I think that what is needed most of all in Web PKI space right now is
to arrive at a statement of what applications and servers should
expect so they can be designed to work with the PKI that exists rather
than the infinite set of possibilities that are consistent with PKIX
but not deployed.

At the moment we have a system that depends a great deal on 'lore'
which is only understood by a handful of people and is mostly arrived
at by trial and error:

* Server Lore: The PKI/SSL features that the servers actually support
* Client Lore: The PKI/SSL features that the clients actually implement
* CA Lore: How certs rollover, PKI topology

A lot of the lore results from different people trying to 'do the
right thing' in different ways. Some of it results from one side
trying to do the right thing but not being supported by another.

Quite a bit of the lore results from the common misconception that the
primary purpose of the Web PKI is to encrypt stuff rather than to
assure people that they are talking to the right party and that that
party is accountable in some fashion.

Standards that rely on Lore are not really standards in my view.


On the code signing thing, I agree that running the right code is
probably the most important security concern right now. There is
nothing Chrome can do to improve security if the Chrome executable has
been compromised.

Anti-Virus vendors such as Comodo have been moving away from
traditional AV approaches of looking for badness to a default-deny
approach. We only run the code we know is trustworthy rather than only
nerfing the code known to be bad.

Code signing could be an important part of that approach but it is
actually pretty difficult right now as every code signing scheme is
different and while most are open, some are closed (e.g. iOS). Most of
the schemes out there depend on some form of X.509 PKI and some form
of digital signature. Some only authenticate the installation package,
others have signatures on the running .exe and .obj files, some have
manifests.

It would be nice if there was some form of registry that actually
catalogued all this variation and that might lead to some future
project to come up with a single scheme that could be applied to all
code. There is really no good reason for the Java code signing scheme
to be completely different from the .Net scheme and require a
completely different validation strategy.
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