On 25/06/15 09:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 24.06.15 at 19:15, <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> wrote:
>> On 22/06/15 15:47, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> Host uses of the bits will be added subsequently, and must not be
>>> overridden by guests (including Dom0, namely when acting on behalf of
>>> a guest).
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
>>>
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
>>> @@ -846,6 +846,12 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct p
>>>
>>> if ( !msix->used_entries )
>>> {
>>> + msix->host_maskall = 0;
>>> + if ( !msix->guest_maskall )
>>> + control &= ~PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL;
>>> + else
>>> + control |= PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL;
>> Is the guest (or hardware) in a position to influence guest_maskall at
>> this point? I am not sure that it is.
> Of course - via the cfg write intercept (i.e. the hunk immediately
> following this one).
So it is. I had got the call chronology confused.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> (although
perhaps better to wait until we understand Sanders MSI masking problem).
~Andrew
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