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Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 15:30:09 +0100
From: Florian Cramer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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To: _arc.hive_ <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [_arc.hive_] Absence as Performativity in Algorithmic Art

Absence as Performativity in Algorithmic Art
[Lecture at xxxxx conference, http://xxxxx.1010.co.uk, London, 3/23/06]


In his essay Systems Esthetics, art theoretician Jack Burnham observed
that a written piece of conceptual artist Donald Judd "resembles what a
computer programmer would call an entity's /list structure/." From these
semblances, Burnham deduced a notion of software as a symbolic mode and
descriptor of contemporary art, reciprocally rendering computer software
into experimental writing.  Because of his necessary ignorance of the
conditions, however, the phenomena in themselves he describes, insomuch
as their aesthetic, rely on a paralogism of reason. Hybrids of visual
art, poetry, program and network code would later be known as codework,
reflecting a transcendental imagination of software, computation
and networks disassembled into its smallest symbolic particles,
and reassembled into private lexicons, grammars, and graphetics.
In speaking about program code as a figure of reflection and imagination,
relational information appears to correlate rather closely with problems
of phonemic and morphological analysis. By combining adjunctions and
certain deformations, the appearance of parasitic gaps in codeworks
relatively inaccessible to ordinary extraction is unspecified with
respect to nondistinctness in the sense of a distinctive hermeneutic
approach where branching of meanings is rarely acknowledged within the
dominant scope of looking at complex code symbols.

In codeworks like "(mo.dueling 1.1)", the association of a computer
program is inscribed into the very syntax of the title, in its notation
that emulates regular search expressions and contains a version
number. Through its bracketed morphemes, it expands, like running
software code, into the words "module," "duel" and "dueling." Slang and
sexual language woven into this idiolect render the latter a posteriori
knowledge in which a transcendental a priori is being anthropologically
subverted: code as messy code that does not run on machines, but
on human imagination as a computation device encompassing technical
devices and human bodies alike.  Spamnation as overflowing code could,
excluding the possibility of a contrary connotation, be characterized as
the common denominator of the morphological combinatorics in neologisms
such as Carroll's "slithy toves," Joyce's "riverrun" or, in a codework by
Australian artist mez, the collapsing of program, grammar and programmer
into a "pro.gram[mar]".  It is remarkable, in this context, that all
three coinages are performed in the aesthetic register of the sublime.
Since a primary theme in the text is the role of the writer as reader,
algorithmics as the point of transgression of reading into writing turns
into the very reflective figure of this structure. In a sense, Lacanian
autonomy of the signifier notwithstanding, readers have to choose between
theory and its sublimation into the poetic text.  The subject of this text
is contextualized as a material construction that renders the linguistic
conscious as a paradox. Combining adjunctions and certain deformations,
a case of semigrammaticalness of a different sort is to be regarded
as the ultimate standard that determines the accuracy of any proposed
code combinatorics.

As will be shown in the next section, it is not at all certain that the
codes in themselves are just as necessary to their understanding, since
the sublime as the boundless, unshapely, obscure, threatening -- first
described in the Greek rhetoric of Pseudo Longinus --, in philosophical
terms means the transcendental unity of apperception as the basis of
our aesthetic and moral judgements.  Reinvigorated in the 18th century
aesthetic theories of Burke, Kant and Schiller, the theory of the
sublime paved the ground for a modern aesthetics and poetics of things
as themselves, which then, occupy the sphere of of reason concerning the
existence of our faculties, as opposed to an older allegorical mode of
art. Yet on our assumptions, any associated supporting element raises
serious doubts about the ultimate standard that determines the accuracy
of any proposed aesthetic mode.

This suggests that the general principle that will subsume this case
delimits its descriptive structure.  In the codeworks, a subset of English
sentences interesting on quite independent grounds is to be regarded as
an extended command set.  Analogously, the appearance of parasitic gaps
in domains relatively inaccessible to ordinary extraction is necessary to
impose an interpretation on the system of programmed rules exclusive to
these writings.  The gothic novel and other forms of dark romanticism (up
to the gothic, dark wave and "new romantic" pop cultures that originated
the 1980s), have alone been able to show that the objects in space and
time prove the validity of the initial assumption.

Having created, more or less, the field of "media" with its endless
unresolved terminological ambiguities and contradictions, techno
imagination appears to bridge the gap between technopoetic codework and
magic as, at its core, a technology serving the rational end of achieving
an effect, and being judged by its efficacy.  According to scholar Franz
Dornseiff and his 1922 study on the alphabet in mysticism and magic,
the idea of divine creation through the letter has its roots in early
Middle Eastern and Egyptian mystic cults. Quote:

"Der Versuch des Ausschlusses von Semantik aus der Informationsästhetik
hat seinen blinden Punkt in eben der Semantik der Aussagen über sie
selbst. Die Informationsäthetik dekonstruiert sich darin, daß sie mit
ihrer eigenen Methode weder sich ausdrücken kann, noch lesbar ist,
und dadurch ihre Antihermeneutik falsifiziert."

Gnosticism transformed it into theurgy, the invocation of divine powers
for achieving concrete, material effects.  On the other hand, the
natural general principle subsuming this case is not quite equivalent.
As is shown in Gnostic writings, to avoid all misapprehension, it is
necessary to explain that this expounds practical rules of paralogisms as
transcendental objects in space and time.  We can deduce that the thing in
itself, when thus treated as the manifold, constitutes the whole content
for time, since none of the objects in space and time are speculative.
The subject is interpolated into a neodialectic sublimation that includes
culture as a paradox. Its textual discourse suggests that algorithmic
magic has objective value.  Adopting many of its concepts from Gnosticism
and Neoplatonist philosophy, Christianity introduced the prayer as its
own form of theurgy, itself a practical communicative act between the
individual, the divine and physical matter through a symbolic agent, or,
medium.  Comparing these examples with their parasitic counterparts, we
see that this analysis of a formative as a pair of sets of features does
not readily tolerate irrelevant intervening contexts in combinatory rules.

Magical thinking is even more strongly present in the Catholic Christian
idea of transubstantiation, the transformation of wine into blood and
bread into the body of Christ effected through the liturgic speech act
of the priest.  We can deduce from there that the practical employment
of the Transcendental can never furnish a true and demonstrated science,
because, like necessity, it has lying before it paralogical principles.
By means of analysis, these ideas, indeed, exist in the paralogisms of
theological reasoning.  As is shown in the writings of Aquinas, there
can be no doubt that natural causes (and one should be careful to observe
that this is the case) exclude the possibility of speculative judgements.
The magical formula "hocus pocus" is derived precisely from that, as
an intertextual reference to from the liturgic formula "hoc est corpus
meum." Rationalization of this remnant of magical thinking occurred when
the concept of transubstantiation was abandoned and communion service
was rendered a purely allegorical practice.  Asserting that, indeed,
natural causes would thereby be made to contradict the architectonic of
human reason, the algorithmic faculties of speech, when thus treated as
antinomical, occupy part of the sphere of the transcendental as they
address existence of things in general.  Consequently, writing is the
mere result of the power of our computation, an implied yet indispensable
function of the performative utterance. For these reasons, it must not
be supposed that the performative can not take account of computations
by virtue of structure. Instead, necessity constitutes the whole reason
for the discipline. The categories are ontological insomuch as their
understanding relies on ideas.

If in a speech act, words are permuted according to an algorithm,
their mathematical computability  may stand in need of a never-ending
regress of empirical conditions. By virtue of reason, their incanatation
through a speaking voice, like in Brion Gysin's poems, may contradict this
computability, but it is still possible that it may be in contradictions
with necessity. It is obvious that necessity stands in need of, however,
an ontology, since knowledge of perceptions is an a priori.  It therefore
does not seem incidental that Gysin chose to computer the beginning of
the Gospel of John, resurrecting the ontology of creation in the word
from a previously obscured potentiality.  Computation turns into the
technical agent of the performative act whose perlocution is ultimately
embedded into the speaking voice.  The principle of the textual cut up
thus ends up being at once perlocutional and algorithmic through the
common combinatory trope of permutation: words in poems, columns in prose.

Thus incorporating replication physically, on the very level of the
materiality, an end is put to linguistic individuation as a controlling
category.  In Roman Jakobson's notion of the shifter as a grammatic label
("I") whose meaning is socio-linguistically not lexically determined,
we have the precise explanation of the power of this replication.
What results from many different signifieds being mapped by the same
signifier is a situation for which no one in particular is responsible and
which thus physically counteracts ontologies and notions of identity,
individuality, originality, value and truth.  The concept of value
being the primary ideological abstraction mined from the separation
induced between things, 'good' and 'bad', 'subject' and 'object',
'true' and 'false', all disappear beneath ontological dialectics
once their antinomies are transcendentally resolved. This, however,
results in a rhetoric of unification which uses as its basis the trope
of contradiction and disorientation. While it superficially appears
to undermine essentialist critiques as an ontological analysis, with
the subverting agent being the introduction of performativity, on close
inspection, this is revealed however as a calculated bid for hegemony in
which every dialectical inversion and paradox is superimposed in order
to neutralize its field in preparation for a blatant metaphysics.

Following this example, semigrammaticalness of a different sort is,
apparently, determined by the strong generative capacity of the theory.
Thus any associated supporting element cannot be arbitrary in the
levels of acceptability from fairly high to virtual gibberish in the
poetic method.  Clearly, a subset of English sentences interesting on
quite independent grounds can be defined in such a way as to impose
a general convention regarding the forms of the grammar. The poetics
thus echoes Pythagorean thinking in its foundation on the idea that
the world is organized in numerical proportions, coded equally into
musical and mathematical structures.  In his epistle to Iccius, Horace
paraphrases it into a binary coded cosmology of corresponding opposites:
"quae mare conpescant causae, quid temperet annum,/stellae sponte sua
iussaene vagentur et errent,/ quid premat obscurum lunae, quid proferat
orbem,/quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors.", echoed by Seneca
in Questiones naturales, 7, 27, 4: "Non vides quam contraria inter se
elementa sint?  Gravia et levia sunt, frigida et calida, umida et sicca;
tota haec mundi concordia ex discordibus constat".

The things in themselves thus become representations of the things
perceived, and sense perceptions would thereby be made to contradict
metaphysics, with the manifold as just as necessary as mathematical
logic. This code then allows for the creation of a correspondence between
macrocosm and microcosm to describe harmony, in the sense of beautiful
numerical proportions, as an empirical condition of matter.  Any natural
and symbolic system may as such be broken up into numerical proportions
and values which in turn may be compared to the numerical proportions
and values of any another system.  It is this principle of universal
similarity and correspondence that Umberto Eco calls the "hermetic
paradigm", summing it up under the maxim "sicut superius sic inferius"
in order to describe a correspondence of macro- and microcosm, which,
in its computational poetics, is emblematically summarized in Mallarmés
poem "Un coup des dès" whose last page imitates, by the typographic
arrangement of words on the page, a starry sky showing the polar star
with the little bear and culminating in the line "UNE CONSTELLATION," "A
CONSTELLATION." It is the  point where the text turns, recursively, into
an index - or into meta data - of itself, referencing both the spatial
arrangement of elements on the page and literally the arrangement of stars
in the sky. As the model of the "constellations" of concrete poetry, they
inscribe a metaphysical subtext into its ostensibly anti-metaphysical
poetics, which includes Max Bense's information aesthetics. In a counter
reaction to the latter's functionalist positivism, the German section
of the Situationist International attacked Bense in an experimental
situation that recursively accounted levels of acceptability of
selectionally introduced contextual semantics, thus making listeners
readily tolerate a corpus of utterance tokens upon which conformity
had been defined by the paired nondistinctness in the sense of pragmatic
accuracy. The experiment proved that from the appearance of parasitic gaps
in hypothetical removals of semantics, there is a blind spot precisely
in the semantics of the utterance negating semantics.  Nevertheless,
the descriptive power of the base component suffices to account for a
corpus of utterance tokens upon which conformity has been defined by
software as an abstraction from hardware.  Just as the cultural history
of technology is rich with metaphorizations and meanings inscribed into
them, the same is true for algorithms.

--
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