Ryan, I'm not really following this conversation.
Probably my mental model of dns-01 challenges is lacking.
The word "window" does not appear in RFC8555 or acme-subdomains, so that's
your word, I think.

Ryan Sleevi <ryan-i...@sleevi.com> wrote:
    > Further, if we assume that say there are ten domain labels, but the server
    > is only willing to maintain state for five (as a window), then it’s not
    > clear how the client can request the server sends the first five rather
    > than the last five. Having the client advertise its capabilities let’s the
    > client choose the window, and if the server rejects all of them, the 
client
    > at least can try again with a different window (e.g. the last five
    > labels).

I don't really understand this at all.
I think that we are discussing so.me.comp.lex.example.

The client has control over lex.example, but and can prove it with dns-01 TXT
record placed at _acme-challenge.lex.example.  Why does it matter whether it
is so.me.comp.lex.example or ve.ry.so.me.comp.lex.example.
or an.other.comp.lex.example??

One thing that just occured to me is whether or not there is any value in the
dns-01 challenge remaining in the DNS after the authorization.
What I'm thinking is that the CA could offload some of it's state for the
client to store for it.

    > That’s why my slight preference was to have the client advertise.
    > Processing after validation seemed preferable to processing prior to
    > validation, and it also seemed useful to let the client advertise
    > capabilities directly to let the server reduce any stored state.

    > However, I
    > can equally imagine an asinine implementation of client-advertise that
    > requests a cert for “www.example.com” but let’s the client set the ADN as 
“
    > example.net” and, post-validation of example.net, fails to check that “
    > example.net” matches “example.com”. Or does something equally silly like
    > allowing “prefix.example” to authorize “not-actually-a-prefix.example”.

I can't see how any of these things are anything other than serious bugs.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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