A cautionary tale on Afghanistan
The wrong model

Dan Restrepo* | International Herald Tribune | January 29, 2007

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/29/opinion/edrest.php



As the most significant political scandal in at least a generation 
rocks the foundations of Colombian democracy, the Bush 
administration paradoxically appears to have selected it as a model 
for the path forward in Afghanistan.

Last week, President George W. Bush nominated William Wood, U.S. 
ambassador to Colombia, to be Washington's next chief envoy in 
Kabul. Two days later, while visiting Bogotá, General Peter Pace, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held up Colombia as a shining 
example for the Afghani government.

Although Colombia's decades- long struggles against narco-
trafficking and insurgencies certainly offer lessons for 
Afghanistan, they are not the road map to success suggested by the 
Bush administration. Instead, Colombia's experiences offer 
cautionary tales for Afghanistan as it wrestles with the resurgent 
Taliban and a booming heroin trade.

The first object lesson is found in the political crisis gripping 
Colombia. The erstwhile public secret of the deep connections 
between Colombia's political and governing class and narco-terrorist 
paramilitary organizations has begun to unravel. Formal charges have 
been brought against numerous members of Congress; scores of other 
politicians from across Colombia's political spectrum have been 
openly tied to the country's paramilitaries and the investigation is 
seemingly just beginning.

Last week, the first Colombian paramilitary leader confessed his 
murderous past in the government's effort to demobilize tens of 
thousands of combatants in the country's three-sided armed conflict. 
He began laying out details of years of close cooperation between 
the paramilitaries, the Colombian military, and local, state, and 
national political leaders.

Colombia's long struggle with powerful drug lords underscores the 
threat these individuals and organizations pose to democratic 
institutions. If Colombia, a country with a long tradition of 
democracy, has been compromised, the challenge for the fledgling 
Afghani democracy is even greater.

The persistence of the Colombian drug trade highlights the second 
lesson Colombia has to offer Afghanistan. Eradication and 
enforcement alone do not lead to the promised land of success. If 
they did, Colombia would have brought its narcotics problem under 
control.

Afghanistan, like Colombia, needs to understand the importance of 
providing alternative economic avenues for those cultivating the raw 
materials of its drug trade. It also needs consumer countries around 
the world to take greater responsibility for addressing the public 
health crises within their borders fueling the drug trafficking 
scourge.

Unfortunately, as can be seen from the composition of the roughly 
$700 million of U.S. assistance to Colombia in each of the past six 
years, economic alternatives and social investment often get short 
shrift in U.S.-sponsored counter-narcotic strategy.

The limitations on the effectiveness of eradication are even more 
pronounced in Afghanistan than in Colombia. The bane of Colombia's 
existence — the coca plant — in contrast is a perennial that 
requires years of maturation to generate a productive harvest.

Colombia's various approaches to combating one of the world's 
longest running insurgencies — the FARC — offers significant pause 
for Afghanistan. Colombia's efforts against the FARC were hampered 
in the late 1990s when the Colombian government ceded a huge swath 
of its territory to the rebel army in a doomed effort to jump-start 
peace talks. With breathing room, the FARC was able to mount the 
greatest threat to the existence of the Colombian state it has 
mustered in its 40-plus years.

To its credit, the Colombian government reversed this approach and 
has begun to regain the upper hand against the FARC. Unfortunately 
for Afghanistan, the Taliban have found safe haven in Pakistani 
territory. Unless Afghanistan gets the unlikely cooperation of 
Pakistan and sustained NATO and U.S. efforts on the Afghan-Pakistan 
border, the Taliban may well benefit from the same kind of breathing 
room that made the FARC ever more lethal.

The Colombianization of U.S.-Afghanistan policy is rife with peril, 
not the least because it is unclear that U.S. policy in Colombia has 
been a success or that Colombia is the shining example the 
administration would like to believe.

*Dan Restrepo is director of The Americas Project at the Center for 
American Progress. This article first appeared in the Boston Globe.


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