http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2009-09/464037.html
Corrupt officials wont line up to surrender anymore a.. Source: Global Times b.. [23:38 September 03 2009] c.. Illustration: Liu Rui By Cao Lin We often see the poor waiting in line deep in the night to snap up affordable housing, migrant workers staying up all night to seek train tickets during the Spring Festival, and drivers queuing up late at night to fuel up before the oil price rises. But have you ever seen corrupt officials waiting in line in front of anti-corruption bureaus deep in the night to surrender themselves up to justice? Dont regard such a scene as impossible, for it did happen once. Recently, Peoples Daily conducted an interview with the first director of the Guangdong Anti-Corruption Bureau, the first anti-corruption bureau in China. The director talked about the grand anti-corruption campaign in 1989, when 3,485 officials surrendered themselves during the first month of the campaign, and until midnight on the last day of the notification period, there were still some waiting in line in the bureau to confess. It is quite impressive to look back upon the history of our anti-corruption. It was assumed that venal officials who took bribes were daring and psychologically strong, while they were actually timid to the extent of queuing up waiting for confession. The deterrent power of the system was so strong as to put the corrupt officials on tenterhooks. Such experiences were sure to please the public and increase their confidence in anti-corruption greatly. However, that is just history. More than two decades later, will venal officials today queue up voluntarily at the word of anti-corruption bureaus command to surrender? And are present notices equipped with as strong deterrent power as they used to be, or are corrupt officials as "innocent" as their predecessors? In my opinion, it was the inexperi?ence and lack of sophistication among corrupt officials rather than the effectiveness of the system that led to the spectacular event of their lining up in late night waiting to confess before the deadline. It was the first time for those officials, who had never seen any real anti-corruption campaign before and thus were rather weak psychologically, to be confronted with so severe an institutional deterrence; the systems psychological offensive frightened them and easily penetrated their inner defenses. The appearance of the first anti-corruption bureau at the time set off an earthshaking anti-corruption tide in Guangdong. Then, the Supreme Peoples Court and the Supreme Peoples Procuratorate jointly issued the "Notification for Corruption, Bribery and Speculation and Profiteering Criminals to Confess within a Time Limit" immediately, and anti-corruption bureaus promptly launched publicity campaigns to push for voluntary surrender. This kind of pressing notices may account for little now that anti-corruption is a normal part of the political environment, but at the time they were of an unheard of harshness. However, similar "confession within a time limit" programs arent powerful today, since after more than two decades of anti-corruption schemes, corrupt officials are no longer so naive. They have accumulated plenty of experience through numerous anti-corruption campaigns and know how to conceal their crimes. Moreover, they are thoroughly acquainted with the weaknesses and loopholes of the anti-corruption system, which elevates them high above those corrupt officials who rushed to give themselves up at the news of severe punishment. On the contrary, they may just regard notices of "confession within a time limit" as a manifestation of weakness among anti-corruption institutions, holding the notion that "If they knew about my corruption, they would have arrested me long ago, rather than wanting me to line up to confess." It thus can be seen today that long-term effectiveness of anti-corruption lies rather in institutional investigation of corruption than harsh measures. The key is to prevent institutional corruption and create such a feeling among corrupt officials that they will be caught as soon as they make a move. Harsh measures and tough attitudes in anti-corruption can scare out inexperienced officials. Once they find that they remain still safe under the deterrence of "confession" notices, they will develop a growing contempt for these notices; and when they see that the exposure of corruption is the mere results of accidents like a big fire, a theft, or a quarrel with the mistress, they mock the system all the more. The occasion when corrupt officials waited in line deep in the night to give themselves up can only be regarded as a story of long ago. What current anti-corruption needs is more thorough, sound and institutional methods. The author is an editor at the Opinion Department of China Youth Daily [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
