The description of the protocol is fine.  The dicta, less so.

Setion 3.2 says:

  If an MSA is not able to determine a return path to the submitting
  user, from a valid MAIL FROM, a valid source IP address, or based on
  authenticated identity, then the MSA SHOULD immediately reject the
  message. A message can be immediately rejected by returning a 550
  code to the MAIL command.

I think I understand the motivation, but that just seems wrong.  I
have lots of web scripts that submit mail using various bounce
addresses, and there's no way to tell whose script it was without
looking at the web logs.  My MUAs put a variety of bounce addresses on
the mail they send, some in domains local to the host with the
submission server, some not.  So what?

Suggest deleting this pp and fixing the first sentence two pp down
that refers to it.

The NOTE: at the end of the section suffers from our endemic bad UI
advice syndrome:

  To properly handle delayed bounces, the client MUA needs to maintain
  a queue of messages it has submitted, and match bounces to them.

Again, that just seems wrong.  Humans can and do look at bounces and
do whatever they do with no MUA help.  Suggest deleting the sentence.

Section 3.3, third pp says:

  IP address restrictions are very widely implemented, but do not
  allow for travelers and similar situations, and can be easily
  spoofed unless all transport paths between the MUA and MSA are
  trustworthy.

Spoofing the IP on a TCP session is very difficult, and if an attacker
can do that, you've got worse problems than faked mail.

The following paragraph mentions IPsec, the pp after that
pop-before-smtp.  Speaking as the inventor of pop-before-smtp, I think
it's time to kill that dinosaur.  I'd suggest replacing all three PP
with something like this:

  IP address restrictions are widely used, both fixed IP ranges of
  known networks, and IP addresses recently validated for use by other
  protocols such as POP [POP3].  Secure IP [IPSEC] and other
  encrypted and authenticated tunneling techniques can be used to
  provide protection against eavesdropping and traffic analysis.

Saurian note: I've also done IMAP-before-SMTP.  Please don't document it.

Section 6,1 refers to "submission rights." They're not defined anywhere.
What are they?  The phrase appears in RFCs 2476 and 4409 but not in any
other RFC as far as I can tell.

Section 6.4 describes special case handling of mail addressed to
postmaster.  Does anyone actually do that?  If not, perhaps move it to
a deprecated appendix.

The NOTE: in section 8 appears to contradict the last paragraph in 4.2.
Is it OK to expand single-component domains or not?

Section 8.7 makes resolving CNAMES optional.  I thought it was still
officially mandatory.

R's,
John
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