legislativo para aprovar o esdrúxulo projeto de lei PLS
>172/03 (do senado) e PL 1503/03 (da camâra), que oficializa o
>obscurantismo eleitoral com a criação do Voto Virtual, como se
tal
>interferência não fosse importante.
>
>[ ]s
>Eng. Amilcar Brunazo Filho
>-----------------------------------
>texto da noticia do NY Times
>
>----------------------------
>Computer Voting Is Open to Easy Fraud, Experts Say
>By JOHN SCHWARTZ
>
>
>he software that runs many high-tech voting machines contains
>serious flaws that would allow voters to cast extra votes and
permit
>poll workers to alter ballots without being detected, computer
>security researchers said yesterday.
>
>"We found some stunning, stunning flaws," said Aviel D. Rubin,
>technical director of the Information Security Institute at
Johns
>Hopkins University, who led a team that examined the software
from
>Diebold Election Systems, which has about 33,000 voting
machines
>operating in the United States.
>
>The systems, in which voters are given computer-chip-bearing
smart
>cards to operate the machines, could be tricked by anyone with
$100
>worth of computer equipment, said Adam Stubblefield, a
co-author of
>the paper.
>
>"With what we found, practically anyone in the country — from a
>teenager on up — could produce these smart cards that could
allow
>someone to vote as many times as they like," Mr. Stubblefield
said.
>
>The software was initially obtained by critics of electronic
voting,
>who discovered it on a Diebold Internet site in January. This
is the
>first review of the software by recognized computer security
>experts.
>
>A spokesman for Diebold, Joe Richardson, said the company could
not
>comment in detail until it had seen the full report. He said
that
>the software on the site was "about a year old" and that "if
there
>were problems with it, the code could have been rectified or
>changed" since then. The company, he said, puts its software
through
>rigorous testing.
>
>"We're constantly improving it so the technology we have 10
years
>from now will be better than what we have today," Mr.
Richardson
>said. "We're always open to anything that can improve our
systems."
>
>Another co-author of the paper, Tadayoshi Kohno, said it was
>unlikely that the company had plugged all of the holes they
>discovered.
>
>"There is no easy fix," Mr. Kohno said.
>
>The move to electronic voting — which intensified after the
troubled
>Florida presidential balloting in 2000 — has been a source of
>controversy among security researchers. They argue that the
>companies should open their software to public review to be
sure it
>operates properly.
>
>Mr. Richardson of Diebold said the company's voting-machine
source
>code, the basis of its computer program, had been certified by
an
>independent testing group. Outsiders might want more access, he
>said, but "we don't feel it's necessary to turn it over to
everyone
>who asks to see it, because it is proprietary."
>
>Diebold is one of the most successful companies in this field.
>Georgia and Maryland are among its clients, as are many
counties
>around the country. The Maryland contract, announced this
month, is
>worth $56 million.
>
>Diebold, based in North Canton, Ohio, is best known as a maker
of
>automated teller machines. The company acquired Global Election
>Systems last year and renamed it Diebold Election Systems. Last
year
>the election unit contributed more than $110 million in sales
to the
>company's $2 billion in revenue.
>
>As an industry leader, Diebold has been the focus of much of
the
>controversy over high-tech voting. Some people, in comments
widely
>circulated on the Internet, contend that the company's software
has
>been designed to allow voter fraud. Mr. Rubin called such
assertions
>"ludicrous" and said the software's flaws showed the hallmarks
of
>poor design, not subterfuge.
>
>The list of flaws in the Diebold software is long, according to
the
>paper, which is online at avirubin .com/vote.pdf. Among other
>things, the researchers said, ballots could be altered by
anyone
>with access to a machine, so that a voter might think he is
casting
>a ballot for one candidate while the vote is recorded for an
>opponent.
>
>The kind of scrutiny that the researchers applied to the
Diebold
>software would turn up flaws in all but the most rigorously
produced
>software, Mr. Stubblefield said. But the standards must be as
high
>as the stakes, he said.
>
>"This isn't the code for a vending machine," he said. "This is
the
>code that protects our democracy."
>
>Still, things that seem troubling in coding may not be as big a
>problem in the real world, Mr. Richardson said. For example,
>counties restrict access to the voting machines before and
after
>elections, he said. While the researchers "are all experts at
>writing code, they may not have a full understanding of how
>elections are run," he said.
>
>But Douglas W. Jones, an associate professor of computer
science at
>the University of Iowa, said he was shocked to discover flaws
cited
>in Mr. Rubin's paper that he had mentioned to the system's
>developers about five years ago as a state elections official.
>
>"To find that such flaws have not been corrected in half a
decade is
>awful," Professor Jones said.
>
>Peter G. Neumann, an expert in computer security at SRI
>International, said the Diebold code was "just the tip of the
>iceberg" of problems with electronic voting systems.
>
>"This is an iceberg that needs to be hacked at a good bit," Mr.
>Neumann said, "so this is a step forward."
>
>______________________________________________________________
>O texto acima e' de inteira e exclusiva responsabilidade de seu
>autor, conforme identificado no campo "remetente", e nao
>representa necessariamente o ponto de vista do Forum do Voto-E
>
>O Forum do Voto-E visa debater a confibilidade dos sistemas
>eleitorais informatizados, em especial o brasileiro, e dos
>sistemas de assinatura digital e infraestrutura de chaves
publicas.
>__________________________________________________
>Pagina, Jornal e Forum do Voto Eletronico
> http://www.votoseguro.org
>__________________________________________________
