#39: appropriately acknowlege and accommodate DANE #choose ticket.new #when True see..
Re: [websec] WG Last Call on draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-06 until April-9 (paul hoffman) https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/websec/current/msg01092.html This document pretends that the TLSA protocol from the DANE WG will not exist. This is a tad odd, given that TLSA is likely to be published a few weeks before HSTS. In specific, bullet 2 of section 2.2 and all of section 10.2 are written as if self-signed certificates will always cause HTST- compliant browsers to fail, even if those certificates cause matching when used with TLSA. Proposed replacements: 2. The UA terminates any secure transport connection attempts upon any and all secure transport errors or warnings, including those caused by a web application presenting a certificate that does chain to a trusted root or match a trusted certificate association from the TLSA protocol [I-D.draft-ietf-dane-protocol]. . . . If a web site/organization/enterprise is generating their own secure transport public-key certificates for web sites, and that organization's root certification authority (CA) certificate is not typically embedded by default in browser CA certificate stores, and if HSTS Policy is enabled on a site identifying itself using a self- signed certificate, and the certificate presented by the TLS server does not match a trusted certificate association from the TLSA protocol [I-D.draft-ietf-dane-protocol], then secure connections to that site will fail, per the HSTS design. This is to protect against various active attacks, as discussed above. However, if said organization strongly wishes to employ self-signed certificates, and their own CA in concert with HSTS, they can do so by deploying their root CA certificate to their users' browsers. They can also, in addition or instead, distribute to their users' browsers the end-entity certificate(s) for specific hosts. There are various ways in which this can be accomplished (details are out of scope for this specification). Once their root CA certificate is installed in the browsers, they may employ HSTS Policy on their site(s). Alternately, that organization can deploy the TLSA protocol; all browsers that also use TLSA will then be able to trust the self-signed certificates if it announced through TLSA. Note: Interactively distributing root CA certificates to users, e.g., via email, and having the users install them, is arguably training the users to be susceptible to a possible form of phishing attack, see Section 14.6 "Bogus Root CA Certificate Phish plus DNS Cache Poisoning Attack". #end #otherwise #if changes_body Changes (by jeff.hodges@…): * status: new => closed * resolution: => fixed #end #if changes_descr #if not changes_body and not change.comment and change.author Description changed by jeff.hodges@…: #end -- #end #if change.comment Comment: fixed in -07 #end #end #end -- -------------------------+------------------------------------------------- Reporter: | Owner: draft-ietf-websec-strict- jeff.hodges@… | transport-sec@… Type: defect | Status: closed Priority: major | Milestone: Component: strict- | Version: transport-sec | Resolution: fixed Severity: In WG Last | Call | Keywords: | -------------------------+------------------------------------------------- Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/39#comment:1> websec <http://tools.ietf.org/websec/> _______________________________________________ websec mailing list websec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/websec