Indo-Pak Economic Ties: Ground Realities
  By B. Raman
   
  Observer Research Foundation
  http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A319.htm


Analyses and discussions in matters relating to Indo-Pakistan 
economic relations continue to be marked by considerable wishful-
thinking, superficial analysis and illusions. This article, in the 
form of questions and answers, tries to project the problem in its 
proper perspective.

Has Pakistan committed any violation of international laws and 
conventions relating to trade by refusing to reciprocate India's 
action under the Narasimha Rao Government (1991-96) in granting it 
the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status?

No. It has not. After the birth of Pakistan in 1947, the GATT (the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), the predecessor of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), had, by a special provision, permitted 
Pakistan to impose reasonable restrictions on its trade with India 
because the economy of the newly-created state through the partition 
of India was, in its perception, in a much disadvantageous state as 
compared to that of India. However, it is now 57 years since Pakistan 
was born. It is illogical for it to continue to apply discriminatory 
policies towards India.

Why have different Pakistani Governments been opposed to granting the 
MFN status to India and to normalising the bilateral economic 
relations?

They generally give what they project as the pending dispute over the 
future of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) as the reason. They say that unless 
and until the Kashmir dispute is resolved, there cannot be a 
normalisation of the economic relations. But, the real reasons are 
more economic than political. At the time of its birth in 1947, 
Pakistan's was essentially a three-commodity and one-port economy. It 
continues to be so. There has been no major diversification of the 
economy. Textiles, leather goods and sports goods still account for 
over 75 per cent of its exports and over two-thirds of its tax 
revenue. Karachi is the only major port available for international 
trade and will continue to be so until the Gwadar port in 
Balochistan, now under construction with Chinese assistance, gets 
going.

The Pakistani textile industry is export-dependent. The quality and 
the cost of its production are determined by the external and not the 
internal market. As against this, the Indian textile industry is not 
export-dependent to that extent and domestic demand plays a more 
important role in determining the quality and the cost of its 
production. It is said that, consequently, Pakistani textiles are of 
a much better quality than Indian textiles, but much more expensive 
and hence not easily affordable by the poorer sections of the 
Pakistani society. Many of the Indian textiles, though poorer in 
quality, are within the reach of the poor people. Hence, the 
Pakistani textile magnates have always been worried that if the 
Pakistani market is thrown open to Indian industries, the cheaper 
indian textiles could flood their market affecting them. In Pakistan, 
while the feudal landlords continue to wield considerable political 
power and generally align themselves with the military, the textile 
magnates and traders wield considerable economic power by virtue of 
the fact that they constitute the largest single group of tax-payers.

When she was the Prime Minister between 1993 and 1996, Mrs.Benazir 
Bhutto had set up a working group to examine the implications of 
Pakistan granting the MFN status to India. The group had strongly 
advised against it till its economy was diversified to the same 
extent as that of India, thereby reducing its dependence on textile 
exports. It recommended a crash programme to diversify the economy. 
It drew the attention of the Government to what it described as the 
economic plight of Bangladesh because of India's alleged economic 
hegemony there and warned that Pakistan could become another economic 
Bangladesh if it prematurely opened its market to India.

At a meeting convened by her to discuss this report, officials of her 
Foreign Office advised that she should link the refusal to grant the 
MFN status to the continuing Kashmir dispute and should not give the 
economic reasons, though they were valid. She accepted their advice. 
The Nawaz Sharif and the Pervez Musharraf Governments have also been 
following this advice.

The Benazir Bhutto and the Nawaz Sharif Governments did not take any 
steps to diversify the economy and reduce the dependence on textile 
exports. One of the first acts of Musharraf after seizing power in 
October 1999, was to give a push to the diversification programme 
with Chinese assistance, with emphasis on information technology 
(software), development of its untapped mineral resources etc. The 
programme has made some headway, but it will take some more years 
before Pakistan feels confident that it will have a level playing 
field if it normalises economic relations with India.

Another reason for Pakistan's reluctance is the fear that it could 
find it difficult to resist Indian pressure to allow India and 
Afghanistan to use the land route for their bilateral trade, by 
granting India transit rights. Presently, while the Government of 
Pakistan is prepared to concede transit rights to Afghanistan for its 
exports to India, it is not prepared to grant transit rights to India 
for its exports to Afghanistan. There are two reasons for it.

Firstly, even while accusing India of exercising economic hegemony 
over its smaller neighbours, Pakistan wants to exercise economic 
hegemony over Afghanistan and does not want India as a competitor 
there.

Secondly, Afghanistan's transit trade through Pakistan is a lucrative 
source of revenue for the Karachi port through which most of 
Afghanistan's external trade passes and for the Pakistani road 
transport companies, many of which are owned by the Pakistan army and 
retired Pakistani Army officers. For example, it is said that Lt.Gen.
(retd) Hamid Gul, former Director-General of the Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI), has minted millions since his retirement by 
handling part of Afghanistan's transit trade. There are many others 
who have similarly profited. They are worried that if a two-way 
transit trade between India and Afghanistan is allowed, Kabul might 
start using the Mumbai port for part of its external trade, thereby 
affecting their profits. They are, therefore, in the forefront of 
those opposing the normalisation of economic relations with India. 
Instead of admitting the real reason, they cite the so-called Kashmir 
dispute as the reason.

What is the present state of trade between India and Pakistan?

Pakistan has a restricted approved list of commodities in respect of 
which it allows bilateral trade. The total value of this legitimate 
trade is estimated at US $ 400 million.
There is a much larger bilateral trade estimated at over US $ one 
billion either through trans-border smuggling or through third 
countries such as Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Goods 
smuggled across the border include items such as cheap textiles, 
audio and video cassettes, pan leaves etc. Third country exports to 
Pakistan are mainly in respect of machinery and spare parts, 
particularly for their textile industry and even for Government-owned 
port installations. Before 9/11, the Government itself turned a blind 
eye to or even encouraged third-country imports of Indian machinery 
and spare parts because of Pakistan's precarious foreign exchange 
reserves. Pakistani industrialists could not afford to import them 
from the West or Japan or South Korea. After 9/11, Pakistan's foreign 
exchange reserves have increased nearly seven-fold and, consequently, 
the same dependence on third-country imports from India is not there.

What is the position regarding the gas pipeline from Iran to India 
via Pakistan?

The proposal for a gas pipeline was first mooted by Iran when Benazir 
Bhutto was the Prime Minister between 1993 and 1996. It was taken up 
with the Nawaz Sharif Government also. At that time, the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) had advised them that they should not 
agree to the extension of the pipeline to India since the 
availability of gas from Iran could strengthen India's economic and 
industrial capability. Benazir and Nawaz told Iran that while the 
pipeline could connect Iran and Pakistan, it could not be extended to 
India. A few months after seizing power in October 1999, Musharraf 
had been to Teheran on his first visit. The Iranian authorities urged 
him to re-consider the decision of his predecessors and allow the 
extension of the pipeline to India. On his return to Islamabad, he 
ordered a re-examination of the case and lifted Pakistan's objection 
to its extension to India. In reply to criticism by the Islamic 
fundamentalist parties, he said that while Pakistan would continue to 
reject proposals for the normalisation of the economic relations with 
India, it would treat the pipeline issue as a stand-alone issue 
without linking it to the Kashmir dispute. He justified his decision 
on the following grounds. First, Pakistan would need additional 
energy for diversifying its industrial capability and for stepping up 
production. Second, a gas pipeline required huge investment and no 
foreign company would be prepared to make that kind of investment for 
selling gas in Pakistan alone which would not bring adequate returns 
on the investment. Only its extension to India would make it 
profitable for the investors. Third, at a time when Pakistan's 
economy was in a state of collapse, it badly needed the US $ 800 
million per annum offered by Iran as transit fee for the gas.

The project did not take off due to India's security concerns which 
arose from the following factors. First, the pipeline would have to 
pass through the Sunni majority areas of Balochistan where there is 
considerable anti-Teheran and anti-Islamabad feelings. Balochistan 
itself is an important source of gas. The gas pipelines connecting 
Balochistan with industries and towns in Punjab are already subject 
to frequent attacks by Baloch nationalist groups fighting for the 
independence of Balochistan. Second, the Islamic fundamentalist and 
jihadi organisations, which are opposed to the extension of the 
pipeline to India till the Kashmir issue is resolved, might disrupt 
the gas supply through sabotage even if the Baloch nationalists do 
not do so to express their anger against Islamabad.

Another security-related aspect is the possibility of the Government 
of Pakistan itself stopping the supplies in the event of a military 
conflict with India. Pakistani authorities counter this by pointing 
out that whenever there was any conflict or danger of a conflict, it 
was India, which tried to punish Pakistan economically and not vice 
versa. In this connection, they refer to India's suspension of the 
over flight rights of its airlines in 1971 and 2000. They also refer 
to the demand by Indian hawks in 2000 for the suspension of the Indus 
Waters Treaty in order to deprive the Pakistani farmers of water.

While there were no direct talks between India and Pakistan on the 
security issue, in its discussions with Teheran, Islamabad was 
repeatedly holding out the assurance that it would ensure the 
security of the supplies to India. One of the suggestions reportedly 
under consideration was that if there was any sabotage of the 
pipeline in Pakistani territory, Iran would shut off the supply to 
Pakistan too till the damaged pipeline was repaired. This would 
ensure that Pakistan took effective measures for the security of the 
pipeline and that if , despite these measures, there was a disruption 
of the supplies, stoppage of supplies to its own consumers would make 
it repair the damage fast.

As a result of the post-9/11 improvement in the Pakistani economy and 
the seven-fold increase in its foreign exchange reserves, it is no 
longer as dependent on the transit fee as it was in the past for 
preventing an economic break-down. Despite this, it is as keen as it 
was in the past for an early implementation of the project without 
linking it to the Kashmir issue because its expanding economy badly 
needs additional energy supplies. The pipelines for bringing gas and 
oil from Turkmenistan, which have been under discussion since 1994, 
are unlikely to materialise in the near future till the security 
situation improves in Afghanistan. Even in respect of oil and gas 
from Turkmenistan, foreign investors are not prepared to invest 
heavily unless there is a possibility of the pipelines being extended 
to India.

There has recently been a change in the policy of the Government of 
India of not discussing the issue directly with Pakistan. 
Negotiations are already on on this subject. The statements made by 
Mr.Shaukat Aziz, the Pakistani Prime Minister, during his visit to 
New Delhi on November 23 and 24, 2004 underline Pakistan's continuing 
keenness to go ahead with this project despite the lack of progress 
in the talks on Kashmir. Mr.Aziz has described the pipeline project 
as an important confidence-building measure.

According to media reports, the Government of India is now trying to 
link progress on this issue to Pakistan's granting the MFN status to 
India. Mr.Aziz has warned that if there is continued delay, Pakistan 
might be constrained to go ahead with the project on its own in order 
to meet its pressing requirements. He has also pointed out that to 
meet Pakistani requirements only, a pipeline with a smaller diameter 
would be sufficient. Once such a pipeline has been laid, according to 
him, there would be no possibility of extending it to India, which 
would require a larger diameter.

An unknown and inadequately discussed aspect of the pipeline issue is 
the likely attitude of the USA. The economic sanctions imposed by the 
USA against Iran in 1979 continue and there is no prospect of an 
improvement in the US-Iran relations in the near future. On the 
contrary, relations have further worsened because of US suspicions of 
Iran embarking on a clandestine military nuclear project. If Iran 
continues to resist US demands for abandoning this project, there is 
a possibility of the US engineering multilateral economic sanctions 
against it through the UN Security Council.

The present US sanctions against Iran prevent not only US companies 
from having normal business relations with Iran, but also foreign 
companies which use American licenses, patents, equipment and spare 
parts. Though there are no sanctions of the European Union against 
Iran, there were reported instances in the past of the US 
pressurising European companies not to supply to Iran equipment and 
technologies which, in the US perception, would be of strategic 
significance.

Neither Iran nor Pakistan nor India would have the kind of money, 
equipment and technology required for laying the pipeline. Iran will 
have to raise money abroad to make the project a reality. At present, 
multilateral institutions such as the Asian Development Bank seem to 
be inclined to financially support the project, but unless and until 
there is an improvement in the USA's relations with Iran and it gives 
satisfaction to Washington DC on the nuclear issue, it is doubtful 
whether the US would let the project go through. The fact that the US 
has not come in the way of an Australian company doing a feasibility 
study of the project does not necessarily mean that it would not try 
to stand inn the way of the project.

What then are the options before India?
Keep up the psychological pressure on Pakistan for the grant of the 
MFN status. Heavens have not fallen as a result of Pakistan not 
granting the status so far. Heavens would not shine on India, if it 
does. But it is a psychological weapon which India has for projecting 
Pakistan to the international community as an unreasonable power. 

Intensify the interactions with those sections of the Pakistani 
business community which are in favour of an early normalisation of 
the economic relations in order to step up pressure on Islamabad from 
its own business class. 

Keep the talks going on the pipeline issue without any illusions 
regarding its early and smooth implementation. 

*******

Identify other areas of co-operation which could be projected to 
Pakistan as stand-alone areas. In one of his statements in India, 
Mr.Aziz has been quoted as referring to co-operation in the field of 
agriculture between Indian and Pakistani Punjabs as another possible 
stand-alone area which Pakistan would be prepared to take up without 
linking it to the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's agriculture has not been 
doing as well as that of India, forcing it to import wheat 
periodically. This is an area which needs to be explored intensively. 
The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. 
of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical 
Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer 
Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, Paper No. 1173, 
November 26. 

* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.  








------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> 
What would our lives be like without music, dance, and theater?
Donate or volunteer in the arts today at Network for Good!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/TzSHvD/SOnJAA/79vVAA/NJYolB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~-> 

��������������������������������������������������������
This is ZESTEconomics. Post economics-related articles and event info to 
[email protected]

If you got this mail as a forward, subscribe to ZESTEconomics by sending a 
blank mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] OR, if you have a Yahoo! ID, visit 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTEconomics/join

==theZESTcommunity======================================

[1] ZESTCurrent: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTCurrent/
[2] ZESTEconomics: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTEconomics/
[3] ZESTGlobal: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTGlobal/
[4] ZESTMedia: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTMedia/
[5] ZESTPoets: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTPoets/
[6] ZESTCaste: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTCaste/
[7] ZESTAlternative: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTAlternative/
[8] TalkZEST: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TalkZEST/ 
Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTEconomics/

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [EMAIL PROTECTED]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
 



Reply via email to