Need a space between the paragraph and the list so pandoc knows it's a list.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dun...@citrix.com> --- Release justification: - "Bug" in docs (incorrect HTML output generated) CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jack...@citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wei.l...@citrix.com> CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> CC: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> CC: Tim Deegan <t...@xen.org> CC: Konrad Wilk <konrad.w...@oracle.com> CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabell...@kernel.org> CC: Julien Grall <julien.gr...@arm.com> CC: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com> --- docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc b/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc index cfe528b1d3..4ef119c821 100644 --- a/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc +++ b/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc @@ -109,15 +109,17 @@ See docs/design/qemu-deprivilege.md for technical details. # Limitations The following features still need to be implemented: - * Inserting a new cdrom while the guest is running (xl cdrom-insert) - * Support for qdisk backends + +* Inserting a new cdrom while the guest is running (xl cdrom-insert) +* Support for qdisk backends A number of restrictions still need to be implemented. A compromised device model may be able to do the following: - * Delay or exploit weaknesses in the toolstack - * Launch "fork bombs" or other resource exhaustion attacks - * Make network connections on the management network - * Break out of the restrictions after migration + +* Delay or exploit weaknesses in the toolstack +* Launch "fork bombs" or other resource exhaustion attacks +* Make network connections on the management network +* Break out of the restrictions after migration Additionally, getting PCI passthrough to work securely would require a significant rework of how passthrough works at the moment. It may be -- 2.20.1 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
