An Economy On Thin Ice 
  By Paul A. Volcker
  washingtonpost.com |April 10, 2005,
  http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38725-2005Apr8language=printer
  

The U.S. expansion appears on track. Europe and Japan may lack 
exuberance, but their economies are at least on the plus side. China 
and India -- with close to 40 percent of the world's population -- 
have sustained growth at rates that not so long ago would have 
seemed, if not impossible, highly improbable.

Yet, under the placid surface, there are disturbing trends: huge 
imbalances, disequilibria, risks -- call them what you will. 
Altogether the circumstances seem to me as dangerous and intractable 
as any I can remember, and I can remember quite a lot. What really 
concerns me is that there seems to be so little willingness or 
capacity to do much about it.

We sit here absorbed in a debate about how to maintain Social 
Security -- and, more important, Medicare -- when the baby boomers 
retire. But right now, those same boomers are spending like there's 
no tomorrow. If we can believe the numbers, personal savings in the 
United States have practically disappeared.

To be sure, businesses have begun to rebuild their financial 
reserves. But in the space of a few years, the federal deficit has 
come to offset that source of national savings.

We are buying a lot of housing at rising prices, but home ownership 
has become a vehicle for borrowing as much as a source of financial 
security. As a nation we are consuming and investing about 6 percent 
more than we are producing.

What holds it all together is a massive and growing flow of capital 
from abroad, running to more than $2 billion every working day, and 
growing. There is no sense of strain. As a nation we don't 
consciously borrow or beg. We aren't even offering attractive 
interest rates, nor do we have to offer our creditors protection 
against the risk of a declining dollar.

Most of the time, it has been private capital that has freely flowed 
into our markets from abroad -- where better to invest in an 
uncertain world, the refrain has gone, than the United States?

More recently, we've become more dependent on foreign central banks, 
particularly in China and Japan and elsewhere in East Asia.

It's all quite comfortable for us. We fill our shops and our garages 
with goods from abroad, and the competition has been a powerful 
restraint on our internal prices. It's surely helped keep interest 
rates exceptionally low despite our vanishing savings and rapid 
growth.

And it's comfortable for our trading partners and for those 
supplying the capital. Some, such as China, depend heavily on our 
expanding domestic markets. And for the most part, the central banks 
of the emerging world have been willing to hold more and more 
dollars, which are, after all, the closest thing the world has to a 
truly international currency.

The difficulty is that this seemingly comfortable pattern can't go 
on indefinitely. I don't know of any country that has managed to 
consume and invest 6 percent more than it produces for long. The 
United States is absorbing about 80 percent of the net flow of 
international capital. And at some point, both central banks and 
private institutions will have their fill of dollars.

I don't know whether change will come with a bang or a whimper, 
whether sooner or later. But as things stand, it is more likely than 
not that it will be financial crises rather than policy foresight 
that will force the change.

It's not that it is so difficult intellectually to set out a 
scenario for a "soft landing" and sustained growth. There is a wide 
area of agreement among establishment economists about a textbook 
pretty picture: China and other continental Asian economies should 
permit and encourage a substantial exchange rate appreciation 
against the dollar. Japan and Europe should work promptly and 
aggressively toward domestic stimulus and deal more effectively and 
speedily with structural obstacles to growth. And the United States, 
by some combination of measures, should forcibly increase its rate 
of internal saving, thereby reducing its import demand.

But can we, with any degree of confidence today, look forward to any 
one of these policies being put in place any time soon, much less a 
combination of all?

The answer is no. So I think we are skating on increasingly thin 
ice. On the present trajectory, the deficits and imbalances will 
increase. At some point, the sense of confidence in capital markets 
that today so benignly supports the flow of funds to the United 
States and the growing world economy could fade. Then some event, or 
combination of events, could come along to disturb markets, with 
damaging volatility in both exchange markets and interest rates. We 
had a taste of that in the stagflation of the 1970s -- a volatile 
and depressed dollar, inflationary pressures, a sudden increase in 
interest rates and a couple of big recessions.

The clear lesson I draw is that there is a high premium on doing 
what we can to minimize the risks and to ensure that there is time 
for orderly adjustment. I'm not suggesting anything unorthodox or 
arcane. What is required is a willingness to act now -- and next 
year, and the following year, and to act even when, on the surface, 
everything seems so placid and favorable.

What I am talking about really boils down to the oldest lesson of 
economic policy: a strong sense of monetary and fiscal discipline. 
This is not a time for ideological intransigence and partisan 
posturing on the budget at the expense of the deficit rising still 
higher. Surely we would all be better off if other countries did 
their part. But their failures must not deflect us from what we can 
do, in our own self-interest.

A wise observer of the economic scene once commented that "what can 
be left to later, usually is -- and then, alas, it's too late." I 
don't want to let that stand as the epitaph of what has been an 
unparalleled period of success for the American economy and of 
enormous potential for the world at large. 

The writer was chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1987. 
This article is adapted from a speech in February at an economic 
summit sponsored by the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy 
Research. 









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