On (2014-01-01 23:51 +0200), Eugeniu Patrascu wrote:
Is this legal? Can NSA walk in to US based company and legally coerce to
install such backdoor? If not, what is the incentive for private company to
cooperate?
As you might have seen from the beginning of time, people in power assume
On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 10:01 AM, Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
On (2014-01-01 23:51 +0200), Eugeniu Patrascu wrote:
Is this legal? Can NSA walk in to US based company and legally coerce
to
install such backdoor? If not, what is the incentive for private
company to
cooperate?
On (2013-12-31 23:04 +), Warren Bailey wrote:
that RSA had a check cut for their participation (sell outs..), would it
be out of the realm of possibility cisco knowingly placed this into their
product line? And would it be their mistake to come out with a “we had no
idea!” rather than
If legal, consider risk to NSA. Official product ran inside company to add
requested feature, hundred of people aware of it. Seems both expensive to
order such feature and almost guaranteed to be exposed by some of the
employees.
Alternative method is to presume all software is insecure,
Thank you Randy for pointing that out. However take into account the NANOG
list is moderated, and my comment was delayed for moderation. I was
commenting on posts about trivial things, before that nice post with nice
codenames.
A good year to all. May this be a smoother year to you all that have
Warren Bailey wbai...@satelliteintelligencegroup.com
I find it insanely difficult to believe cisco systems has a backdoor
into some of their product lines with no knowledge or participation.
actually, i suspect a mix of both, the usg encouraging calea gone bad
(while committing to bad-mouth
On Wed, 01 Jan 2014 11:55:37 +0200, Saku Ytti said:
Is this legal? Can NSA walk in to US based company and legally coerce to
install such backdoor?
Well, legal or not... we will probably never know exactly what was said, but
apparently the NSA was able to convince/coerce many of the 800 pound
On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 3:55 AM, Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
Is this legal? Can NSA walk in to US based company and legally coerce to
install such backdoor? If not, what is the incentive for private company to
cooperate?
As evidenced by Lavabit; apparently, one thing that they CAN do
is
On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 11:55 AM, Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
On (2013-12-31 23:04 +), Warren Bailey wrote:
that RSA had a check cut for their participation (sell outs..), would it
be out of the realm of possibility cisco knowingly placed this into their
product line? And would it be
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 5:38 AM, Sabri Berisha sa...@cluecentral.netwrote:
Hi Roland.
I don't know much about Juniper
gear, but it appears that the Juniper boxes listed are similar in nature,
albeit running FreeBSD underneath (correction welcome).
With most Juniper gear, it is actually
I think there needs to be some clarification on how these tools get used,
how often they're used, and if they're ever cleaned up when no longer part
of an active operation. Of course we'll never get that.
The amount of apologists with the attitude this isn't a big deal, nothing
to see here, the
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 8:05 AM, Ray Soucy r...@maine.edu wrote:
This whole backdoor business is a very, very, dangerous game.
While I agree with this (and the issues brought up with NSA's NIST
approved PRNG that RSA used). If I were in their shoes, I would have
been collecting every bit of
@nanog.org list nanog@nanog.org
Objet : Re: NSA able to compromise Cisco, Juniper, Huawei switches
I think there needs to be some clarification on how these tools get used,
how often they're used, and if they're ever cleaned up when no longer part
of an active operation. Of course we'll never get
I think there needs to be some clarification on how these tools get used,
how often they're used, and if they're ever cleaned up when no longer part
of an active operation. Of course we'll never get that.
Highly unlikely, I'd say.
The amount of apologists with the attitude this isn't a big
On (2013-12-31 14:45 +0100), sth...@nethelp.no wrote:
This whole backdoor business is a very, very, dangerous game.
It *is* a big deal. And if you want to get even more scared, listen to
Jacob Appelbaum's talk at the CCC here:
I'm going to wait calmly for some of the examples being
On Dec 31, 2013, at 8:32 AM, Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
I'm going to wait calmly for some of the examples being recovered from the
field, documented and analysed.
If I were Cisco/Juniper/et all I would have a team working on this right now.
It should be trivial for them to insert code into
Since some weeks all my cisco / juniper equipment was replaced with open
source solutions (sometimes with embedded devices) and that works fine.
Google as search engine and Facebook accounts are deleted and some more
things. Cloud solutions outside europe now are forbidden for me. Thank
you NSA
On (2013-12-31 09:03 -0600), Leo Bicknell wrote:
If I were Cisco/Juniper/et all I would have a team working on this right now.
It should be trivial for them to insert code into the routers that say,
hashes all sorts of things (code image, BIOS, any PROMS and EERPOMS and
such on the
On Dec 31, 2013, at 11:50 AM, Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
I asked earlier today JTAC (#2013-1231-0033) and JTAC asked SIRT for tool to
read BIOS and output SHA2 or SHA3 hash, and such tool does not exist yet. I'm
dubious, it might be possible even with existing tools. At least it's
On (2013-12-31 16:22 +0100), na...@mitteilung.com wrote:
Since some weeks all my cisco / juniper equipment was replaced with open
source solutions (sometimes with embedded devices) and that works fine.
Google as search engine and Facebook accounts are deleted and some more
things. Cloud
Hi,
some approaches were discussed in 2010, by Graeme Neilson from NZ here:
https://www.troopers.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/TROOPERS10_Netscreen_of_the_Dead_Graeme_Neilson.pdf
a later year, at the same conference, he gave a private session demonstrating
basically the same stuff for JunOS,
On Dec 31, 2013, at 12:49 PM, Enno Rey e...@ernw.de wrote:
Hi,
some approaches were discussed in 2010, by Graeme Neilson from NZ here:
https://www.troopers.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/TROOPERS10_Netscreen_of_the_Dead_Graeme_Neilson.pdf
a later year, at the same conference, he gave a
* Randy Bush:
Clay Kossmeyer here from the Cisco PSIRT.
shoveling kitty litter as fast as you can, eh?
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityResponse/cisco-sr-20131229-der-spiegel
The article does not discuss or disclose any Cisco product vulnerabilities.
this is
On (2013-12-31 18:49 +0100), Enno Rey wrote:
some approaches were discussed in 2010, by Graeme Neilson from NZ here:
https://www.troopers.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/TROOPERS10_Netscreen_of_the_Dead_Graeme_Neilson.pdf
a later year, at the same conference, he gave a private session
On Dec 31, 2013, at 7:05 AM, Ray Soucy wrote:
I think there needs to be some clarification on how these tools get used,
how often they're used, and if they're ever cleaned up when no longer part
of an active operation. Of course we'll never get that.
But that's exactly what we need.
Look
On Mon, 30 Dec 2013 19:38:12 -0800, Sabri Berisha said:
However, attempting any of the limited attacks that I can think of would
require expert-level knowledge of not just the overall architecture, but also
of the microcode that runs on the specific PFE that the attacker would target,
Already
There's a limit to what can reasonably be called a *product*
vulnerability.
right. if the product was wearing a low-cut blouse and a short skirt,
it's not.
it's weasel words (excuse the idiom). shoveling kitty litter over a big
steaming pile.
let me insert a second advert for jake's 30c3
+1
NSA states very clearly this is baked in and ³widely deployed². Either
Cisco is not very happy with their government overlords today, or they are
having long meetings at those oversized conference tables trying to figure
out what to tell everyone. I¹m curious about the implications to the US
On Jan 1, 2014, at 2:07 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote:
it's weasel words (excuse the idiom). shoveling kitty litter over a big
steaming pile.
Clayton is responding to the ability that he's allowed, and he's using words
very precisely.
Here's Cisco's official responses, so far.
The best response I've seen to all this hype and I completely agree with
Scott:
Do ya think that you wouldn't also notice a drastic increase in outbound
traffic to begin with? It's fun to watch all the hype and things like
that, but to truly sit down and think about what it would actually take
On Jan 1, 2014, at 2:16 AM, Warren Bailey
wbai...@satelliteintelligencegroup.com wrote:
Randy is right here.. Cisco has some Œsplainin to do - we buy these devices
as ³security appliances², not NSA rootkit gateways
* Randy Bush:
There's a limit to what can reasonably be called a *product*
vulnerability.
right. if the product was wearing a low-cut blouse and a short skirt,
it's not.
Uh-oh, is this an attempt at an argument based on a blame the victim
rape analogy?
On Jan 1, 2014, at 2:34 AM, Jonathan Greenwood II gwoo...@gmail.com wrote:
The best response I've seen to all this hype and I completely agree with
Scott:
Do ya think that you wouldn't also notice a drastic increase in outbound
traffic to begin with? It's fun to watch all the hype and
it's weasel words (excuse the idiom). shoveling kitty litter over a
big steaming pile.
Clayton is responding to the ability that he's allowed, and he's using
words very precisely.
qed
pgp7iFOpQgLqE.pgp
Description: PGP signature
The best response I've seen to all this hype and I completely agree with
Scott:
Do ya think that you wouldn't also notice a drastic increase in outbound
traffic to begin with? It's fun to watch all the hype and things like
that, but to truly sit down and think about what it would actually
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 12/31/2013 12:33 PM, sth...@nethelp.no wrote:
The best response I've seen to all this hype and I completely agree with
Scott:
Do ya think that you wouldn't also notice a drastic increase in
outbound traffic to begin with? It's fun to watch
Explaining, not a denial written by their legal department. I find it
insanely difficult to believe cisco systems has a backdoor into some of
their product lines with no knowledge or participation. Given the fact
that RSA had a check cut for their participation (sell outs..), would it
be out of
* Warren Bailey:
Explaining, not a denial written by their legal department. I find it
insanely difficult to believe cisco systems has a backdoor into some of
their product lines with no knowledge or participation.
As far as I understand it, these are firmware tweaks or implants
sitting on a
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 12/31/2013 4:02 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:
* Warren Bailey:
Explaining, not a denial written by their legal department. I find it
insanely difficult to believe cisco systems has a backdoor into some of
their product lines with no knowledge or
China. ;) lol
Sent from my Mobile Device.
Original message
From: Paul Ferguson fergdawgs...@mykolab.com
Date: 12/31/2013 4:13 PM (GMT-08:00)
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: NSA able to compromise Cisco, Juniper, Huawei switches
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Found some interesting news on one of the Australia news websites.
http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/368527,nsa-able-to-compromise-cisco-juniper-huawei-switches.aspx
Regards,
Steven.
On (2013-12-30 20:30 +1100), sten rulz wrote:
Found some interesting news on one of the Australia news websites.
http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/368527,nsa-able-to-compromise-cisco-juniper-huawei-switches.aspx
The quality of this data is too damn low.
Not as bad as this though,
Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
On (2013-12-30 20:30 +1100), sten rulz wrote:
I really think we're doing disservice to an issue which might be at
scale of
human-rights issue, by spamming media with 0 data news. Where is this
backdoor? How does it work? How can I recreate on my devices?
I don't
On (2013-12-30 06:12 -0500), Shawn Wilson wrote:
I don't really want you to know how to recreate it until the companies have
had a chance to fix said issue. I'd hope, if such issues were disclosed,
those news outlets would go through proper channels of disclosure before
going to press with
On Dec 30, 2013, at 5:06 PM, Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
The quality of this data is too damn low.
The #1 way that Cisco routers and switches are compromised is brute-forcing
against an unsecured management plane, with username 'cisco' and password
'cisco.
The #1 way that Juniper and
On Dec 30, 2013, at 6:18 PM, Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
I welcome the short-term havok and damage of such disclose if it would be
anywhere near the magnitude implied, it would create pressure to change
things.
This is the type of change we're likely to see, IMHO:
Even more outrageous than the domestic spying is the arrogance to think
that they can protect the details on backdoors into critical
infrastructure.
They may have basically created the framework for an Internet-wide kill
switch, that likely also affects every aspect of modern communication.
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 8:07 AM, Ray Soucy r...@maine.edu wrote:
I hope Cisco, Juniper, and others respond quickly with updated images for
all platforms affected before the details leak.
So, if this plays out nice (if true, it won't), the fix will come
months before the disclosure. Think, if
On Dec 30, 2013, at 8:07 PM, Ray Soucy r...@maine.edu wrote:
I hope Cisco, Juniper, and others respond quickly with updated images for all
platforms affected before the details leak.
During my time at Cisco, I was involved deeply enough with various platform
teams as well as PSIRT, etc., to
I'd love to know how they were getting in flight wifi.
Sent from my Mobile Device.
Original message
From: sten rulz stenr...@gmail.com
Date: 12/30/2013 12:32 AM (GMT-09:00)
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: NSA able to compromise Cisco, Juniper, Huawei switches
Found some
On Mon, 30 Dec 2013 14:34:52 +, Dobbins, Roland said:
My assumption is that this allegation about Cisco and Juniper is the result
of non-specialists reading about lawful intercept for the first time, and
failing to do their homework.
That does raise an interesting question. What
On Dec 30, 2013, at 10:44 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu
valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
What percentage of Cisco gear that supports a CALEA lawful intercept mode is
installed in situations where CALEA doesn't apply, and thus there's a high
likelyhood that said support is misconfigured and
On Dec 30, 2013, at 11:03 PM, Dobbins, Roland rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:
AFAIK, it must be explicitly enabled in order to be functional. It isn't the
sort of thing which is enabled by default, nor can it be enabled without
making explicit configuration changes.
It's also possible they're
On 12/30/2013 08:03 AM, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
On Dec 30, 2013, at 10:44 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu
valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
What percentage of Cisco gear that supports a CALEA lawful intercept mode is
installed in situations where CALEA doesn't apply, and thus there's a high
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 04:03:07PM +, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
On Dec 30, 2013, at 10:44 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu
valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
What percentage of Cisco gear that supports a CALEA lawful intercept mode
is installed in situations where CALEA doesn't apply, and thus
This might be an interesting example of it's (mis)use.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_wiretapping_case_2004%E2%80%932005
Sam Moats
On 2013-12-30 11:16, Enno Rey wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 04:03:07PM +, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
On Dec 30, 2013, at 10:44 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu
On 12/30/2013 9:05 AM, Warren Bailey wrote:
I'd love to know how they were getting in flight wifi.
Sent from my Mobile Device.
Original message
From: sten rulz stenr...@gmail.com
Date: 12/30/2013 12:32 AM (GMT-09:00)
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: NSA able to compromise Cisco
this morning.
Sent from my Mobile Device.
Original message
From: valdis.kletni...@vt.edu
Date: 12/30/2013 6:48 AM (GMT-09:00)
To: Dobbins, Roland rdobb...@arbor.net
Cc: nanog@nanog.org list nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: NSA able to compromise Cisco, Juniper, Huawei switches
I built the other.
Sent from my Mobile Device.
Original message
From: Jeremy Bresley b...@brezworks.com
Date: 12/30/2013 7:34 AM (GMT-09:00)
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: NSA able to compromise Cisco, Juniper, Huawei switches
On 12/30/2013 9:05 AM, Warren Bailey wrote
On Dec 30, 2013, at 11:16 PM, Enno Rey e...@ernw.de wrote:
at least back in 2007 it could be enabled/configured by SNMP RW access [see
slide 43 of the presentation referenced in this post
http://www.insinuator.net/2013/07/snmp-reflected-amplification-ddos-attacks/]
so knowing the term
On Dec 30, 2013, at 11:18 PM, Sam Moats s...@circlenet.us wrote:
This might be an interesting example of it's (mis)use.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_wiretapping_case_2004%E2%80%932005
That's one of the cases I know about; it was utilized via Ericsson gear.
Looking more at the actual leaked information it seems that if the NSA is
working with companies, it's not anything the companies are likely aware
of.
The common form of infection seems to be though software updates performed
by administrators (through the NSA hijacking web traffic). They are
to compromise Cisco, Juniper, Huawei switches
Looking more at the actual leaked information it seems that if the NSA is
working with companies, it's not anything the companies are likely aware of.
The common form of infection seems to be though software updates performed
by administrators (through the NSA
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 1:17 PM, Lorell Hathcock lor...@hathcock.org wrote:
NANOG:
Here's the really scary question for me.
Would it be possible for NSA-payload traffic that originates on our private
networks that is destined for the NSA to go undetected by our IDS systems?
Yup.
On a side note,
I've been involved with organizing the New England regional Collegiate
Cyber-Defense Competition for a while, and one our Red Team members was
able to make a pretty convincing IOS rootkit using IOS TCL scripting to
mask configuration from the students. I don't think any students
IIRC, Cisco threatened to sue if it was ever released
you gotta love it. they will roll over and piss themselves for nsa and
other who are violating every principle, but threaten paying customers
who would report a hole.
the question is what have these companies and gov people not violated?
Hi all,
I've been watching this list for a couple weeks now and while risking
beeing flamed, i just wanted to say that any network professional that puts
any equipment into production without securing it against the kind of
issues mentioned so far (cisco/cisco, snmp private, etc) is negligent and
There are many ways a backdoor could be used in a properly secured system.
To think otherwise is a huge mistake. I can think of several ways, if
tasked and given the resources of a large gov't that I would attack this
problem. To assume that those tasked and focused only this type of
solution
These are not backdoor issues, NSA related, whatever... This is noise.
Trying to get this thread on track, can the original poster provide any
proof of this so called ability of the so called inteligence agency beeing
able to access cisco/juniper, taking into account that management access
Hi Folks -
Clay Kossmeyer here from the Cisco PSIRT.
We've published the following document in response to the original (Dec. 29)
Der Spiegel article:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityResponse/cisco-sr-20131229-der-spiegel
and are investing the claims in the Dec.
Clay Kossmeyer here from the Cisco PSIRT.
shoveling kitty litter as fast as you can, eh?
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityResponse/cisco-sr-20131229-der-spiegel
The article does not discuss or disclose any Cisco product vulnerabilities.
this is disengenuous at
Hi,
you gotta love it. they will roll over and piss themselves for nsa and
other who are violating every principle, but threaten paying customers
who would report a hole.
Don't forget that for C and J, the U.S. government is a large customer as well.
Thanks,
Sabri
On 12/30/2013 3:51 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
Clay Kossmeyer here from the Cisco PSIRT.
shoveling kitty litter as fast as you can, eh?
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityResponse/cisco-sr-20131229-der-spiegel
The article does not discuss or disclose any Cisco product
On Dec 30, 2013, at 11:28 PM, Marco Teixeira ad...@marcoteixeira.com wrote:
i just wanted to say that any network professional that puts any equipment
into production without securing it against the kind of
issues mentioned so far (cisco/cisco, snmp private, etc) is negligent and
should be
On Dec 31, 2013, at 12:00 AM, Ray Soucy r...@maine.edu wrote:
So this isn't an issue of the NSA working with Cisco and Juniper to include
back doors, it's an issue of the NSA modifying those releases after the fact
though BIOS implants.
Yes, I see this now, thanks.
AFAICT, the Cisco boxes
So this isn't an issue of the NSA working with Cisco and Juniper to
include back doors, it's an issue of the NSA modifying those releases
after the fact though BIOS implants.
Yes, I see this now, thanks.
AFAICT, the Cisco boxes listed are ASAs and PIXes, which are
essentially Linux PCs
On Dec 31, 2013, at 9:41 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote:
you may want to read the more complete, well let's say extensive
Thanks, Randy - now I see the JunOS stuff in there for J-series and M-series.
---
Roland Dobbins
The cynic in me says that cisco switch/router gear isn't part of that
report on clandestine backdoors, because they don't need said clandestine
backdoors to access them...
-Blake
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 8:54 PM, Dobbins, Roland rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:
On Dec 31, 2013, at 9:41 AM, Randy
On Dec 31, 2013, at 10:16 AM, Blake Dunlap iki...@gmail.com wrote:
The cynic in me says that cisco switch/router gear isn't part of that report
on clandestine backdoors, because they don't need said clandestine backdoors
to access them...
T-series is in there, too.
It's also important to
Hi Roland.
I don't know much about Juniper
gear, but it appears that the Juniper boxes listed are similar in nature,
albeit running FreeBSD underneath (correction welcome).
With most Juniper gear, it is actually quite difficult to achieve wire-tapping
on a large scale using something as
- Original Message -
From: Ray Soucy r...@maine.edu
I hope when [if] the truth is learned it is a lot less prevalent than
it sounds, but I'm not optimistic.
This is why we need all infrastructure to be implemented using open
standards, open hardware designs, and open source
Is Ken Thompson turning over in his grave yet?
I certainly hope not...
It's also important to keep in mind that all these purported documents
refer to technologies which were supposedly available 5 years ago,
based on the dates in the slides.
assumptions that the TAO folk have been taking a long much-deserved
sabbatical are probably naive
the shocking revelation
Sabri,
As I was going through reading all these replies, the one thing that
continued to poke at me was the requirement of the signed binaries and
microcode. The same goes for many of the Cisco binaries, without direct
assistance, which is unclear at this point through the cloud of smoke so
to
On Dec 31, 2013, at 10:59 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote:
assumptions that the TAO folk have been taking a long much-deserved
sabbatical are probably naive
Indeed; that is my point.
These documents allege that the capabilities in question were present five
years ago, which is an
On Dec 31, 2013, at 10:38 AM, Sabri Berisha sa...@cluecentral.net wrote:
Assuming M/MX/T series, you are correct that the foundation of the
control-plane is a FreeBSD-based kernel.
And the management plane, too?
However, that control-plane talks to a forwarding-plane (PFE). The PFE runs
On Dec 31, 2013, at 11:06 AM, [AP] NANOG na...@armoredpackets.com wrote:
Then looking at things from the evil side though, if they owned the system
which provides the signing then they could sign
virtually anything they wish.
Or if they owned *people* with the right level of access to do
Roland,
I did fail to mention the HUMINT (Human Intelligence) side of things,
thank you for bringing that up!
--
Thank you,
Robert Miller
http://www.armoredpackets.com
Twitter: @arch3angel
On 12/30/13, 11:33 PM, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
On Dec 31, 2013, at 11:06 AM, [AP] NANOG
I'm torn on this. On one hand, it seems sinister. On the other, it's not
only what the NSA is tasked with doing, but it's what you'd EXPECT them to
be doing in the role as the NSA.
I'm not saying it's right or wrong...it creeps me out a little,
though...but these are the kinds of things we have
On 12/30/2013 11:06 PM, [AP] NANOG wrote:
As I was going through reading all these replies, the one thing that
continued to poke at me was the requirement of the signed binaries and
microcode. The same goes for many of the Cisco binaries, without direct
assistance, which is unclear at this
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 10:41 PM, Blair Trosper blair.tros...@gmail.comwrote:
I'm torn on this. On one hand, it seems sinister. On the other, it's not
only what the NSA is tasked with doing, but it's what you'd EXPECT them to
be doing in the role as the NSA.
[snip]
The NSA's role is not
We're all getting far too conditioned for the click OK to proceed
overload, and the sources aren't helping.
If one embarks with deliberation upon a course of action which may entertain
certain results then the intent to cause the result so obtained is, by
implication, proved.
To supplement and amend what I said:
These are the KINDS of things we want the NSA to do; however, the
institutional oversight necessary to make sure it's Constitutional,
warranted, and kept in bounds is woefully lacking (if any exists at all).
Even FISA is unsatisfactory.
At any rate, I agree
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