A new conundrum
  The upsurge in new financial instruments may be changing the 
relationship between debt and equity markets in ways that are still 
hard to fathom

  The Economist | May 17th 2005 
  http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=3982368

 
Buttonwood has been wrestling with a financial Sudoku of her own this 
week. It started at a City lunch, when Jacob de Tusch-Lec, an equity 
strategist at Merrill Lynch, produced a great chart showing the 
different reactions of certain European corporate bonds and shares in 
the market turmoil sparked by concerns over the creditworthiness of 
Ford and General Motors. Credit markets screamed trouble, with 
spreads widening dramatically, while share prices barely flinched. 
Are the corporate-bond and equity markets decoupling in their 
appetite for risk? If so, why?

This turns out to be about ten $64,000 questions rolled into one (OK, 
two). First of all, it is not clear that the corporate-bond and 
equity markets were ever really "coupled"�ie, linked in a predictable 
way. There are plenty of reasons why it seems that they should be. 
They are both, to some extent, priced off the yield available on 
allegedly risk-free bonds (Treasuries). Furthermore, both stocks and 
bonds represent claims on the cashflow and assets of a given 
enterprise, so the holders of both should react similarly to at least 
some sorts of news affecting the health of that enterprise.

There is a ton of academic research on the interaction between stock 
and bond markets going back several decades. The broad picture is 
that depending on inflation, mainly, and other factors, returns on 
shares and returns on bonds move together at some times, are opposed 
at other times, and occasionally are simply mutually irrelevant. 

For the past five years or so, however, bonds and shares have had a 
fairly consistent relationship. As spreads on corporate bonds have 
widened, share prices have fallen; and as spreads have narrowed, 
shares have risen. This has given rise to a popular trading and 
hedging strategy: going long on credit and shorting stocks in various 
ways. But this strategy is coming unglued as credit spreads widen and 
share prices fail to fall.

Last week's turmoil in structured-finance products and credit 
derivatives has focused minds wonderfully on how some of the more 
obscure financial products and operators actually work. There has 
been gall galore about the Danger of Derivatives and the Horror that 
is Hedge Funds. It may all be true, and there is certainly more pain 
to come as the latter continue trying to unwind unprofitable 
positions in the former. But is there a more general pattern about 
changing market behaviour here?

Some people argue that the current decoupling of equity and bond 
markets is circumstantial. The heavily advertised woes of GM and Ford 
are a special situation, they say, one that does not reflect on the 
health of the corporate sector in general. Many investors in equities 
are looking through what they see as a temporary economic "soft 
patch" to growth and profits ahead. 

Another explanation for the relative buoyancy of share prices is that 
they are supported by the continued prospect of leveraged buy-outs 
(LBOs), and by mergers and acquisitions generally. Some deals are 
proving harder to finance than their originators thought but there is 
still a wall of money out there looking for something to loom over. 
LBOs are famously good for shareholders and bad for bondholders: they 
are usually done at a premium to the existing share price, they 
maximise returns to new shareholders too, and by loading the company 
with new debt they push it a step closer to bankruptcy, to the 
chagrin of old bondholders. So it is easy to see that equity and bond 
markets would respond differently to them. 

The odd couple
Buttonwood's hunch, though, is that stock and bond markets are not so 
much delinking as linking in a new way. There has been explosive 
growth in new financial products bridging the old gap between debt 
and equity. Ten years ago, an investor eager to play the two side by 
side had essentially one instrument: the convertible bond (debt 
switchable into equity). Today, convertible bonds exist mainly as 
arbitrage opportunities�unprofitable ones, for the moment�for hedge 
funds, who own more than 80% of the $290 billion market. 

Instead, that investor has a new, equity-like instrument in the shape 
of credit-default swaps, which permit him to insure against the risk 
of corporate default in a liquid market now worth more than $5 
trillion. Or there are newer and less liquid collateralised debt 
obligations, or CDOs, in which referenced company debt is bundled 
together, divided into tranches of varying degrees of riskiness and 
sold to investors. As James Bianco of Bianco Research in America puts 
it: "They have stripped out the essential `bondness' of bonds�market 
risk, duration, yield-curve�and ended up with a pure credit 
instrument that they think should walk and talk more like a stock 
than anything else in bond land."

The trouble is that credit derivatives and structured-finance 
products are not equities, and when events arise that divide the 
sheep from the goats�ie, the interests of shareholders from the 
interests of bondholders�investors who think they are the same thing 
get caught out�as they are now.

And there is no reason for this to change soon. Company bosses made 
their bondholders happy by paying down debt in the early 2000s; now 
they have switched to stroke-the-shareholder mode with big share 
buybacks and special dividends. This�plus a wave of LBOs and 
corporate raiders like Kirk Kerkorian�looks likely to continue to 
drive a wedge between bonds and equities, which will cause yet more 
pain to hedge funds that are already believed to have lost billions 
on positions that required stocks and bonds to behave similarly. Wall 
Street firms and big banks that deal with the funds will also suffer. 
And that is before investors head for the exit.

This is not yet a crisis. But these are early days, and it seems that 
relatively few positions have been successfully unwound yet. It is 
possible that some time next autumn a couple of big banks will 
announce big losses in their prime-brokerage and proprietary-trading 
businesses�and if this were to raise their cost of funding 
substantially, it could begin to be a crisis.

On a less cataclysmic note, however, all markets overshoot, and new 
instruments and risk-control techniques, plus new participants, make 
it more likely. So another possibility, suggests Mark Kiesel of 
PIMCO, an American bond-investment firm, is that hedge funds and 
dealers will have their wrists badly smacked, learn a lesson and 
dedicate themselves henceforth to fundamental credit analysis and due 
diligence. PIMCO is looking to make profits by picking up and holding 
debt whose spread has widened further than it should have in the 
general conflagration. Others will follow suit. As you see, 
Buttonwood strives always for cheer.






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