This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit
to the 4.17-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-entry-64-remove-ebx-handling-from-error_entry-exit.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.17 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <sta...@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
From b3681dd548d06deb2e1573890829dff4b15abf46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 22 Jul 2018 11:05:09 -0700
Subject: x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit
From: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
commit b3681dd548d06deb2e1573890829dff4b15abf46 upstream.
error_entry and error_exit communicate the user vs. kernel status of
the frame using %ebx. This is unnecessary -- the information is in
regs->cs. Just use regs->cs.
This makes error_entry simpler and makes error_exit more robust.
It also fixes a nasty bug. Before all the Spectre nonsense, the
xen_failsafe_callback entry point returned like this:
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
SAVE_C_REGS
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
jmp error_exit
And it did not go through error_entry. This was bogus: RBX
contained garbage, and error_exit expected a flag in RBX.
Fortunately, it generally contained *nonzero* garbage, so the
correct code path was used. As part of the Spectre fixes, code was
added to clear RBX to mitigate certain speculation attacks. Now,
depending on kernel configuration, RBX got zeroed and, when running
some Wine workloads, the kernel crashes. This was introduced by:
commit 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for
exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
With this patch applied, RBX is no longer needed as a flag, and the
problem goes away.
I suspect that malicious userspace could use this bug to crash the
kernel even without the offending patch applied, though.
[ Historical note: I wrote this patch as a cleanup before I was aware
of the bug it fixed. ]
[ Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all
kernels. If you're nervous about that, a more conservative fix to
add xorl %ebx,%ebx; incl %ebx before the jump to error_exit should
also fix the problem. ]
Reported-and-tested-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <m....@runbox.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrov...@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brge...@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.han...@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlas...@redhat.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <li...@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Greg KH <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoim...@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <pet...@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Fixes: 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts,
to reduce speculation attack surface")
Link:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b5010a090d3586b2d6e06c7ad3ec5542d1241c45.1532282627.git.l...@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 18 ++++--------------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
call \do_sym
- jmp error_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
+ jmp error_exit
.endif
END(\sym)
.endm
@@ -1222,7 +1222,6 @@ END(paranoid_exit)
/*
* Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed.
- * Return: EBX=0: came from user mode; EBX=1: otherwise
*/
ENTRY(error_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
@@ -1269,7 +1268,6 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* for these here too.
*/
.Lerror_kernelspace:
- incl %ebx
leaq native_irq_return_iret(%rip), %rcx
cmpq %rcx, RIP+8(%rsp)
je .Lerror_bad_iret
@@ -1303,28 +1301,20 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
/*
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
- * as if we faulted immediately after IRET and clear EBX so that
- * error_exit knows that we will be returning to user mode.
+ * as if we faulted immediately after IRET.
*/
mov %rsp, %rdi
call fixup_bad_iret
mov %rax, %rsp
- decl %ebx
jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs
END(error_entry)
-
-/*
- * On entry, EBX is a "return to kernel mode" flag:
- * 1: already in kernel mode, don't need SWAPGS
- * 0: user gsbase is loaded, we need SWAPGS and standard preparation for
return to usermode
- */
ENTRY(error_exit)
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
- testl %ebx, %ebx
- jnz retint_kernel
+ testb $3, CS(%rsp)
+ jz retint_kernel
jmp retint_user
END(error_exit)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from l...@kernel.org are
queue-4.17/x86-entry-64-remove-ebx-handling-from-error_entry-exit.patch
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
