Dear Vipul
Thank you for your critical contribution on US - India. It is very true and you are right in this article. It should touch the heads of Indian politics. US is very clverly playing the card between Pakistan and India. Bush has been proud president of the US who has met two PMs of the same country in his official capacity.
Did you see there is no reaction from our neighbour friend Mr.Musharaf? There is lot of internal conflcits that has to be manged by the Pakistan politics.
Thank you
Sam
Bangalore. India
Vipul Bathwal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
U.S.-Indian Relations and the Geopolitical System
By George Friedman
Geopolitical Intelligence Report | July 22, 2005
http://www.lebanonwire.com/0705/05072201STR.asp
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is in Washington and has
addressed a joint session of Congress. Most visiting heads of
government don't get that privilege, but Singh is no ordinary
leader. The Indo-American relationship is emerging as one of the
foundations of the global system. For the United States, India --
particularly since 9/11 -- has come to represent a strategic partner
in the U.S.-jihadist war: By its very existence as a U.S. ally, it
serves to keep the pressure for cooperation very high on rival
Pakistan. For India, the United States has come to represent an
alternative to its former relationship with the Soviet Union, which
helped to guarantee India's regional interests. Thus, Singh's visit,
while dealing with a range of the normal minutiae of international
relations, represents confirmation that something of fundamental
importance has happened.
Unlike many summits, this particular one has had the look, feel and
substance of a significant event. Foreign leaders do not usually get
to address Congress. The entire tone of the meetings implied a
significant turning point. But in this case, the concrete agreements
were as important as the symbolism: Significant deals were signed.
The most publicly significant was a deal giving the Indians access
to American nuclear technology for civilian uses. India became a
nuclear power in 1974, against strong U.S. opposition. The decision
to give India nuclear technology -- even for civilian uses -- marks
a sea change in American thinking about India's nuclear capability.
To be more precise, it marks the culmination of a sea change.
Washington used a series of severe, near-nuclear crises between
India and Pakistan following the Sept. 11 attacks to leverage
Islamabad toward greater cooperation with the United States. It was
clear then that the United States was changing its view of India "on
the fly." This new agreement represents a public affirmation that
Washington regards India's nuclear capabilities as non-threatening
to American interests and, indeed, as a potential asset.
In agreeing to increase India's nuclear technology base, albeit only
for civilian uses and under international supervision, the United
States is affirming that a special relationship exists with India.
At the same time that this public agreement was being reached,
official leaks from the Pentagon said that India would begin
purchasing up to $5 billion worth of conventional weapons, once
Congress approves the deal. This requires an act of Congress because
current law on non-proliferation bars the sale of a wide array of
military technology to countries that have acquired nuclear weapons -
- specifically focusing on any technology that might be useful to a
nuclear weapons program. Since the technologies that are potentially
useful are amazingly diverse, large swathes of technology are
excluded from sale. Should Congress approve the bill, it would place
India in a position similar to that of Israel (save that Israel
doesn't acknowledge publicly that it has nuclear weapons).
The things being sold to India are also interesting. For example,
India will be allowed to purchase Aegis technology, which is
designed to protect naval vessels -- and battle groups -- from anti-
ship missiles. So far, only Japan has acquired the technology,
partly because of its cost. In addition, New Delhi will be able to
purchase anti-submarine patrol aircraft. The United States, which
until a few years ago regarded the Indian naval build-up -- based on
Soviet technology -- as a threat to U.S. control of sea lanes in the
Indian Ocean, has now completely reversed its posture. It is selling
New Delhi naval technology that will allow the Indians to fulfill
one of their key strategic objectives, which is to be able to
control regional sea lanes. The United States would not be providing
this technology without having achieved a far-reaching strategic
agreement with New Delhi.
This, by the way, has the Pakistanis worried. Islamabad clearly
understands that its status as Washington's ally in the U.S.-
jihadist war will go only so far in terms of duration and dividends
for Pakistan. In other words, while India gets a long-term strategic
relationship with the United States, Pakistan's relationship is
viewed as short-term and tactical.
To understand the major shift taking place between Washington and
New Delhi, it is important to understand the geopolitical context
that created it. Almost from the beginning, there were tensions
between the United States and India. India's formal position was non-
alignment between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was one
of the founders and leaders of the non-aligned movement. Apart from
its formal position, India had fundamental problems with the
geopolitical stance of the United States, which during the Cold War
was heavily focused on developing Muslim allies.
The primary interest of the United States was the containment of the
Soviet Union. This inevitably caused Washington to focus on two
predominantly Muslim countries that bordered the Soviet Union:
Turkey and Iran. American strategy could not work if either of these
nations were not allied with the United States, and Washington did
everything it could to assure their alignment, including engineering
a coup in Iran in 1953. The focus on Muslim countries extended
beyond these two. The Americans did not want their rear and flanks
turned by the Soviets; the United States and Britain, therefore,
focused on both Syria and Iraq as well as on the Arabian Peninsula.
It is important to recall that during the 1950s the United States
had rather cool relations with Israel; it was pursuing a pro-Muslim
strategy out of geopolitical necessity.
During the 1950s, the Indians were the ones with a Muslim problem.
The partition of India into Muslim- and Hindu-majority nations had
created Pakistan, which represented India's primary national
security concern. In looking at India's geography, it should be
noted that in many ways, India is an island. Its northern boundary
essentially consists of the Himalayas, impassable for any
substantial military force. Its eastern frontier faces tropical
jungles. Most of its borders consist of ocean. Only to the west,
where Pakistan lies, did there exist a strategic threat. It is true
that what is today Bangladesh was part of Pakistan in those years,
but it never posed a strategic threat. As the crow flies, the
Pakistani border is only a couple of hundred miles from Delhi and
Bombay; that was not a trivial concern.
The United States was pursuing the Muslim world. The Indians saw
themselves as threatened by the Muslim world. U.S. and Indian
interests, already strained by ideology, diverged fundamentally.
India needed a counterweight to the United States and found it in
the Soviet Union. Though it never became Communist, India became an
ally of the Soviets. The Indians built their armed forces on a
foundation of Soviet technology, and their highly bureaucratized
economy found some commonality with the Soviets.
From a purely strategic point of view, the Indo-Soviet relationship
did not mean all that much. Even after the Sino-Soviet split, the
direct impact that India or the Soviets could have on each other's
strategic situation was severely limited. India was never the
military counterweight to China that the Soviets needed -- not
because its forces couldn't challenge the Chinese, but because
geography prevented the two forces from coming to grips with each
other. People speak of Sino-Indian competition -- and there was a
war (though not one that could threaten the survival of either
nation) between India and China in 1962 in the Himalayas -- but the
fact is that the two countries could be ten thousand miles apart for
the extent to which geography permits any meaningful interaction.
India's isolation limited the significance of its confrontation with
the Soviets. The value of the relationship was marginalized by
geography.
India therefore became marginal to the international system. Its
major point of contact was with Pakistan, with which it had fought a
series of wars -- major ones in 1948, 1965 and 1971 -- had serious
territorial issues and deep distrust. Pakistan was supported by the
United States and China, the two anti-Soviet powers in the 1970s and
1980s. This was partly due to India's relationship with the Soviets
and partly due to American interests in the Islamic world.
Marginalization is the key concept for understanding India's
position in the world prior to 2001. Geography prevented it from
having substantial interaction with the great powers. Its point of
contact, Pakistan, was of some importance, but not decisive
importance. Prior to becoming a nuclear power, India had only one
recourse: naval power. But its economy would not support a full-
blooded fleet-building program. Its strength was in its army, but
that army could not be projected anywhere.
Its economy was also marginalized. Built on a socialist model that
took the worst from Soviet planning and Western markets, the Indian
economy isolated itself by laws that severely limited outside
investment. Its infrastructure did not develop and, while several
key industries -- pharmaceuticals and electronics -- emerged, this
never created the fabric of what might be called a national economy.
India was a huge, fragmented country, on the margins of the
international system. Its friendship with the Soviets and its enmity
with the United States were tepid on all sides.
Then came the 9/11 strikes, and the American relationship with the
Islamic world was transformed almost overnight. Suddenly, Pakistan
became a critical piece of the United States' long-term war plan,
and therefore India became an extremely valuable asset. The Indians
understood two things. First, that as marginalized as they had been
in the Cold War, they had become irrelevant to the international
system in the post-Cold War period prior to 9/11. Second, they
understood that the U.S.-jihadist war could become India's entry
into the broader international system.
U.S.-Indian collaboration began intensely shortly after 9/11. Part
of it consisted of a mutual interest in manipulating Pakistan; part
of it had broader implications. As the United States began to view
the Muslim world as an unreliable and threatening entity, it started
to see India in the same light as Israel. It was a potentially
powerful ally that, in spite of its hostility to the Islamic world,
or perhaps because of it, could be extremely useful. Long, complex
negotiations ensued, leading up the present summit. The terms of
endearment, so to speak, were defined. A range of issues on which
the two sides could collaborate emerged.
A not-so-hidden issue at the summit in Washington was China. Sino-
U.S. relations are deteriorating fairly rapidly. There was much
speculation about India being an Asian counterweight to China. We
have no idea what this means, since geographically China and India
occupy two very different Asias. The United States doesn't need a
nuclear counterweight to China, and China is very far from becoming
a major naval power capable of projecting force outside of its
regional waters. By that, we do not mean sailing into these waters,
but fighting, winning battles and sailing home. The nuclear
technology agreement that Singh obtained in Washington increases the
likelihood that China is not going to project force west of
Singapore. On the other hand, it was never likely to do so.
There is, however, another dimension to this. For a generation,
China has been the place where hot money in search of high returns
was destined. It was where the action was. It is no longer that
place, except in the minds of the nostalgic and delusional. But
India could well be. If one thinks of China in 1980, the notion that
its bureaucracy, lack of infrastructure and a culture antithetical
to rapid development would yield the economic powerhouse of 2000
would have been unthinkable. It was unthinkable.
India is in China's position of 1980. It has a mind-boggling
bureaucracy, poor infrastructure and a culture antithetical to rapid
development. At the same time, it has the basic materials that China
built on. As the Sino-U.S. relationship deteriorates, India can be a
counterweight to China -- not in a military sense, but in an
economic sense. If the United States has an economic alternative to
China for investment, Washington develops leverage in its talks with
Beijing on a host of issues. China, after all, still courts
investment -- even as the Chinese buy anything that isn't Chinese.
Another factor underscoring the significance of the shift in Indo-
U.S. relations is New Delhi's relationship with Tehran. India's
relations with Iran have always been a serious point of contention
and concern for the United States. However, due to the situation in
Iraq, tensions with New Delhi over this issue are on the decline.
The United States and Iran at the moment are developing parallel
interests, each with their own reasons to work together to ensure
the success of the fledgling Shia-dominated government in Baghdad.
The Indo-American relationship did not develop out of the subjective
good will of the leaders. The Sept. 11 attacks created a dynamic
that couldn't be resisted, and that created a reality that the Bush-
Singh summit confirmed. It doesn't transform the world, but it
changes it fundamentally. India will come out of this a very
different country, and the United States will look at the Indian
Ocean Basin in a very different way.
Copyright © 2005 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.
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