On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote: > > > > IMPORTANT > > > S 6.2. > > > > algorithm in its "alg" field > > > > > > > > o The JWS Payload MUST NOT be detached > > > > o The JWS Protected Header MUST include the following fields: > > > > > > > > * "alg" (Algorithm) > > > > > > Do you want to specify a set of acceptable signature algorithms here? > > > > I am inclined not to. We have already forbidden "none" and MAC. We > > shouldn't specify "MUST"s here, because CABF sets their own list of > > required algorithms, and we don't want to conflict. I guess you > > could specify some MUST NOTs pretty safely, but given that they're > > already forbidden by CABF, it seems kind of duplicative. > > This is about the signatures that ACME accepts, not the signatures > in certs. Does CABF have a position on what signature algorithms > that ACME uses? >
The Baseline Requirements do not establish any policies here regarding proof of key possession (which is not required, strictly speaking) or domain name validation methods, or on the authentication channel between the Applicant and CA. For example, 3.2.2.4.6 of the BRs (at time of writing, https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.5.7-29-Apr-2018.pdf ) allow the use of MD2 or MD4 as part of their request token construction or within the use of CSRs.
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