An additional 1/2 cent from me; we intend to use ACME primarily, if not solely, with non-DV certs.
On Fri, Sep 22, 2017, 2:51 PM Mary Barnes <mary.ietf.bar...@gmail.com> wrote: > Just to throw in my 1/2 cent. We are using ACME for non-DV certificates > in the ATIS/SIP Forum SHAKEN framework as detailed in ATIS-1000080: > https://www.sipforum.org/download/joint-atissip-forum-standard-signature-based-handling-asserted-information-using-tokens-shaken-governance-model-certificate-management-atis-1000080/?wpdmdl=3360 > > Regards, > Mary. > > On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 3:14 PM, Kathleen Moriarty < > kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> Thank you to the editors and WG for your efforts on >> draft-ietf-acme-acme, it's a well written and easy to understand >> draft. I do have a few comments, that need to be address by the >> editors and SHEPHERD. >> >> Please review the idnits. There are a few warnings that should be >> correctable and can be addressed, but more importantly, it calls out >> several downrefs that are not in the shepherd writeup. These need to >> be in the writeup and then also mentioned in the IETF last call >> announcement (I'll make sure the latter happens). >> >> Here's my mostly editorial comments: >> >> Introduction: >> It reads very well, but it would be helpful to those unfamiliar with >> the work to explicitly state that ACME is about DV certificates. The >> first sentence of the last paragraph seems like the best place to add >> this in. >> Current text: >> This document describes an extensible framework for automating the >> issuance and domain validation procedure, thereby allowing servers >> and infrastructural software to obtain certificates without user >> interaction. >> Proposed: >> This document describes an extensible framework for automating the >> issuance and domain validation procedure for DV certificates, >> thereby allowing servers >> and infrastructural software to obtain certificates without user >> interaction. >> >> I do like how the introduction is framed as it’s clear the level of >> security provided by the certificates issued via ACME. Thanks for >> that. >> >> The introduction should also make it clear that ACME can be used for >> other services using DV certificates, not just HTTP. This is >> mentioned in the Terminology section, but I think a clear sentence >> upfront would be helpful. >> >> Section 2: Nit/suggestion: Change the tense to read as a published RFC >> in the last paragraph, last sentence (take it or leave it). >> Current: >> Such close integration of ACME with HTTPS >> servers would allow the immediate and automated deployment of >> certificates as they are issued, sparing the human administrator from >> much of the time-consuming work described in the previous section. >> Proposed: >> Such close integration of ACME with HTTPS >> servers allows the immediate and automated deployment of >> certificates as they are issued, sparing the human administrator from >> much of the time-consuming work described in the previous section. >> >> IANA Section: >> Everything looks good except that RFC5226 has been obsoleted, so the >> new reference is RFC8126 and “specification required” >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8126#section-4.6 still means the same >> thing, so using that is fine. >> >> Security considerations: >> I think it would be good to mention here that they are DV certs so the >> reader understands from he introduction and this section the level of >> cert issued through ACME and doesn’t assume a higher level of >> assurance. >> >> s/ACME is a protocol for managing certificates/ACME is a protocol for >> managing DV certificates/ >> >> 10.1 - I know this is obvious to the people in the WG, but a reference >> to RFC7525 to properly configure TLS 1.2 should be included to protect >> against the mentioned attacks. If you want to also reference TLS 1.3 >> and specify no 0-RTT that would be good too. It’d be great to see >> this get widely deployed, so there may be a number of newcomers >> reading this to make their lives easier with cert >> issuance/maintenance. >> >> 10.2 - what if the server that the account verifier has an account on >> (client for ACME) is compromised and is used to request new >> certificates or perform other actions? I think this is one of the >> larger risks, so mentioning this is possible and hardening measures >> should be taken to prevent compromise would be prudent. Hardening >> measures or appropriate security controls should be broadly understood >> terms (I think) so that you wouldn’t need to list out things like >> turing off unnecessary services. >> >> 10.5 - I would think you’d see requests for new phishing domains >> rather than known ones through this process. What would you look for >> there as that’s a complex problem - it would be hard to know all legit >> names to know if one was a play off of the original. This happened >> with equifax - they provided a site name with a typo and a ‘white hat’ >> attacker had set up a site that looked just like theirs at that site. >> But it was announced by equifax. Tough problem as automating a check >> on the DNS registration may not detect something unusual, but maybe >> recommending this check could help? RDP lessens what needs to be >> shared from whois though, although I don’t think that’s widely >> deployed. >> >> -- >> >> Best regards, >> Kathleen >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Acme mailing list >> Acme@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme >> > > _______________________________________________ > Acme mailing list > Acme@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme >
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