State capitalism: Is it a rival to market capitalism?
By: Keith Campbell
Published: 30th March 2012
Since the start of the current global economic crisis in 2008, there has been 
renewed interest in the concept of ‘State capitalism’, as distinct from ‘market 
capitalism’. (The term ‘liberal capitalism’ is shorthand for ‘liberal democracy 
plus market capitalism’.)

This interest is centred on China more than any other country, in part because 
of the country’s ability (so far) to ride out the crisis, in part because of 
the key role it has played in keeping the global economy running while the 
developed West has been stagnating and in part because China is, unlike India 
or Brazil or South Korea, not a democracy. This last factor creates the 
impression of a ‘Chinese model’ of autocracy plus State capitalism that can be 
compared and contrasted with the ‘Western model’ of liberal capitalism.

There has been considerable debate about the rival merits of these ‘models’ in 
recent times. Thus, renowned British historian Niall Ferguson, who teaches at 
Harvard University, in the US, had a recent article on State capitalism in the 
US academic journal Foreign Policy. In late January, The Economist, of London, 
had a cover and special report devoted to State capitalism. The topic has also 
been addressed in the past couple of months by The Wall Street Journal and 
Bloomberg Businessweek. And these are only some, albeit prominent, examples.

Definitions

However, what is meant by State capitalism?

“State capitalism is the situation where the State tries to run a business on a 
commercial basis,” defines Econometrix director and chief economist Azar 
Jammine. “China is regarded as the main example.” Ferguson, in his article, 
quoted (without agreeing with) global political risk consultancy Eurasia Group 
president Ian Bremmer, who wrote that State capitalism saw “governments use 
various kinds of State-owned companies to manage the exploi- tation of 
resources that they consider the State’s crown jewels and to create and 
maintain large numbers of jobs”.

The Economist says: “State capitalism . . . tries to meld the powers of the 
State with the powers of capitalism. It depends on government to pick winners 
and promote economic growth. But it also uses tools such as listing State-owned 
companies on the stockmarket and embracing globalisation.”

One thing State capitalism is not: it is not a synonym for resource 
nationalism. Resource nationalism has been defined as the control, by the 
country in whose territory they are located, of in-the-ground (including under- 
the-seabed) resources and the means of extracting and refining them. (See 
Mining Weekly January 26, 2007.) State capitalism and resources nationalism are 
thus very different things.

Another thing that State capitalism is not: it is not new. The Economist cites 
democratic Japan in the 1950s and Imperial Germany in the 1870s as previous 
cases, although “never before has it operated on such a scale and with such 
sophisticated tools”.

State Capitalism and Natural Resources

State-owned companies dominate the global hydrocarbons sector. National oil 
companies (NOCs), as they are referred to, hold a staggering 77% of the world’s 
oil reserves.

The biggest oil company in the world is Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco, which has 
280-million barrels of proven reserves and has a production capacity of 
12.5-million barrels per day (although it usually keeps its production at lower 
levels, partly to preserve reserves and partly for politico-economic reasons). 
From second to tenth place (in terms or production), the remaining top ten oil 
com- panies are the National Iranian Oil Company, Petroleos Mexi- canos (better 
known as Pemex), the Iraq National Oil Company, Exxon Mobil, BP, the China 
National Petroleum Corporation (which has a publicly listed sub-sidiary called 
PetroChina), the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, the Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation and Petroleos de Venezuela (known as PDVSA). (This list was 
compiled by Forbes magazine in 2010.) Of these companies, only two, Exxon Mobil 
and BP, are not State-owned.

In the mining sector, however, the picture is very different. The world’s top 
three miners are all private-sector companies – BHP Billiton, Vale and Rio 
Tinto. While the number four company, China Shenhua, is a subsidiary of the 
State-owned Shenhua Group, its market capitalisation in 2010 was half that of 
Rio Tinto, reported PricewaterhouseCoopers in its Mine 2011 report. Fifth place 
was held by Xstrata, sixth by Anglo American, seventh by FreeportMcMoRan, 
eighth by Barrick Gold, ninth by Potash Corporation and tenth by Coal India. Of 
these, only Coal India is State-owned.

Of course, China as a country has very significant mineral and metal reserves. 
In 2008, according to thebusinessofmining.com, its share of global production 
was 37% for iron-ore, 39% for coal, 16% for copper and 97% for rare- earth 
minerals. In 2009, the country accounted for 6% of copper, 12% of gold and 25% 
of zinc production. But this pro- duction is spread across some 200 000 mining 
companies, most of them tiny. However, a small number of major mining 
com-panies have emerged, with the big three being China Shenhua, the Aluminium 
Corporation of China (usually known as Chinalco) and China Coal Energy. All are 
wholly or partly State-owned.

Thus, State capitalism is huge in the global oil and gas industry, but of much 
less significance in the mining sector. However, there is an important 
qualification to the latter observation. Chinese State capitalism is 
characterised by State-owned central holding agency, the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, which controls groups of vertically 
integrated companies (although this control is often, in practice, loose). 
Because they are vertically integrated, many of these companies, although their 
core business is not mining, are nevertheless involved in mining (to provide 
raw materials for their core operations or for energy to power these core 
operations).

Moreover, with China’s demand for almost all types of mineral, metal and 
hydrocarbon inputs now exceeding its domestic production, many State-owned 
enterprises are looking abroad for these resources. In this, they are being 
supported by the Chinese government, which is particularly uneasy about the 
country’s dependence, since 1993, on imported oil.

State-owned companies have accounted for 80% of Chinese foreign direct 
investment, supported by soft loans from State banks. The country’s oil com- 
panies have been especially active, and deals exchanging infrastructure for oil 
have become a common business tool for them – and for other Chinese State-owned 
companies seeking access to other commodities. This, of course, puts 
private-sector resource companies from other countries at a serious 
disadvantage.

State Capitalist South Africa

South Africa is a long-standing practitioner of State capitalism. The great 
bulk of key infrastructure, whether railways, ports, airports, electricity 
generation and transmission, water and sewage and broadcasting systems, is in 
the hands of wholly or predominantly State-owned companies. Moreover, the State 
is the biggest shareholder in national tele- communications giant Telkom with a 
39.76% share, with the next biggest shareholder being the Public Investment 
Corporation – which manages public-sector pension, provident, social security, 
development and guardian funds – with 9.31%; the biggest private- sector 
shareholder is Allan Gray Investment Council, with 8.82%. So, although Telkom 
is not, technically, State-owned, it is certainly State-dominated.

In 2002, the government created the Petroleum, Oil and Gas Corporation of South 
Africa (PetroSA) as the country’s NOC. It explores for and exploits 
hydrocarbons both at home and abroad, and owns and operates the largest 
commercial gas-to-liquids refinery in the world – at Mossel Bay on the 
country’s south coast. At home, the company operates the FA-EM south coast 
gasfields and the Oribi and Oryx oilfields, while abroad it has exploration 
licences in Equatorial Guinea and Namibia. Although a minnow by global 
standards, the company’s official vision is to “be the leading African energy 
company”.

PetroSA also undertakes the marketing and trading of oil and petrochemicals and 
is involved in the development of the country’s refining and liquid fuels 
logistics system. To this end, the company has a $11-billion project for a 
refinery with a daily production capacity of 400 000 barrels, which would be 
sited in the Coega industrial development zone, in the Eastern Cape province. 
(There is also an alternative feasibility study for a smaller refinery at 
Coega.) If this project goes ahead, it could involve giant Chinese State-owned 
oil group Sinopec, with which PetroSA has a memorandum of understanding, signed 
in September.

BP chief economist Christof Ruehl has cast doubt on the economic logic for this 
project, called Mthombo by PetroSA. He has warned that Chinese policy was to 
have self-sufficiency in refinery capacity, which will constrain the growth of 
the export market, while, at home, such an extra refinery could create a 
surplus of petrol. PetroSA maintains that the refinery is necessary to replace 
ageing plants and reduce South Africa’s dependence on exports.

Further, in 2007, the South African government set up the African Exploration, 
Mining & Finance Corporation (AEMFC), under the Central Energy Fund (CEF), as a 
first step in the creation of a State-owned mining company. The company has 
since been awarded 27 exploration rights in South Africa and started the 
development of its first mine, a coal operation at Vlakfontein some 100 km east 
of Johannesburg, in February last year. It should start production next year, 
and the AEMFC hopes to be one of the country’s top five coal producers by 2020.

Earlier this month, the government approved a plan to “hive off” the AEMFC from 
the CEF, with the mining company to act as the core element in the State’s 
participation in the mining sector. Government sees the AEMFC as an essential 
element in its strategy to beneficiate the country’s minerals and the company 
has already targeted chromium, diamonds, gold, iron-ore, manganese, nickel, 
platinum, titanium, uranium and vanadium as well as coal.

“I think the South African government has an ideological obsession with State 
involvement in the economy. The South African government very strongly supports 
State intervention in the economy,” argues Jammine. “I think the Chinese 
example is a convenient excuse. Politicians refer to China to justify policy in 
South Africa. But they ignore the differences. There are huge differences 
between China and South Africa. The Chinese are seriously embarking on 
developing their human capital resources whereas South Africa has a dearth of 
skilled managers and doesn’t seem to be on the way to improving this at the 
moment. My biggest concern about State capitalism is that the [South African] 
State has thus far failed to implement projects it has planned and budgeted 
for. So it cannot run its own companies effectively. I have the same misgivings 
about the State-owned mining company.”

A New Model?

But is there such a thing as a State capitalist model? Bremmer believes so, and 
also believes that it is a threat to market capitalism and to democracy in the 
developing world. Of State capitalism he says: “The State is using markets to 
create wealth that can be directed as political officials see fit . . . the 
ultimate motive is not economic (maximising growth) but political [Bremmer’s 
emphasis] (maximising the State’s power and the leader-ship’s chances of 
survival). This is a form of capitalism but one in which the State acts as the 
dominant economic player and uses markets primarily for political gain.”

Ferguson, however, has a different view. “Ultimately, it is an unhelpful 
oversimplification to divide the world into ‘market capitalist’ and ‘State 
capitalist’ camps. The reality is that most countries are arranged along a 
spectrum where both the intent and the extent of State intervention in the 
economy vary. Only extreme libertarians argue that the State has no role 
whatsoever to play in the economy.”

Although Ferguson gives no examples, they are easy to find. In strongly free 
market Chile, copper mining major Codelco is still State-owned. In the US, the 
country’s national passenger railway company, Amtrak, is State-owned, as are 
various local commuter and suburban railroads. America also has State-owned 
electricity-generating companies, of which the most famous is the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (which, interestingly, is run on a not-for-profit basis).

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, under Mao Zedong, the Chinese 
economy was effectively 100% State-owned, including collectivised agriculture. 
Today, collectivisation has been abolished and agriculture has been 
semiprivatised, while the private sector now accounts for more than 60% of the 
country’s economic output and employs at least 80% of its workforce. Moreover, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recently publicly called for “more economic and 
political structural reform” and, although these reforms should be “step by 
step”, they were nevertheless an “urgent task”, otherwise the huge progress 
China has made over the past 30 years “may be lost”.

Meanwhile, neither of the two other emerging economic giants, Brazil and India, 
has shown the slightest indication of taking a State capitalist approach. In 
fact, in January, the Indian government approached London-listed miner Vedanta 
Resources to sell its stakes in two of the group’s subsidiaries, Bharat 
Aluminium and Hindustan Zinc, for $3.2-billion. Vedanta revealed its acceptance 
of the deal early this month. And, in Brazil, the current centre-left 
administration last month reinitiated privatisations – the antithesis of State 
capitalism – by concessioning two airports and a terminal at a third for a 
total of $14.1-billion.

“The real contest of our time is not between a State-capitalist China and a 
market-capitalist America, with Europe somewhere in the middle,” wrote 
Ferguson. “It is a contest that goes on within all three regions as we all 
struggle to strike the right balance between the economic institutions that 
generate wealth and the political institutions that regulate and redistribute 
it. The character of this century . . . will be determined by which political 
system gets that balance right.”

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