Turkish Democracy at the Crossroads

Saban Kardas | Reflection Cafe | 17 April 2008

http://www.reflectioncafe.net/2008/04/turkish-democracy-at-crossroads.html

As several observers of Turkish politics concur, since the beginning of the 
year we have been witnessing an undeclared bureaucratic -- i.e., judicial -- 
coup in the making. Far from upholding the rule of law, the closure case 
against the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is widely viewed 
as part and parcel of a political and ideological position that hardly stands 
any chance of gaining the public's approval through legitimate democratic 
channels. It is, in that sense, an attempt for the imposition of a particular 
ideology and political project on the Turkish society through extra-political 
channels, not unlike previous military interventions. The growing assertiveness 
of the judiciary emerges as yet another challenge to the consolidation of 
democracy, similar to the negative effects of military coups on democratization.

Democratic consolidation

As scholars on democratic transition, like Adam Przeworski, argue, democracy 
implies subjecting all interests to competition and institutionalized 
uncertainty. A consolidated democracy is one that is self-enforcing, i.e., an 
equilibrium in which major political actors agree to submit their interests and 
values to the outcome of institutional rules which are unknown ex ante. The 
process of democratic consolidation refers to passing a threshold beyond which 
all actors, including the losers, agree to avoid intervening to reverse 
outcomes of the political process through extra-political channels. To put it 
differently, consolidation alters the preferences and strategies of political 
actors, and democracy becomes the only game in town.

Because the armed forces are the most significant actors with a capability to 
overturn the constitutional order and reverse political outcomes, transitions 
from authoritarian rule in most cases go hand in hand, and come to be 
identified, with a struggle for withdrawal of the military from civilian 
politics and the enhancing of civilian control over the military. The processes 
of democratization and re-democratization are complex in nature. The factors 
that lead to the transformation of an authoritarian regime and the factors that 
give way to installation and eventual consolidation of a stable democratic rule 
may differ. The consolidation of democracy, in most cases, has been more 
troublesome than the transition to democracy.

Opportunity costs of guardianship: barriers to consolidation

Turkish democracy suffered a great deal from periodic military interventions 
and indirect interferences in civilian politics. Because direct military rule 
was short lived, re-democratizations were achieved in a relatively short time 
period in the Turkish case. Because the Turkish military preferred to exert its 
influence through indirect channels, however, the consolidation of democracy 
was never completed. The costs of military interventions, therefore, went 
beyond forcing a temporary vacation from the democratic experience, instead 
leaving permanent effects in their aftermath. For one, the dark shadow of new 
constitutional orders created by military regimes and the institutions put in 
place by soldiers have continued to narrow the scope of democratic politics in 
subsequent periods.

To the extent that non-political interference remains an option, democracy can 
hardly establish itself as the only game in town. This situation brings forth 
an important question, posed by Przeworski, which is crucial for the durability 
of democracy: How can losers to abide by democratic decisions and support, 
rather than subvert, democratic institutions. In a setting characterized by 
military or other non-political guardianship over a democratic mandate, the 
preference and strategies of political actors differ from the patterns in 
established democracies. As long as losers have incentives to utilize 
undemocratic avenues to realize their political projects, their commitment to 
democracy and the outcome of democratic processes will be hindered. The 
winners, in contrast, never feel fully secure despite the popular legitimacy 
they possess. Their survival instinct forces them to put a high premium on 
avoiding a possible intervention, which is not conducive to deepening 
democratization. In the Turkish case, for one, the shadow of intervention has 
set major brakes against any party seeking to dismantle the remnants of 
authoritarianism in the Turkish state system. More importantly, the use of 
non-political channels has served to perpetuate the limited notion of democracy 
underpinning the right/center-right position -- i.e., winners -- in Turkish 
politics.

The standard framework of analysis for politics in multi-party period in Turkey 
was based on center-periphery dichotomy, namely a struggle for redefining the 
balance of power between the core institutions that traditionally are 
controlled by non-elected state elites representing the state power and the 
peripheral societal actors, which have been represented by various right and 
center-right parties. As a matter of fact, the major currency of center-right 
parties in their quest for recognition against the establishment was their 
staunch commitment to a narrow notion of procedural democracy. Using the power 
of ballot box effectively, they made significant advances in expanding their 
power and influence. As the successor of the center-right position, 
representing large segments of the Turkish society that are upwardly mobile and 
increasingly ambitious to share political power, yet determined to maintain 
their conservative lifestyle, the AK Party is poised to encounter the 
bureaucratic core. The current crisis is yet another showdown in this perennial 
struggle.

Just as extra-political interventions prevent parties representing the state 
ideology from fully embracing popular legitimacy, they also relieve the parties 
advocating a center-right platform from the burden of going beyond a minimalist 
conceptualization of democracy. It is in that regard illustrative to recall the 
shooting game between the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the AK Party; the 
former threatening to refer legislative acts to judicial review by the court, 
and the latter referring to -- early -- elections and referenda. The idea that 
bureaucratic establishment seeks to constrain the demands of peripheral forces 
has provided center-right parties with a custom-made mobilization tool, as the 
good showing of the AK Party in the July 2007 elections attests. The feeling of 
encirclement by the bureaucratic core, moreover, has forced these peripheral 
sectors into a defensive mood to preserve the precious mechanical features of 
democratic process from bureaucratic encroachment. Democratization in that 
sense is reduced to an ongoing struggle to ensure the continuation of the game.

Political liberalization as strategy of survival

Democracy, however, is a moving target, and ensuring the right to contestation 
and participation are necessary but insufficient qualifications for cotemporary 
liberal democracies based on the indispensability of basic freedoms. Although 
the concept of liberal democracy tends to equate democratization and 
liberalization, these two concepts refer to two interrelated but independent 
phenomena. Democratic consolidation today means a transition from procedural 
democracy to liberal democracy.

The AK Party leadership appears to have concluded that the party's survival 
depends on further democratization. It also must have realized that winning 
elections is no longer a panacea. For the consolidation of a thicker notion of 
democracy, the AK Party needs to revitalize the liberal roots of the 
center-right tradition and go beyond minimalist democracy. Without expanding 
pluralism and freedom, it is difficult to eliminate reserved domains of power 
for social or political forces that are not democratically accountable. Such a 
freedom-oriented perspective also would be the best way to reconfigure the 
system of constitutional checks and balances. By moving away from the current 
system which serves to maintain a state ideology against social trends to a 
system that guarantees basic rights and civil liberties without discriminating 
between societal preferences, it could develop truly "democratic" controls over 
democratic outcomes. By protecting individuals and groups against arbitrary 
treatment by not only other individuals and groups but also the state, the AK 
Party could level the playing field for all. Agreeing to limit not only the 
state power but also the governmental power and to expand freedoms for all, the 
AK Party could best alleviate the fears that it is manipulating its electoral 
successes to install a majoritarian democracy.

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