David - I think this is where we rely on judgment and bear in mind the purpose of this exercise. We want to spotlight those issues that the developers and operators of the Web PKI can reasonably fix. To your example, the operators can fix OCSP availability, but not fault-tolerant hardware. All the best. Tim.
> On Oct 15, 2013, at 1:26 PM, "David Chadwick" <d.w.chadw...@kent.ac.uk> wrote: > > In this case where do you draw the line of who to include and not to include. > Supply chains are massively long and complex these days. So if the mainframe > running the OCSP server crashes due to a fault of the manufacturer, so that > no-one is able to check the revocation status of certs, is the computer > manufacturer responsible rather than the CA? Should we mention this in the > spec? Where do you draw the line? > > regards > > David > >> On 15/10/2013 18:06, Ben Wilson wrote: >> Concerning " 3.3.1. Subscriber uses agent", David Chadwick wrote, "5. What >> is the relevance of section 3.3.1? If a third party is subcontracted to a >> party to do work on its behalf, then the party is ultimately responsible for >> this and there is no need to mention it." >> >> David, >> >> I think it is helpful to mention or flag where certain relationships might >> exist that are not apparent by looking at just the technical/operational >> aspects to provide context to model. Since we are trying to explain how >> things operate, I think we need to go slightly beyond just the traditional >> three-party model. >> >> I don't think that the distinguishing feature here is legal. For instance, >> can we say with certainty that one party or another is "ultimately >> responsible"? That might involve legal wrangling and it might ultimately >> take a judge to make the determinations of who was responsible for what. >> The devil is in the details of the subcontract. I'm not saying we need to >> get into all of that legal stuff - quite the contrary. >> >> Ben >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: wpkops-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:wpkops-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of >> David Chadwick >> Sent: Monday, October 14, 2013 5:52 AM >> To: Bruce Morton; wpkops WG (wpkops@ietf.org) (wpkops@ietf.org) >> Subject: Re: [wpkops] FW: New Version Notification for >> draft-barreira-trustmodel-00.txt >> >> Hi Bruce >> >> here are my comments on this version >> >> 1. There is a potential problem with the scope/Introduction of the document, >> since it only covers trust between the browser and the subscriber, when what >> really matters is trust between the RP and the subscriber. How is this gap >> to be covered? >> >> 2. Section 2.1. 3rd para insert may -> The root store provide "may" >> require the root CA.... >> Rationale. If the root store provider can verify a CA simply because it has >> been accepted by another root store provider, as per the second paragraph, >> then conversely, it may not require it to be annually audited but may remove >> it only when the other root store provider removes it. >> >> 3. Section 2.3 insert may -> The subscriber may identify... >> Rationale. This more accurately reflects the current situation today, >> doesn't it? >> >> 4. Section 3.2.3. A third party RA is not identified in a CA certificate as >> anything, is it?. Remove "as an issuing CA" as this implies it is identified >> as something else. >> >> 5. What is the relevance of section 3.3.1? If a third party is subcontracted >> to a party to do work on its behalf, then the party is ultimately >> responsible for this and there is no need to mention it. >> >> 6. Section 5.2. Non-unique names. It is unclear whether non-unique names >> refers to Internet wide unique names, or only to CA wide unique names. >> Be explicit. >> >> regards >> >> David >> >>> On 11/10/2013 13:02, Bruce Morton wrote: >>> The Trust Model draft has been updated. >>> >>> Bruce. >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: internet-dra...@ietf.org [mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org] >>> Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2013 8:47 AM >>> To: Inigo Barreira; Bruce Morton >>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-barreira-trustmodel-00.txt >>> >>> >>> A new version of I-D, draft-barreira-trustmodel-00.txt has been >> successfully submitted by Inigo Barreira and posted to the IETF repository. >>> >>> Filename: draft-barreira-trustmodel >>> Revision: 00 >>> Title: Trust models of the Web PKI >>> Creation date: 2013-10-09 >>> Group: Individual Submission >>> Number of pages: 9 >>> URL: >> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-barreira-trustmodel-00.txt >>> Status: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barreira-trustmodel >>> Htmlized: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barreira-trustmodel-00 >>> >>> >>> Abstract: >>> This is one of a set of documents to define the operation of the Web >>> PKI. It describes the currently deployed Web PKI trust. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of >> submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at >> tools.ietf.org. >>> >>> The IETF Secretariat >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> wpkops mailing list >>> wpkops@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wpkops >> _______________________________________________ >> wpkops mailing list >> wpkops@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wpkops >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> wpkops mailing list >> wpkops@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wpkops > _______________________________________________ > wpkops mailing list > wpkops@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wpkops _______________________________________________ wpkops mailing list wpkops@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wpkops
