April 10, 2009

Indonesian President Yudhoyono's Big Decision

by Walter Lohman

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) is a clear winner in his 
country's April 9 parliamentary (DPR) elections. Indications are that SBY's 
Democrat Party has increased its 7.5 percent support from the 2004 DPR 
elections to approximately 20 percent. Whether his party clears the legal 20 
percent threshold of seats required to name its own presidential candidate does 
not practically matter: Either way, SBY will need to form a governing 
coalition. The most important part of the coalition will be his choice of a 
vice presidential running mate.

The Islamist Failure

The other major outcome of the election is the considerable setback dealt to 
the Indonesian Islamist parties. PKS, the ideology's standard bearer, failed to 
improve substantially from its 2004 share. Throughout the last year, PKS held 
firmly to a goal of garnering 20 percent of the vote. That was probably never 
in the cards. But they outwitted themselves on the 15 percent they might have 
reasonably hoped for. To expand their base, PKS sought to appeal to Indonesian 
nationalism and downplay their Islamism. They portrayed themselves as members 
of the political elite, ingratiated themselves with SBY at every opportunity, 
and floated coalition balloons with each of the mainstream parties.

The PKS campaign failed. If Indonesians voted out of a sense of nationalism, 
they went with more trusted sources: a president who has largely led the 
country in the right direction and older parties with which voters are more 
comfortable.

At the same time, PKS failed to pick up defections from the other Islamist 
parties. Two of these parties went below the 2.5 percent threshold for 
representation in parliament. And the fourth, the PPP of the Suharto era, 
continued its long decline, presently hovering around 5 percent of yesterday's 
vote total. It is unclear where all these voters went—although given its poor 
performance, it seems certain that they did not go to PKS. Maybe they were as 
confused by PKS's appeals to non-sectarian nationalism as everyone else. 
Polling before the election also indicated the possibility of migration from 
the Pancasila-based Muslim parties—PKB and PAN—to PKS. This also does not 
appear to have happened.

No political victories are permanent. In 1999, PKS itself failed to make the 
threshold necessary to contest the 2004 elections. It changed its name to 
qualify and emerged in 2004 with 45 seats and three cabinet posts. They turned 
the name change to their advantage, using it to obscure their previously more 
explicit ideological agenda. They have been running from those roots ever since 
to good, steady effect—until now. Their loss will exacerbate infighting and 
likely lead them to rely more on their missionary political work, which 
continues apace whatever this week's national election results.

Unfortunately, however, there is one other possibility that could save PKS from 
its defeat and pending turmoil.

Vice Presidential Lottery

The Indonesian electorate's attention now turns to the nominating process for 
president. Only nine of the 38 parties contesting the parliamentary elections 
qualified for representation, and only a handful of them will field 
presidential candidates. The system will force them into multiparty coalitions, 
each representing at least 20 percent of the seats in the DPR. Even if SBY's 
Democrat Party ends up with the 20 percent of seats necessary to nominate him 
without a coalition, he will still require a coalition of supporting parties to 
compete effectively in July.

SBY would seem to be in the driver's seat for the coming presidential election. 
His party finished far ahead of the others, virtually tripling its 2004 total, 
and the big parties—Megawati's PDI-P and Golkar—lost votes. But the situation 
is complicated. If PDI-P and Golkar—the second and third place finishers—manage 
to come together, SBY would be left with few choices for a vice presidential 
partner. He could preempt that possibility by resurrecting his partnership with 
Golkar, either by patching up political affairs with his current vice president 
or running with another Golkar candidate (the sultan of Yogyakarta, for 
example). He could reach out to PKB and PAN, but given their declining 
fortunes, that is unlikely.

The other real prospect for vice president is Hidayat Nur Wahid, the former 
president of PKS and the speaker of the joint assembly and holder of three 
degrees from University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Eight percent may be far 
below what PKS had hoped for, but it did hold its own, and it has strong 
organizational capacity. Securing a spot a heartbeat away from the presidency 
would more than salvage their poor performance in the parliamentary elections.

The Future of U.S.–Indonesia Relations

SBY has clearly done some things of mutual importance to Indonesia and the 
United States. On his watch, Indonesia has prosecuted the war on terrorism 
quite effectively: Indonesia is now going on its fourth year without a major 
terrorist attack. Under SBY's leadership, Indonesia is reasserting itself in 
East Asian politics, and speaking aloud about the importance of values in its 
foreign policy. On this basis—and on the basis of the positive political model 
Indonesia serves for other predominantly Muslim countries—the Obama 
Administration is rightly committed to taking the U.S.–Indonesia relationship 
to a whole new level of partnership.

On the negative side, SBY has sent mixed signals about an Islamist agenda 
diametrically opposed to both Indonesian tradition and American interest in 
liberal democratic governance. The most recent example is the remarkable 
commission he offered Shari'a financing at the World Islamic Economic Forum 
this past March: "Islamic bankers should therefore do some missionary work in 
the Western world to promote the concept of Shari'a banking, for which many in 
the West are more than ready now." While Shari'a financing is a complex subject 
for another paper, suffice it to say that most Indonesians in the market are 
indifferent to it, and those inclined to examine their options would find more 
than enough authoritative religious opinion approving of interest-based banking 
services. Plus, Shari'a financing constitutes a bare 3 percent of the 
Indonesian market.

No one accuses SBY of being an Islamist. And the DPR election results are 
evidence that he is a good political tactician. But from the perspective of 
U.S.–Indonesia relations, his political maneuvering may ultimately bring him 
into the cross fire of American politics. Careless statements extolling as a 
role model Indonesia's most influential Islamist[1] and calls for Islamist 
missions to the West could have the effect of choking off the tremendous 
potential in U.S.–Indonesian relations.

A Telling Choice

SBY's election victory should give him the confidence he needs to develop and 
assert his own vision for Indonesia. With his choice of a vice presidential 
candidate, he will tell the world something about that vision. There are many 
factors to consider in his choice—political calculations top among them—but if 
SBY cares about establishing a deeper, mutually beneficial relationship with 
the United States, he will consider the way his choice will be received outside 
Indonesia. Throwing PKS a lifeline by giving them the vice presidency will 
effectively kill any effort to take the U.S.–Indonesia relationship to the next 
level.

Walter Lohman is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation
 


Kirim email ke