Hi all, I know this is legacy code, but this is where we currently stumbled into it, and maybe the same pattern also exists in 3.x:
http://git.xenomai.org/xenomai-2.6.git/tree/ksrc/skins/posix/syscall.c#n1182 more precisely: return pse51_mutex_check_init(&umx->shadow_mutex, attr); Here we pass the userspace object for initialization to the core instead of handing over the kernel shadow and then copying over the result. Is there a reason for this? Could we have more of such cases? Background: SMAP detects and prevents any direct userspace memory access on x86 except or those that are wrapped in stac() and clac() (which toggle a bit in eflags). Generally a useful feature we should allow to be enabled for robustness reasons. Thanks, Jan -- Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RTC ITP SES-DE Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux _______________________________________________ Xenomai mailing list Xenomai@xenomai.org http://xenomai.org/mailman/listinfo/xenomai
