Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-27 Thread Adrian Woodley
I'm relatively new to the NTP pool, however doesn't the pool action itself hedge against the sort of interference that this proposal aims to protect against? If an individual server is being intercepted or otherwise tampered with, and made to drift significantly away from true time, won't it

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-27 Thread Magnus Danielson
Hi Hal, On 2020-03-11 22:30, Hal Murray wrote: > The RFC is close to getting published. > > Do you know about it? Any thoughts about how to get the pool to support it? > > In case you and/or others aren't familiar with it, here is a rough > description. Details here: >

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-19 Thread Miroslav Lichvar
On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 11:20:18AM -0600, Ask Bjørn Hansen wrote: > On Mar 12, 2020, at 9:54, Miroslav Lichvar <[1]mlich...@redhat.com> > wrote: >- clients only trusting a pool certificate authority (that only issues >short lived certs for [2]x.nts.ntppool.org or some

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-18 Thread Hal Murray
We are far enough down in the weeds that I have lost the big picture of this branch of the discussion. I think we want to encourage servers that already have their own certificate to join the pool. That means minimal changes to their current NTP/NTS setup. "None" is the desired amount, but

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Rob Janssen
I think it is mostly "a solution in search of a problem". When you really (need to) worry that someone in between you and the network at large is carefully modifying all time replies in such a way that your local clock would be considerably off time without you detecting it (e.g. because it

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Ask Bjørn Hansen
> On Mar 12, 2020, at 11:36, Miroslav Lichvar wrote: > > I think that's no different from how NTP clients currently work with the > pool. If a server is removed from the pool, the clients will use it until > it's marked as a falseticker or unreachable. It doesn't matter if it was > removed

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Dan Geist
For anyone interested in piggybacking one of the encrypted DNS efforts, there's a list of example use-cases being developed at: https://github.com/Encrypted-DNS-Deployment-Initiative/Use-Cases And the initiative's site and information about participation is at https://www.encrypted-dns.org/

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Miroslav Lichvar
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 09:24:55AM -0500, Ask Bjørn Hansen wrote: > On Mar 12, 2020, at 09:45, Miroslav Lichvar wrote: > > > > One of my suggestions was to specify a NTS-KE redirect where the > > server wouldn't provide cookies, but a TTL and a list of hostnames and > > addresses. It would

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Ask Bjørn Hansen
> On Mar 12, 2020, at 09:45, Miroslav Lichvar wrote: > One of my suggestions was to specify a NTS-KE redirect where the > server wouldn't provide cookies, but a TTL and a list of hostnames and > addresses. It would basically be DNS over NTS-KE. Easy to implement on > both servers and clients. If

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Ask Bjørn Hansen
On Mar 12, 2020, at 09:45, Miroslav Lichvar wrote: > > One of my suggestions was to specify a NTS-KE redirect where the > server wouldn't provide cookies, but a TTL and a list of hostnames and > addresses. It would basically be DNS over NTS-KE. Easy to implement on > both servers and clients. If

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 02:23:54AM -0700, Hal Murray wrote: > If all goes well, the NTS-KE step is very rare. The client gets 8 cookies. > Each NTP exchange uses a cookie and gets back a new cookie. If an occasional > packet is lost, the client can ask for extras. The NTP side just keeps >

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Miroslav Lichvar
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 02:23:54AM -0700, Hal Murray wrote: > You said "shorter lived certs" a couple of times. Are you thinking of short > enough to cover temporarily removing servers with bad time from the pool? If > so, that won't work. > > If all goes well, the NTS-KE step is very rare.

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Hal Murray
> SRV records with server names then used in the KE. I think that works. Unfortunately, there is no POSIX API for SRV. It needs DNSSEC or something equivalent. You said "shorter lived certs" a couple of times. Are you thinking of short enough to cover temporarily removing servers with bad

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Miroslav Lichvar
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 01:56:47AM -0700, Hal Murray wrote: > I think the way to use DNSSEC is to setup a local caching resolver that uses > DNSSEC and edit your local /etc/resolv to point to it rather than whatever > they are currently using. Yes, but how will the NTS client know the hostname

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Hal Murray
mlich...@redhat.com said: > DNSSEC disadvantages > - additional complexity for NTS clients > - not widely supported (i.e. NTS clients would need to have their own I think the way to use DNSSEC is to setup a local caching resolver that uses DNSSEC and edit your local /etc/resolv to point to

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Hal Murray
er...@rail.eu.org said: > If this needs non trivial work on the server side, then you can say goodbye > to many servers in the pool... There was no intention to require NTS. All the old stuff should continue to work as it currently does. If you are running ntpsec, it's pretty simple to add

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 08:44:33AM +0100, Miroslav Lichvar wrote: > There is a different problem that might need to be addressed first. > MITM attackers could circumvent NTS simply by joining the pool. How > could that be prevented or minimized? Not accept any new members and > trust the old ones

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Erwan David
Le 11/03/2020 à 22:30, Hal Murray a écrit : > > The RFC is close to getting published. > > Do you know about it? Any thoughts about how to get the pool to support it? > > In case you and/or others aren't familiar with it, here is a rough > description. Details here: >

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-12 Thread Miroslav Lichvar
On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 12:03:10AM +0100, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 02:30:11PM -0700, Hal Murray wrote: > > > > Any thoughts about how to get the pool to support it? > > I think that if we want to use NTS with the pool, that we need a > secure way of getting the list of

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-11 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 02:30:11PM -0700, Hal Murray wrote: > > Any thoughts about how to get the pool to support it? I think that if we want to use NTS with the pool, that we need a secure way of getting the list of servers. That probably means either DNSSEC or TLS. Both have their advantages

Re: [Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-11 Thread Ask Bjørn Hansen
(Again from an address that can email the list...) > On Mar 11, 2020, at 16:40, Ask Bjørn Hansen wrote: > >  > I haven’t carefully weighed the pros and cons, but variations on the > following is what I have considered. I don’t know that they’d work as the RFC > has been described. Past

[Pool] NTS, Network Time Security

2020-03-11 Thread Hal Murray
The RFC is close to getting published. Do you know about it? Any thoughts about how to get the pool to support it? In case you and/or others aren't familiar with it, here is a rough description. Details here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp/ The idea is