This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only.

WEEKEND EDITION DECEMBER 2-4, 2011
Hammurabi Knew Better
Debt Slavery – Why It Destroyed Rome, Why It Will Destroy Us Unless It’s Stopped
by MICHAEL HUDSON
Book V of Aristotle’s Politics describes the eternal transition of oligarchies 
making themselves into hereditary aristocracies – which end up being overthrown 
by tyrants or develop internal rivalries as some families decide to “take the 
multitude into their camp” and usher in democracy, within which an oligarchy 
emerges once again, followed by aristocracy, democracy, and so on throughout 
history.

Debt has been the main dynamic driving these shifts – always with new twists 
and turns. It polarizes wealth to create a creditor class, whose oligarchic 
rule is ended as new leaders (“tyrants” to Aristotle) win popular support by 
cancelling the debts and redistributing property or taking its usufruct for the 
state.

Since the Renaissance, however, bankers have shifted their political support to 
democracies. This did not reflect egalitarian or liberal political convictions 
as such, but rather a desire for better security for their loans. As James 
Steuart explained in 1767, royal borrowings remained private affairs rather 
than truly public debts. For a sovereign’s debts to become binding upon the 
entire nation, elected representatives had to enact the taxes to pay their 
interest charges.

By giving taxpayers this voice in government, the Dutch and British democracies 
provided creditors with much safer claims for payment than did kings and 
princes whose debts died with them. But the recent debt protests from Iceland 
to Greece and Spain suggest that creditors are shifting their support away from 
democracies. They are demanding fiscal austerity and even privatization 
sell-offs.

This is turning international finance into a new mode of warfare. Its objective 
is the same as military conquest in times past: to appropriate land and mineral 
resources, also communal infrastructure and extract tribute. In response, 
democracies are demanding referendums over whether to pay creditors by selling 
off the public domain and raising taxes to impose unemployment, falling wages 
and economic depression. The alternative is to write down debts or even annul 
them, and to re-assert regulatory control over the financial sector.

Near Eastern rulers proclaimed clean slates for debtors to preserve economic 
balance

Charging interest on advances of goods or money was not originally intended to 
polarize economies. First administered early in the third millennium BC as a 
contractual arrangement by Sumer’s temples and palaces with merchants and 
entrepreneurs who typically worked in the royal bureaucracy, interest at 20 per 
cent (doubling the principal in five years) was supposed to approximate a fair 
share of the returns from long-distance trade or leasing land and other public 
assets such as workshops, boats and ale houses.

As the practice was privatized by royal collectors of user fees and rents, 
“divine kingship” protected agrarian debtors. Hammurabi’s laws (c. 1750 BC) 
cancelled their debts in times of flood or drought. All the rulers of his 
Babylonian dynasty began their first full year on the throne by cancelling 
agrarian debts so as to clear out payment arrears by proclaiming a clean slate. 
Bondservants, land or crop rights and other pledges were returned to the 
debtors to “restore order” in an idealized “original” condition of balance. 
This practice survived in the Jubilee Year of Mosaic Law in Leviticus 25.

The logic was clear enough. Ancient societies needed to field armies to defend 
their land, and this required liberating indebted citizens from bondage. 
Hammurabi’s laws protected charioteers and other fighters from being reduced to 
debt bondage, and blocked creditors from taking the crops of tenants on royal 
and other public lands and on communal land that owed manpower and military 
service to the palace.

In Egypt, the pharaoh Bakenranef (c. 720-715 BC, “Bocchoris” in Greek) 
proclaimed a debt amnesty and abolished debt-servitude when faced with a 
military threat from Ethiopia. According to Diodorus of Sicily (I, 79, writing 
in 40-30 BC), he ruled that if a debtor contested the claim, the debt was 
nullified if the creditor could not back up his claim by producing a written 
contract. (It seems that creditors always have been prone to exaggerate the 
balances due.) The pharaoh reasoned that “the bodies of citizens should belong 
to the state, to the end that it might avail itself of the services which its 
citizens owed it, in times of both war and peace. For he felt that it would be 
absurd for a soldier … to be haled to prison by his creditor for an unpaid 
loan, and that the greed of private citizens should in this way endanger the 
safety of all.”

The fact that the main Near Eastern creditors were the palace, temples and 
their collectors made it politically easy to cancel the debts. It always is 
easy to annul debts owed to oneself. Even Roman emperors burned the tax records 
to prevent a crisis. But it was much harder to cancel debts owed to private 
creditors as the practice of charging interest spread westward to Mediterranean 
chiefdoms after about 750 BC. Instead of enabling families to bridge gaps 
between income and outgo, debt became the major lever of land expropriation, 
polarizing communities between creditor oligarchies and indebted clients. In 
Judah, the prophet Isaiah (5:8-9) decried foreclosing creditors who “add house 
to house and join field to field till no space is left and you live alone in 
the land.”

Creditor power and stable growth rarely have gone together. Most personal debts 
in this classical period were the product of small amounts of money lent to 
individuals living on the edge of subsistence and who could not make ends meet. 
Forfeiture of land and assets – and personal liberty – forced debtors into 
bondage that became irreversible. By the 7thcentury BC, “tyrants” (popular 
leaders) emerged to overthrow the aristocracies in Corinth and other wealthy 
Greek cities, gaining support by cancelling the debts. In a less tyrannical 
manner, Solon founded the Athenian democracy in 594 BC by banning debt bondage.

But oligarchies re-emerged and called in Rome when Sparta’s kings Agis, 
Cleomenes and their successor Nabis sought to cancel debts late in the third 
century BC. They were killed and their supporters driven out. It has been a 
political constant of history since antiquity that creditor interests opposed 
both popular democracy and royal power able to limit the financial conquest of 
society – a conquest aimed at attaching interest-bearing debt claims for 
payment on as much of the economic surplus as possible.

When the Gracchi brothers and their followers tried to reform the credit laws 
in 133 BC, the dominant Senatorial class acted with violence, killing them and 
inaugurating a century of Social War, resolved by the ascension of Augustus as 
emperor in 29 BC.

Rome’s creditor oligarchy wins the Social War, enslaves the population and 
brings on a Dark Age

Matters were more bloody abroad. Aristotle did not mention empire building as 
part of his political schema, but foreign conquest always has been a major 
factor in imposing debts, and war debts have been the major cause of public 
debt in modern times. Antiquity’s harshest debt levy was by Rome, whose 
creditors spread out to plague Asia Minor, its most prosperous province. The 
rule of law all but disappeared when publican creditor “knights”  arrived. 
Mithridates of Pontus led three popular revolts, and local populations in 
Ephesus and other cities rose up and killed a reported 80,000 Romans in 88 BC. 
The Roman army retaliated, and Sulla imposed war tribute of 20,000 talents in 
84 BC. Charges for back interest multiplied this sum six-fold by 70 BC.

Among Rome’s leading historians, Livy, Plutarch and Diodorus blamed the fall of 
the Republic on creditor intransigence in waging the century-long Social War 
marked by political murder from 133 to 29 BC. Populist leaders sought to gain a 
following by advocating debt cancellations (e.g., the Catiline conspiracy in 
63-62 BC). They were killed. By the second century AD about a quarter of the 
population was reduced to bondage. By the fifth century Rome’s economy 
collapsed, stripped of money. Subsistence life reverted to the countryside.

Creditors find a legalistic reason to support parliamentary democracy

When banking recovered after the Crusades looted Byzantium and infused silver 
and gold to review Western European commerce, Christian opposition to charging 
interest was overcome by the combination of prestigious lenders (the Knights 
Templars and Hospitallers providing credit during the Crusades) and their major 
clients – kings, at first to pay the Church and increasingly to wage war. But 
royal debts went bad when kings died. The Bardi and Peruzzi went bankrupt in 
1345 when Edward III repudiated his war debts. Banking families lost more on 
loans to the Habsburg and Bourbon despots on the thrones of Spain, Austria and 
France.

Matters changed with the Dutch democracy, seeking to win and secure its liberty 
from Habsburg Spain. The fact that their parliament was to contract permanent 
public debts on behalf of the state enabled the Low Countries to raise loans to 
employ mercenaries in an epoch when money and credit were the sinews of war. 
Access to credit “was accordingly their most powerful weapon in the struggle 
for their freedom,” Richard Ehrenberg wrote in his Capital and Finance in the 
Age of the Renaissance (1928): “Anyone who gave credit to a prince knew that 
the repayment of the debt depended only on his debtor’s capacity and will to 
pay. The case was very different for the cities, which had power as overlords, 
but were also corporations, associations of individuals held in common bond. 
According to the generally accepted law each individual burgher was liable for 
the debts of the city both with his person and his property.”

The financial achievement of parliamentary government was thus to establish 
debts that were not merely the personal obligations of princes, but were truly 
public and binding regardless of who occupied the throne. This is why the first 
two democratic nations, the Netherlands and Britain after its 1688 revolution, 
developed the most active capital markets and proceeded to become leading 
military powers. What is ironic is that it was the need for war financing that 
promoted democracy, forming a symbiotic trinity between war making, credit and 
parliamentary democracy which has lasted to this day.

At this time “the legal position of the King qua borrower was obscure, and it 
was still doubtful whether his creditors had any remedy against him in case of 
default.” (Charles Wilson, England’s Apprenticeship: 1603-1763: 1965.) The more 
despotic Spain, Austria and France became, the greater the difficulty they 
found in financing their military adventures. By the end of the eighteenth 
century Austria was left “without credit, and consequently without much debt,” 
the least credit-worthy and worst armed country in Europe, fully dependent on 
British subsidies and loan guarantees by the time of the Napoleonic Wars.

Finance accommodates itself to democracy, but then pushes for oligarchy

While the nineteenth century’s democratic reforms reduced the power of landed 
aristocracies to control parliaments, bankers moved flexibly to achieve a 
symbiotic relationship with nearly every form of government. In France, 
followers of Saint-Simon promoted the idea of banks acting like mutual funds, 
extending credit against equity shares in profit. The German state made an 
alliance with large banking and heavy industry. Marx wrote optimistically about 
how socialism would make finance productive rather than parasitic. In the 
United States, regulation of public utilities went hand in hand with guaranteed 
returns. In China, Sun-Yat-Sen wrote in 1922: “I intend to make all the 
national industries of China into a Great Trust owned by the Chinese people, 
and financed with international capital for mutual benefit.”

World War I saw the United States replace Britain as the major creditor nation, 
and by the end of World War II it had cornered some 80 per cent of the world’s 
monetary gold. Its diplomats shaped the IMF and World Bank along 
creditor-oriented lines that financed trade dependency, mainly on the United 
States. Loans to finance trade and payments deficits were subject to 
“conditionalities” that shifted economic planning to client oligarchies and 
military dictatorships. The democratic response to resulting austerity plans 
squeezing out debt service was unable to go much beyond “IMF riots,” until 
Argentina rejected its foreign debt.

A similar creditor-oriented austerity is now being imposed on Europe by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and EU bureaucracy. Ostensibly social democratic 
governments have been directed to save the banks rather than reviving economic 
growth and employment. Losses on bad bank loans and speculations are taken onto 
the public balance sheet while scaling back public spending and even selling 
off infrastructure. The response of taxpayers stuck with the resulting debt has 
been to mount popular protests starting in Iceland and Latvia in January 2009, 
and more widespread demonstrations in Greece and Spain this autumn to protest 
their governments’ refusal to hold referendums on these fateful bailouts of 
foreign bondholders.

Shifting planning away from elected public representatives to bankers

Every economy is planned. This traditionally has been the function of 
government. Relinquishing this role under the slogan of “free markets” leaves 
it in the hands of banks. Yet the planning privilege of credit creation and 
allocation turns out to be even more centralized than that of elected public 
officials. And to make matters worse, the financial time frame is short-term 
hit-and-run, ending up as asset stripping. By seeking their own gains, the 
banks tend to destroy the economy. The surplus ends up being consumed by 
interest and other financial charges, leaving no revenue for new capital 
investment or basic social spending.

This is why relinquishing policy control to a creditor class rarely has gone 
together with economic growth and rising living standards. The tendency for 
debts to grow faster than the population’s ability to pay has been a basic 
constant throughout all recorded history. Debts mount up exponentially, 
absorbing the surplus and reducing much of the population to the equivalent of 
debt peonage. To restore economic balance, antiquity’s cry for debt 
cancellation sought what the Bronze Age Near East achieved by royal fiat: to 
cancel the overgrowth of debts.

In more modern times, democracies have urged a strong state to tax rentier 
income and wealth, and when called for, to write down debts. This is done most 
readily when the state itself creates money and credit. It is done least easily 
when banks translate their gains into political power. When banks are permitted 
to be self-regulating and given veto power over government regulators, the 
economy is distorted to permit creditors to indulge in the speculative gambles 
and outright fraud that have marked the past decade. The fall of the Roman 
Empire demonstrates what happens when creditor demands are unchecked. Under 
these conditions the alternative to government planning and regulation of the 
financial sector becomes a road to debt peonage.

Finance vs. government; oligarchy vs. democracy

Democracy involves subordinating financial dynamics to serve economic balance 
and growth – and taxing rentier income or keeping basic monopolies in the 
public domain. Untaxing or privatizing property income “frees” it to be pledged 
to the banks, to be capitalized into larger loans. Financed by debt leveraging, 
asset-price inflation increases rentier wealth while indebting the economy at 
large. The economy shrinks, falling into negative equity.

The financial sector has gained sufficient influence to use such emergencies as 
an opportunity to convince governments that that the economy will collapse they 
it do not “save the banks.” In practice this means consolidating their control 
over policy, which they use in ways that further polarize economies. The basic 
model is what occurred in ancient Rome, moving from democracy to oligarchy. In 
fact, giving priority to bankers and leaving economic planning to be dictated 
by the EU, ECB and IMF threatens to strip the nation-state of the power to coin 
or print money and levy taxes.

The resulting conflict is pitting financial interests against national 
self-determination. The idea of an independent central bank being “the hallmark 
of democracy” is a euphemism for relinquishing the most important policy 
decision – the ability to create money and credit – to the financial sector. 
Rather than leaving the policy choice to popular referendums, the rescue of 
banks organized by the EU and ECB now represents the largest category of rising 
national debt. The private bank debts taken onto government balance sheets in 
Ireland and Greece have been turned into taxpayer obligations. The same is true 
for America’s $13 trillion added since September 2008 (including $5.3 trillion 
in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bad mortgages taken onto the government’s balance 
sheet, and $2 trillion of Federal Reserve “cash-for-trash” swaps).

This is being dictated by financial proxies euphemized as technocrats. 
Designated by creditor lobbyists, their role is to calculate just how much 
unemployment and depression is needed to squeeze out a surplus to pay creditors 
for debts now on the books. What makes this calculation self-defeating is the 
fact that economic shrinkage – debt deflation – makes the debt burden even more 
unpayable.

Neither banks nor public authorities (or mainstream academics, for that matter) 
calculated the economy’s realistic ability to pay – that is, to pay without 
shrinking the economy. Through their media and think tanks, they have convinced 
populations that the way to get rich most rapidly is to borrow money to buy 
real estate, stocks and bonds rising in price – being inflated by bank credit – 
and to reverse the past century’s progressive taxation of wealth.

To put matters bluntly, the result has been junk economics. Its aim is to 
disable public checks and balances, shifting planning power into the hands of 
high finance on the claim that this is more efficient than public regulation. 
Government planning and taxation is accused of being “the road to serfdom,” as 
if “free markets” controlled by bankers given leeway to act recklessly is not 
planned by special interests in ways that are oligarchic, not democratic. 
Governments are told to pay bailout debts taken on not to defend countries in 
military warfare as in times past, but to benefit the wealthiest layer of the 
population by shifting its losses onto taxpayers.

The failure to take the wishes of voters into consideration leaves the 
resulting national debts on shaky ground politically and even legally. Debts 
imposed by fiat, by governments or foreign financial agencies in the face of 
strong popular opposition may be as tenuous as those of the Habsburgs and other 
despots in past epochs. Lacking popular validation, they may die with the 
regime that contracted them. New governments may act democratically to 
subordinate the banking and financial sector to serve the economy, not the 
other way around.

At the very least, they may seek to pay by re-introducing progressive taxation 
of wealth and income, shifting the fiscal burden onto rentier wealth and 
property. Re-regulation of banking and providing a public option for credit and 
banking services would renew the social democratic program that seemed well 
underway a century ago.

Iceland and Argentina are most recent examples, but one may look back to the 
moratorium on Inter-Ally arms debts and German reparations in 1931.A basic 
mathematical as well as political principle is at work: Debts that can’t be 
paid, won’t be.

This article appears in the Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung on December 5, 2011.

MICHAEL HUDSON is a former Wall Street economist. A Distinguished Research 
Professor at University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC), he is the author of 
many books, including Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American 
Empire (new ed., Pluto Press, 2002) and Trade, Development and Foreign Debt: A 
History of Theories of Polarization v. Convergence in the World Economy. He can 
be reached via his website, [email protected]

 

 

 

 


Castro's iPad

-- 
You are subscribed. This footer can help you.
Please POST your comments to [email protected] or reply to this 
message.
You can visit the group WEB SITE at 
http://groups.google.com/group/yclsa-eom-forum for different delivery options, 
pages, files and membership.
To UNSUBSCRIBE, please email [email protected] . You 
don't have to put anything in the "Subject:" field. You don't have to put 
anything in the message part. All you have to do is to send an e-mail to this 
address (repeat): [email protected] .

Reply via email to