In article <aa9ecfae-97eb-b421-e0f1-3b239786b...@tana.it> you write: >Until then, a simple forwarding —refraining to append any disclaimer or virus >scanning notice to the body of the message— would not break DKIM signatures and >hence leave DMARC authenticity intact. That is exactly the problem that DKIM >was designed to solve, to overcome the fact that SPF breaks forwarding.
Well, unless the original sender only authenticated with SPF. It's a mess. > Finally, user+al...@dom.ain is not standard. It's a perfectly standard RFC 5321/5322 address. The way it's interpreted by the recipient MTA is up to that MTA, but the way that *any* address is interpreted is up to the recipient MTA. R's, John _______________________________________________ dmarc-discuss mailing list dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org http://www.dmarc.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc-discuss NOTE: Participating in this list means you agree to the DMARC Note Well terms (http://www.dmarc.org/note_well.html)
