Liz Philipson | Himal Magazine | Vol. 18, No. 5, March- April 2006
http://www.himalmag.com/2006/march/cover_story_6.html
In April, Nepal will once again be debated at the United Nations
Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The Nepal Office of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) has made its report to the
Commission public in mid-February and it gives indications of the
increasing misery in the rural areas of the country. This is matched
by an increasing political impatience in the urban areas, as well as
among the political players nationally and internationally. However,
any armed conflict that continues as long as the Nepali Maoist
conflict will demonstrate the complexities of intractability.
Intractable conflicts require patience and collaboration in the
search for a solution.
Since the start of the conflict, there have been changes in power
relationships within and between the major political forces in
Nepal. For instance, at the start of the conflict, the Maoists were
ignored and dismissed something that could not be contemplated
now. The actions taken by the king on 1 February 2005 appear to have
pushed the political parties and the Maoists closer and catalysed
greater coordination between important donors and diplomats.
However, for the people of Nepal there have been new problems. The
issues of structured social alienation, economic inequality and
regional disparity, which have contributed to the success of the
Maoist revolution in rural Nepal, still persist. But those who have
become more powerful or wealthy through the use of the gun are not
about to meekly return to serfdom or penury. In addition, there are
new problems associated with displacement. Economically active
people have left the country; seasonal workers have not returned
from India; and there are sharp increases in female-headed
households and bereaved dependents. People are moving to the urban
areas, either to the district headquarters or, when they can, to
Kathmandu. Those with more money and opportunity are leaving the
country altogether. The loss of social capital from war-torn areas
is always much harder to replace than the infrastructure.
None of these problems will be addressed by a simple `power
agreement' in Kathmandu, but such an agreement is necessary for this
to take place. A complex negotiations process is needed but, sadly,
even a simple political deal remains elusive. The path to an
agreement requires political will on the part of all the parties
the will to come to the negotiating table and the will to remain
there despite the inevitable obstacles. Political will was
singularly missing from previous negotiations in Nepal. Although it
was the Maoists that broke both the 2001 and 2003 ceasefires, the
king never directly put his political weight behind those
negotiating on his behalf. This weakened the process. The parties to
the conflict have gone to the negotiating table on their own terms,
whereas they have to be prepared to consider the positions of
others. As of today, the government remains committed to King
Gyanendra's three-year roadmap, which he announced at the time of
the royal takeover on 1 February 2005, and it has not publicly shown
any inclination for a negotiation of that plan. The other two sides
to the conflict, the political parties and the Maoists, while they
may have indicated non-negotiable bottom lines, have recently
indicated some flexibility.
The November 2005 12-point understanding between the rebels and the
political parties indicated a step in this direction, even though
both remain fundamentally distrustful of each other. The people of
Nepal understood that the four-month-long unilateral ceasefire
called by the Maoists last autumn was a demonstration of a
willingness to negotiate. Both the 12-point understanding and the
ceasefire were popular.
Awaiting the decisive moment
The political parties are focused on a re-enactment of the Jana
Andolan of 1990, a people's movement that will mark the decisive
moment. However, the democratic struggle in which they are engaged
today against the palace is taking place in somewhat different
conditions, as this democratic struggle cannot be settled in
isolation from the ten-year-old Maoist armed rebellion. The
understanding the political parties have reached with the Maoists is
a recognition of that. A more comprehensive peace process will
require a concentration on political processes, not decisive moments
or endgames. Processes are the `how' rather than the `what' or `who'
of negotiations. According to Henry Kissinger in 1969, "the way
negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what is
negotiated. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is
settled first and in what manner, is inseparable from the substance
of the issues."
`Process' encompasses a wide range of activities by various actors
that form a web of support for negotiations, as well as the
interactions through which the protagonists approach and maintain
talks. This includes initiatives in the public domain by civil
society. Good process is critical for the direct interactions
between the parties, where it creates a learning environment and
builds confidence through inclusivity, predictability and
reliability. It should be iterative and have shared ownership. It is
initially easier to build trust in the processes and procedures of
negotiation than between the warring parties themselves. They build
confidence with each other over time within the support of a strong
process. This is the ideal; the reality is usually rather more based
on the art of the possible, but attention to process makes
negotiations possible and helps to sustain them.
In order to build confidence between parties in negotiations, it is
important to incorporate a 360-degree sweep of perceptions, so that
the points-of-view of all parties are included. There are times when
it does not matter if something is true. If a powerful force
believes it to be so and will act upon it, it is relevant. Above
all, analysis that feeds negotiations must be timely, because the
position of the parties will be constantly changing and affecting
the trends in the conflict. Only through thorough analysis can one
determine whether the `conflict glass' is half-empty or half-full
in other words, Are the parties intent upon war or genuinely seeking
a position to negotiate? In 1998, P Saravanamuttu, a Sri Lankan
analyst commenting on his own country, stated: "We are in a
surrealist situation, the rumour of war and about war has greater
credence than the reporting of war. We are blundering, vainly
hopeful, whilst the other side has a better grip on its agenda."
The previous negotiations in Nepal have tended to revolve around
zero-sum negotiating tactics, rather than process-oriented dialogue.
There have also been reports about the lack of preparation and lack
of professionalism in the approach to those negotiations. An
inadequate analytical approach and the lack of an information
strategy both inward and outward should also be added to the
critique. It is important to keep in mind, however, that nothing
substitutes for political will, as stated earlier.
Ceasefires and negotiations
Ceasefires are often seen as a signal that the parties are ready to
negotiate. They provide a humanitarian pause and clear the political
space to enable negotiations to take place. However, this is not
always true talking or even full-blown negotiations may precede a
ceasefire and a ceasefire can be maintained after negotiations
stall. Nevertheless, what we saw in Nepal in both 2001 and 2003 was
the pattern of ceasefire, followed by negotiations, followed by a
concurrent breaking of negotiations and then the ceasefire.
Obviously, that a ceasefire was declared indicated some prior
interaction between the parties; but for the future in Nepal, it may
be useful to engage in rather more substantive talks about talks,
combined with de-escalation. This would give some space for some
principles and parameters to be discussed, and perhaps agreed upon,
before the pressure and public spotlight of a ceasefire added its
own tensions for the parties.
Ceasefires and negotiations are intimately connected but very
different activities and agreements. Ceasefires based on agreements
between the armed parties will include separation-of-forces
agreements, pre-agreed monitoring mandates, investigation and
adjudication mechanisms. Negotiations, on the other hand, are about
finding a new political compact for the country. It is entirely
suitable, indeed desirable, that ceasefires should not be seen as
inclusive processes, but rather should be based on technical
agreements with a narrow focus.
It is essential that peace negotiations be politically and socially
inclusive. This is not simply a liberal aspiration. Those who are
excluded almost invariably turn into peace-spoilers Sri Lanka
offers several examples of this, which has contributed to the
undermining of the stalled process there. Nevertheless, once the
channels of communication are established between armed parties for
the purposes of agreeing to a ceasefire, it is not unusual for those
channels to continue in the same manner in respect to peace
negotiations; thus, utilising the trust and environment already
created, and limiting the interaction to those who held the weapons,
as has previously happened in Nepal.
A negotiation that purports to deliver a democratic peace requires a
democratic process. The parties that have fuelled the war should not
be left alone in charge of the peace. In Nepal, the diversity of
population and history of exclusion make an inclusive peace process
even more important than it might be elsewhere. This does not
necessarily mean that there should be a plethora of organisations
and parties at the main negotiating table. Peace processes take many
forms and each is unique. A Nepali design that is suitable for
Nepali conditions needs to be created, and there are many examples
for reference.
Peace processes are of necessity complex. They will feature layers
of consultation and layered decision-making and recommendations. At
different stages, there may be public `validation' of decisions, or
elections to decision-making bodies. Due to the nature of Nepali
society, inclusivity must be designed into the process. As the
making of a new Constitution seems likely to be required, the manner
in which it is made would be an outcome of the negotiations process
and not necessarily a precondition of negotiations. It would be
decided at the negotiating table whether a new Constitution would be
created by a newly-elected Parliament or by a different assembly. If
it is the latter, then who would it consist of, and in what numbers?
Would they all be elected, or would some be appointed if so, by
whom? What would be the limits of the remit of the assembly or the
Parliament in this respect? Would all aspects be entirely within
their control? Or would they be required to consult interest groups
for instance caste groups on particular aspects? Would there be
preconditions? Negotiations need to set clear parameters for all of
these questions and many others in order to ensure a stable basis
for the Constitution-making process. Public information and
education would also be an essential part of preparations for
Constitution-making and all other aspects of the negotiation process.
Third-party assistance
Is there a Nepali solution? Most emphatically, yes. The complex
conflicts of Nepal can only be ended by a political agreement among
Nepalis. Whether Nepal can find solutions without assistance is
doubtful, however. At the moment, there appears to be polarisation
between the Nepalis who unrealistically seek the `white charger'
upon which the international community will save them, and other
Nepalis who see only the Trojan Horse of India, trying to sneak into
Nepal in the guise of third-party assistance. The negative `big
brother' image of India inhibits support for any international
intervention, lest India be part of it or influence the process.
In fact, India's influence has increased since 1 February 2005. Both
the US and UK have recognised that it is India alone who can
directly pressurise the monarchy; and since all three support a
democratic outcome in Nepal, they have largely followed India's lead
over the last 12 months. Many Nepalis point to the safe haven
enjoyed by Nepali Maoist leaders as being evidence of duplicity and
a desire to foment the conflict. Realistically, however, given
India's own Naxalite problems, this is unlikely. A stable Nepal must
be more attractive to India.
Nevertheless, the evidence of previous Nepali experience is that
there is a need for greater expertise and advice to any negotiation
process.
This could include mediation or facilitation and ceasefire
monitoring. No intractable war has reached a negotiated end without
assistance, including in South Africa. For, though there was no
formal external mediation in South Africa, they received immense
technical assistance and training before, during and after the
negotiations. South Africa was able to cope without direct mediation
because the parties were able to agree on senior judges, acceptable
to all, to chair the negotiations. That, combined with the quality
of leadership of both the African National Congress and the National
Party, led to a successful conclusion. Peace processes in every
continent, including those in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka
and East Timor, have benefited from third-party assistance.
Both the Maoists and the political parties are currently seeking
external third-party mediation. Their motivation is driven by the
need for a witness and possibly a moral guarantor but, for all the
reasons demonstrated by the 2001 and 2003 negotiations processes,
external assistance is also needed at both a technical and `process'
level for ceasefire monitoring and negotiations. However, this does
not mean that the solution should be external. The object of the
negotiations must be a political agreement between Nepalis, and
Nepalis should also be intimately involved with the facilitation or
mediation of the process.
The United Nations has been mentioned as a possible mediator, and it
has the experience to provide comprehensive and complex negotiation
support. Secretary General Kofi Annan has taken interest in Nepal,
and the UN's understanding of the situation is deepened by the
presence of the OHCHR mission in Kathmandu. The Indian government
and the current government of King Gyanendra are opposed to any
external assistance. Given relations with Western diplomats since
the 1 February 2005 takeover, the reluctance of the royal government
is perhaps understandable. India certainly has its own regional and
geopolitical concerns, but continuing to block external facilitation
may backfire with an increasingly unstable Nepal on India's border.
Even the most perfect and perfectly facilitated process, however,
cannot overcome an absence of political will. In Nepal, the
political parties (the only unarmed political force) desperately
need and want a peace process. The Maoists have given strong
indications that they want to negotiate entry into the political
mainstream in order to end their violence. The Royal Palace alone
appears to be unenlightened as to the damage this war is inflicting
on the Nepali people and, indeed, the country itself.
--
This is ZESTGlobal. Post articles on international affairs to [email protected]
If you got this mail as a forward, subscribe to ZESTGlobal by sending a blank mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] OR, if you have a Yahoo! ID, by visiting http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTGlobal/join/
YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
- Visit your group "ZESTGlobal" on the web.
- To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
- Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.
