Markets worry too much about oil price risks
  By Stephen King,
  The Independent Online Edition | March 21, 2005
  http://news.independent.co.uk/business/comment/story.jsp?
story=622153
  

China and India will place upward pressure on commodity prices, but 
will also place downward pressure on wage levels
21 March 2005


There's a sense of unease in the air. The global economy may have 
expanded at a remarkably rapid rate over the last couple of years 
but, somehow, markets seem to think that the story may be too good 
to be true. Since the beginning of 2005, equities have struggled to 
make any real progress. Bond markets have sold off. And the dollar, 
after an initial rally, has slumped once again.

What, perhaps, is more surprising is the apparently fickle nature of 
financial market reactions. Actually, "fickle" probably isn't the 
right adjective: if anything, markets have been downright 
inconsistent. The things they worry about may still be broadly the 
same. But their reaction to these similar worries appears to have 
changed direction.

One obvious area of concern is oil prices. They rose last year when 
most economists at the end of 2003 thought that oil prices would 
fall. And they're still going up now. The most recent low point for 
oil prices was seen in spring 2003, when they were down at around 
$25 per barrel. Since then, they've climbed and climbed. There have 
been occasional interruptions - notably towards the end of last 
year - but they're now heading back up to $60 per barrel. Few 
thought that oil prices would ever get to these levels.

But it's not oil prices themselves that are fickle or inconsistent. 
Rather, it's the reaction of financial markets. In the summer and 
early autumn of last year, when oil prices spiked upwards, bond 
yields fell and equity prices softened. This time around, equity 
prices have moved sideways, but bond yields have risen (see charts).

Why have bond markets reacted so differently this time around? Part 
of the problem lies with the interpretation of oil price movements. 
On one interpretation, higher oil prices are the equivalent of a tax 
increase. They reduce incomes, lower demand and, hence, are bad news 
for economic growth. In the language of international trade, higher 
oil prices represent, for oil-consuming nations, a deterioration in 
the terms of trade.

On another interpretation, higher oil prices are a threat to price 
stability. Higher oil prices, by leaving consumers and companies 
worse off, threaten a series of compensating wage and price 
increases. A wage-price spiral might then develop, leading to slower 
growth but, at the same time, higher inflation. And, as policymakers 
learnt from the bitter experience of the 1970s and early 1980s, this 
kind of inflation is particularly painful to stamp out once it gets 
going.

Of these two broad possibilities, the first could be seen as bond 
market "friendly" - weaker income growth and lower demand should, in 
time, lead to lower inflationary pressures and, therefore, lower 
interest rates. The second possibility, though, is more likely to be 
bond market "unfriendly" - by implying a return to the economic 
conditions that prevailed in the 1970s, bond holders might worry 
about inflation eroding the real value of their savings and would, 
therefore, demand compensation in the form of higher interest rates.

Could it be, therefore, that for the same "external shock" - a rise 
in oil prices - bond investors have changed their minds over the 
last 12 months? Could it be that they feared recession 12 months ago 
but now fear inflation? It's certainly possible: all of us know that 
markets can change their minds, that the same information can be 
treated in different ways depending on the economic model that's 
most in vogue.

Why might markets worry more about inflation now than in the middle 
of last year? One obvious reason is that the global recovery has 
gone on for that much longer and, therefore, spare capacity is not 
so readily available. Some parts of the global economy - notably 
China - have continued to expand at a rapid rate despite the 
authorities' attempts to cool things down. And, as China is seen to 
be the world's pre-eminent consumer of commodities, it's hardly 
surprising that commodity prices have remained buoyant. This is, 
potentially, an important factor. In the middle of last year, the 
world economy was going through a soft patch, partly caused by 
higher oil prices. If the soft patch has ended, and oil prices are 
higher still, perhaps inflation, rather than growth, might now be 
the bigger risk.

Then there's the performance of the dollar. Oil prices are bound to 
be strong in an environment of dollar weakness. When the dollar 
falls, oil prices go up or - alternatively, because this is always a 
relative game - the price of dollars falls for a given value of oil 
(measured in euros, oil prices have been nowhere near as strong). 
But dollar weakness was a theme last year as well and bond markets 
weren't spooked: so why should they worry about dollar weakness 
today?

Perhaps it's because US short-term interest rates have risen at only 
a moderate pace (suggesting that the Fed remains unsure about the 
foundations of the current economic recovery.) The talk in financial 
markets now is that the Fed is "behind the curve", that short-term 
interest rates remain well below the level that would be associated 
with ongoing price stability. If that's true, the US economy is 
unlikely to be immune to the inflationary effects associated with 
higher oil prices.

So, rationalising the shift in the mood within financial markets 
seems to be relatively straightforward. Growth has been stronger, 
the dollar has been weaker, monetary conditions still seem to be 
loose ... but, despite all this, I'm not convinced. It's not so much 
that the mood in financial markets may have shifted towards worries 
about the inflationary consequences of higher oil prices. It's 
rather that the facts may not fully support this shift in mood.

The problem lies in the relationship between profits and wages. 
Higher oil prices suggest income losses which, in turn, point to 
downside risks for either profits or wages. If inflation is to rise, 
we have to see some evidence of wage and price increases coming 
through to compensate for the income losses associated with higher 
oil prices. So far, though, profits have fared remarkably well 
without price increases, at least not at the consumer level: profits 
as a share of GDP are very high more or less the world over. 
Companies, therefore, appear to have been broadly unaffected by 
higher oil prices.

For labour incomes, it's a rather different story. Western workers 
may have seen their take-home pay squeezed as a result of higher oil 
prices but they've not been able to do much about it. They might ask 
for higher wages as compensation for higher oil prices but the 
chances of success are low: the mobility of capital is now so high 
that relatively well-paid Western workers will always be vulnerable 
to the threat of outsourcing. In effect, globalisation has reduced 
Western labour's pricing power.

Financial markets struggle with these sorts of themes. Previously 
reliable relationships between, say, commodity prices and inflation 
work less well in our new, global, environment. Changes in relative 
prices are coming through thick and fast and may no longer be the 
harbingers of inflationary pressures. The integration of China and 
India into the world economy will certainly place upward pressure on 
commodity prices - more demand for a relatively fixed supply - but 
their integration will also, for many industries, place downward 
pressure on wage levels. Working out the inflationary implications 
of these two opposing forces is extraordinarily difficult. And, 
because of this, you shouldn't always take a shift in mood within 
financial markets as a statement of reality. Oil prices may have 
risen further and inflationary worries may have grown, but I suspect 
that the underlying upside risks to ongoing price stability are 
really rather low.

Stephen King is managing director of economics at HSBC









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