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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-2892?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=14226939#comment-14226939
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Sevada Abraamyan commented on YARN-2892:
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In an offline discussion [~ahadr] brought up a good point by mentioning that
validating against the short name might pose a potential security hole. Does
anyone know what the original reasoning was to have the app stored using the
short name instead of the fully qualified name? If I'm understanding the
potential impact then it means in a shared cluster scenario where there are two
kerberos principles it is possible for two users to have the same username
prefix and therefore access each others tokens? In addition to
{{ClientRMService}} we are also using getShortUsername in
{{ApplicationACLsManager}} and {{QueueACLsManager}} to name a few.
> Unable to get AMRMToken in unmanaged AM when using a secure cluster
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: YARN-2892
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-2892
> Project: Hadoop YARN
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: resourcemanager
> Reporter: Sevada Abraamyan
> Assignee: Sevada Abraamyan
> Attachments: YARN-2892.patch
>
>
> An AMRMToken is retrieved from the ApplicationReport by the YarnClient.
> When the RM creates the ApplicationReport and sends it back to the client it
> makes a simple security check whether it should include the AMRMToken in the
> report (See createAndGetApplicationReport in RMAppImpl).This security check
> verifies that the user who submitted the original application is the same
> user who is requesting the ApplicationReport. If they are indeed the same
> user then it includes the AMRMToken, otherwise it does not include it.
> The problem arises from the fact that when an application is submitted, the
> RM saves the short username of the user who created the application (See
> submitApplication in ClientRmService). Afterwards when the ApplicationReport
> is requested, the system tries to match the full username of the requester
> against the previously stored short username.
> In a secure cluster using Kerberos this check fails because the principle is
> stripped from the username when we request a short username. So for example
> the short username might be "Foo" whereas the full username is
> "f...@company.com"
> Note: A very similar problem has been previously reported
> ([Yarn-2232|https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-2232])
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