>>> On 16.03.18 at 15:29, <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> wrote:
> On 16/03/18 14:13, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Commit 9d1d31ad94 ("x86: slightly reduce Meltdown band-aid overhead")
>> moved the STI past the PUSHF. While this isn't an active problem (as we
>> force EFLAGS.IF to 1 before exiting to guest context), let's not risk
>> internal confusion by finding a PV guest frame with interrupts
>> apparently off.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
>>
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
>> @@ -281,6 +281,8 @@ GLOBAL(sysenter_eflags_saved)
>>          /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
>>  
>>          GET_STACK_END(bx)
>> +        /* PUSHF above has saved EFLAGS.IF clear (the caller had it set). */
>> +        orl   $X86_EFLAGS_IF, UREGS_eflags(%rsp)
> 
> For the sake of a single or (which would be beside a line of adjacent
> stack accesses anyway), I think it would be better to have this
> immediately after sysenter_eflags_saved.  It doesn't have an impact on
> speculation safety, and can't plausibly be impacted by SMAP.

Well, I had considered that, but that'll be yet one more separate
place to NOP out later on.

> It is perhaps not very important, but is it worth encoding this as:
> 
>   orb $(X86_EFLAGS_IF >> 8), UREGS_eflags+1(%rsp)
> 
> We have a similar pattern when testing the interrupt flag.

Aren't back to back different size writes to the same location
recommended against? Then again, the push is a qword write
already anyway, followed by (currently) a dword write. I can
certainly do that. But let's first agree on the placement.

> Somewhat independently of this patch, I think we should assert that
> flags are in the expected state in the return-to-guest path, so we
> notice accidental breakage like this more easily.

Not sure - nothing was broken here afaict, we just want to play
safe. And as said the exit paths already force EFLAGS.IF to 1.

Jan


_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

Reply via email to