Hi Chris. Good to see this. Do you intend to publish another revision by the draft submission cutoff date next Monday?
Or would you like us to discuss these issues to resolve at the meeting in Atlanta? Thanks Yoav On Oct 16, 2012, at 8:49 PM, Chris Palmer wrote: > Hi all, > > This is just a quick interim version to respond to Tom Ritter's bugs > that he filed in the issue tracker. We still have some issues to > resolve around pin activation (à la TACK), max-age, and whether and > how to perform pin validation when X.509 chains chain up to private > trust anchors. > > http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/52 > http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/53 > > Any other issues anyone wants to raise? Thanks. > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: <internet-dra...@ietf.org> > Date: Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 11:35 AM > Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-03.txt > To: pal...@google.com > Cc: cev...@google.com > > > > A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-03.txt > has been successfully submitted by Chris Palmer and posted to the > IETF repository. > > Filename: draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning > Revision: 03 > Title: Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP > Creation date: 2012-10-16 > WG ID: websec > Number of pages: 17 > URL: > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-03.txt > Status: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning > Htmlized: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-03 > Diff: > http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-03 > > Abstract: > This memo describes an extension to the HTTP protocol allowing web > host operators to instruct user agents (UAs) to remember ("pin") the > hosts' cryptographic identities for a given period of time. During > that time, UAs will require that the host present a certificate chain > including at least one Subject Public Key Info structure whose > fingerprint matches one or more of the pinned fingerprints for that > host. By effectively reducing the scope of authorities who can > authenticate the domain during the lifetime of the pin, pinning may > reduce the incidence of man-in-the-middle attacks due to compromised > Certification Authorities and other authentication errors and > attacks. > > > > > The IETF Secretariat > _______________________________________________ > websec mailing list > websec@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/websec > IƧ��[�(^rC�{S�֥I�.�+r�^�� _______________________________________________ websec mailing list websec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/websec
