Michael Tandy wrote:
> 
> 6. People are already writing client software; maybe it's too late to
> update the spec for such a marginal improvement.
> 
> What do you think?

If we don't fix it now, a few years later we will not having changed it
now that it still is "not too late".

IMHO the spec should be updated to include that the client SHOULD
checksum the terms, keep a list of checksums the admin has agreed to,
and include them when agreeing.

The server MAY reject to provide certificates not including the
checksum. This way, we can delay rejecting those not-checksummed
requests for a few months if desired.


> 4. If SHA-512 becomes obsolete, manual intervention may be required
> to calculate a new checksum using an updated algorithm. In the event
> there were multiple CAs and SHA-512 approached obsolescence, some CAs
> might only accept SHA-512 while others didn't accept SHA-512. Clients
> might be complicated with an ability to send multiple checksums, or
> to negotiate the checksum algorithm.> 

Digests are already used at other places, and this is precisely not a
place sensitive to weak hashes. The client should be keeping a copy of
the files (either itself, mailing them to the sysadmin, etc.).

It's not a bad idea to specify the agreement-integrity as a dictionary
instead so in that future case, there's not problem of checksum
negotiation:
"agreement-integrity": {"sha512":
"3Ys8QL9di54ggXIGBAS2RHr_W6cMurZPizhZihkQjwl3VG2dpXZYmsYZ0B7LG-tWlVE9-
Hwp9hL3Mosvbr6lCA"}


> 2. Perhaps allowing CAs to update their user agreements without the
> user's knowledge is preferable to CAs breaking users' certificate
> renewal scripts without the user's knowledge. The latter could mean
> that a server that is running fine and securely one day will become
> inaccessible the next day, unable to renew its certificate without
> manual intervention to accept a new agreement. 

I hate sites that simply ask their users to "check their terms" as they
may change them unilaterally whenever they want. Often not even
bothering to provide version numbers / publication dates.

If it's really an agreement, the owner should be able to read and
ponderate it.


> Reliably sending e-mail is difficult due to spam filtering, so many
> servers aren't set up to push notification to administrators when
> problems like this arise.

IMHO the client should also notify them on each renewal (*including*
the new certificate hash), which should encourage them to have it
properly configured.






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