We have already had some discussion on this. I do not want to reset the WGLC.
Please take a look at the PR, it addresses issue that were brought up during
IESG review.
If you have objections or concerns, please reply by the end of next week, 14
sep.
From: Richard Barnes <r...@ipv.sx>
Date: Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:02 AM
To: "acme@ietf.org" <acme@ietf.org>
Cc: "<acme-chairs@ietf. org>" <acme-cha...@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla
<e...@rtfm.com>, Adam Roach <a...@nostrum.com>
Subject: Re: [Acme] ACME breaking change: Most GETs become POSTs
Resent-From: <alias-boun...@ietf.org>
Resent-To: Rich Salz <rs...@akamai.com>, Yoav Nir <ynir.i...@gmail.com>
Resent-Date: Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:02 AM
After the weekend's discussions, I've updated the PR to reflect what I
understand to be emerging agreement on these topics:
ISSUE 1. Should we do POST-as-GET at all, vs. keeping GET and doing the privacy
analysis?
PROPOSED RESOLUTION: Yes.
ISSUE 2: How should we signal that POST-as-GET request is different from other
POST requests?
PROPOSED RESOLUTION: A JWS with a zero-octet payload ("")
ISSUE 3: Should servers be required to allow GET requests for certificate URLs?
PROPOSED RESOLUTION: No, but they MAY
ISSUE 4: How should we address the risk that an attacker can discover URLs by
probing for Unauthorized vs. Not Found?
PROPOSED RESOLUTION: Security considerations that recommend non-correlatable
URL plans
https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/445<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_ietf-2Dwg-2Dacme_acme_pull_445&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=0WrTFNH1Dw6ptcTgU6p4wrd1zn3ZVatHDOrx8DbEWUM&s=ARyNYl3lxrI8cMqtfkMceBinUqRQmbZiPk8NXJWj3O0&e=>
Adam: Is this looking like an approach that would satisfy your DISCUSS?
Chairs / EKR: How would you like to proceed on closing this out? What are the
next process steps?
On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 6:08 PM Richard Barnes <r...@ipv.sx> wrote:
Hey all,
This thread forked into a couple of different issues, so I wanted to post a
little end-of-day summary of the issues and where we stand. I've updated the
PR [1] to reflect most of today's discussion.
===
ISSUE 1. Should we do POST-as-GET at all, vs. keeping GET and doing the privacy
analysis?
It seems like there's pretty strong agreement that we should get rid of GET, as
the architecturally cleanest option.
===
ISSUE 2: How should we signal that POST-as-GET request is different from other
POST requests?
The current PR signals this by sending a JWS with an empty (zero-octet)
payload, instead of a JSON object. Jacob and Daniel suggested that we should
instead use the payload being an empty JSON object as the signal. An earlier
draft PR used a field in the protected header.
===
ISSUE 3: Should servers be required to allow GET requests for certificate URLs?
I had proposed this earlier today; Jacob and Daniel pushed back. I have
implemented a compromise in the latest PR, where servers MAY accept GET
requests.
===
ISSUE 4: How should we address the risk that an attacker can discover URLs by
probing for Unauthorized vs. Not Found?
There seemed to be agreement on the list that this should be addressed with
some guidance to servers on how to assign URLs. I have just added some text to
the PR for this.
===
It seems to me we're pretty much closed on the first issue, and the other three
are still open. Please send comments, so we can resolve this issue and get the
document back in motion!
Thanks,
--Richard
[1]
https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/445<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_ietf-2Dwg-2Dacme_acme_pull_445&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=0WrTFNH1Dw6ptcTgU6p4wrd1zn3ZVatHDOrx8DbEWUM&s=ARyNYl3lxrI8cMqtfkMceBinUqRQmbZiPk8NXJWj3O0&e=>
On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 7:20 PM Jacob Hoffman-Andrews
<j...@eff.org<mailto:j...@eff.org>> wrote:
ACME currently has unauthenticated GETs for some resources. This was
originally discussed in January 2015[1]. We decided to put all sensitive
data in the account resource and consider all GET resources public, with
a slant towards transparency.
Adam Roach recently pointed out in his Area Director review that even
when the contents of GET URLs aren’t sensitive, their correlation may
be. For instance, some CAs might consider the grouping of certificates
by account to be sensitive.
Richard Barnes proposes[2] to change all GETs to POSTs (except directory
and new-nonce). This will be a breaking change. Clients that were
compatible with previous drafts, informally called ACMEv1 and ACMEv2,
will not be compatible with a draft that mandates POSTs everywhere. It
will be a painful change, since the ecosystem just started switching to
ACMEv2, which looked to be near-final.
I think this is the right path forwards. ACME will be a simpler, better
protocol long-term if all requests are authenticated. However, if we’re
taking this path we should aim to come to consensus and land the final
spec quickly to reduce uncertainty for ACME client implementers.
[1]
https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/pull/48#issuecomment-70169712<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_letsencrypt_acme-2Dspec_pull_48-23issuecomment-2D70169712&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=0WrTFNH1Dw6ptcTgU6p4wrd1zn3ZVatHDOrx8DbEWUM&s=-4g1lhzE_4QDBMJ-WyE17zBBm61tdp2A-ImhSpqHet4&e=>
[2]
https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/445/files<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_ietf-2Dwg-2Dacme_acme_pull_445_files&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=0WrTFNH1Dw6ptcTgU6p4wrd1zn3ZVatHDOrx8DbEWUM&s=LoHY-1DpWoqgeBKRrhoq2l8n4_M01eB2qOjY9yUEaRA&e=>
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